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ABSTRACT
Although the literature produced on Marx’s philosophic contribution over the past
100 years is immense, most of it has focused on his analysis of the economic and political
structure of capitalism, the “materialist conception of history,” and his critique of value
production. There has been very little discussion or analysis, however, of his conception
of what constitutes an alternative to capitalism. One reason for this is that it has long been
assumed that Marx’s disdain for utopian socialists and his strictures against inventing
“blueprints about the future” meant that his work does not address the possible content of
a postcapitalist society that transcends value production. Yet while Marx never wrote a
single work addressing the alternative to capitalism, critically important comments and
suggestions are found throughout his writings about the transcendence of value
production and the contours of a postcapitalist future. This study subjects Marx’s
discussions of an alternative to capitalism to critical scrutiny by exploring all four
decades of his philosophic output—from his early writings of the 1840s, to his various
drafts of Capital and Capital itself, as well as his late writings on postcapitalism. This
study examines not only Marx’s major and well-known works, but also his notebooks,
drafts, letters and marginalia that are now being compiled as part of the MEGA2 project.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION: WHY EXPLORE MARX’S CONCEPT OF THE
TRANSCENDENCE OF VALUE PRODUCTION? WHY NOW?
The Object and Approach of this Study
Two decades after the collapse of statist Communism in the USSR and East
Europe, which many claimed had consigned Marx’s work to the dustbin of history, a new
climate has emerged in which his ideas are subject to renewed philosophical discussion
and re-examination. This change is due, in part, to the phenomenon of capitalist
globalization, which has sparked interest in Marx’s analysis of the inherently
expansionary and global nature of capital, which he defined as “self-expanding value.” It
is also due to the emergence of a global justice movement over the past two decades,
which has called attention to the economic inequality, social instability and
environmental destruction that have accompanied the global expansion of capitalism. The
new climate of discussion on Marx also owes much to the financial and economic crisis
that began in 2008, the most serious to afflict the world economy in the past 70 years.
As a result of these and related developments, a number of new works on Marx
have appeared, many of which explore heretofore neglected aspects of his thought—such
as his writings on the world market, economic crisis, race and gender, non-Western
societies, and the philosophical underpinning of his analysis of the logic of capital. These
studies have appeared while a new edition of Marx’s complete works is being issued, the
1

2

2

Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe (known as MEGA ), by an international team of scholars
coordinated by the Internationale Marx-Engels-Stiftung in Amsterdam. MEGA2 will for
the first time make Marx’s entire body of work available for scholarly analysis, in 114
volumes.1 It provides us with a new vantage point for exploring Marx’s work
unencumbered by the partisan affiliations and polemical battles that have governed
generations of earlier discussions of Marx’s philosophical contribution.
Although the literature produced on Marx over the past 100 years is immense,
most of it has focused on his analysis of the economic and political structure of
capitalism, the “materialist conception of history,” and his critique of value production.
There has been very little discussion or analysis, however, of his conception of what
constitutes an alternative to capitalism. The lack of discussion of this issue has persisted
in the face of the growth of the global justice movement, which has sponsored a series of
forums, gatherings and conferences since the 1990s devoted to the theme “Another
World is Possible.” This diverse movement indicates that despite the notion, which
became widely voiced after 1989, that “there is no alternative”2 to capitalism,
considerable numbers of people around the world are searching for such an alternative.
The first Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe was issued in 12 volumes from 1927-35.
It is known as MEGA1. The new Gesamtausgabe, or MEGA2, began appearing in East
Germany in 1972 and has been issued since 1990 by the Internationale Marx-EngelsStiftung in conjunction with the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam. It
will eventually include everything Marx ever wrote, including his voluminous excerpt
notebooks, most of which were unknown until recently. It is the only edition of Marx’s
writings that meets the rigorous standards of modern textual editing.
1

Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher first coined this phrase in the
early 1980s. For a discussion of its ideological impact, see István Mészáros, Beyond
Capital (New York: Monthly Review Books, 1995).
2
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However, there appears to be little or no consensus within the global justice movement
as to what such an alternative might consist of. It is even hard to find consensus as to
what theoretic resources need to be explored in thinking one out. As a result, the
discussion of alternatives to capitalism at events sponsored by the global justice
movement tends to remain rather abstract and limited to statements of intention.
In some respects today’s situation has not changed much since 1918, when Otto
Neurath of the Vienna Circle became planning minister of the short-lived Bavarian
Socialist Republic. He wrote shortly after the collapse of this early effort to develop a
postcapitalist social system:
At the beginning of the [1918] revolution people were as unprepared for the task
of a socialist economy in Germany as they had been for a war economy when war
broke out in 1914. . . . Any preparation for consciously shaping the economy was
lacking. The technique of a socialist economy had been badly neglected. Instead,
only pure criticism of the capitalist economy was offered and the Marxist pure
theory of value and history was studied.3
It would be no exaggeration to say that 100 years later, the situation described by Neurath
continues to largely define contemporary discussions of the issues raised by Marx’s
work.
There are several reasons for the lack of theoretical reflection and discussion of
Marx’s view of the alternative to capitalism. Perhaps of foremost importance is the claim
that he simply never addressed the issue. It has long been assumed that Marx’s disdain

3

See Otto Neurath, “Experiences of Socialization in Bavaria” [1920], in
Empiricism and Sociology, ed. Marie Neurath and Robert S. Cohen (Dordrecht-Holland:
D. Reidel, 1973), 18. Kurt Eisner, the leader of the Bavarian Socialist Republic, asked
Neurath to become planning minister at the end of 1918; he continued to serve as such
under the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic, which was installed in early 1919
following Eisner’s assassination.
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for utopian socialists and his strictures against inventing “blueprints about the future”
meant that he was not interested in commenting about a postcapitalist society. Marx did
not indulge in speculations about the future, many assume, because he believed that
socialism would emerge quasi-automatically from the inherent contradictions of
capitalism. Another reason for the paucity of discussion of Marx’s view of the alternative
to capitalism is that many defenders and critics of Marx took it for granted that socialism
is defined by the abolition of the market and private property and the formation of
centralized, state-planned economies. Why take the trouble to sort out what Marx might
have had to say about an alternative to capitalism when the “socialism” he strove for was
presumably already in existence? This attitude persisted long after it became clear that
the societies that called themselves “socialist” or “communist” were dismal failures.
Given the widespread discrediting of “actually existing socialism” practiced by regimes
that claimed to rule in the name of Marx, it seemed pointless to pour old wine into new
bottles by inquiring anew into what Marx had to say about alternatives to capitalism.
In the twenty-first century we face a radically changed situation. Now that the
state powers that ruled in Marx’s name have largely passed from the scene, at the same
time that the entire corpus of his work is finally becoming available for study, it becomes
possible to take a closer look at his oeuvre to see if the assumptions that have
traditionally governed the understanding of Marx’s view of the alternative to capitalism
are in fact accurate.
Four questions guide this study. First, although Marx never wrote a work
addressing the alternative to capitalism, and he was extremely wary about indulging in
speculation about the future (especially in his published works), numerous comments and

5
suggestions are found throughout his writings about the transcendence of value
production and the contours of a postcapitalist future. How significant are they? One of
the purposes of this study is to subject these comments to systematic and critical
examination. Second, even if it were true that Marx never wrote a word about a
postcapitalist future, it does not follow that his work fails to speak to the matter in
important ways. Is it plausible that Marx’s analysis of capital was a purely empirical and
scientific endeavor that was not in some way informed by presuppositions concerning the
kind of society he hoped would one day come into being? One of the claims that this
study will aim to substantiate is that the very content of Marx’s analysis of capital, value
production, and wage labor rests upon an implicit understanding on his part of what
human existence would consist of in their absence. As a recent analysis of Marx’s
philosophic legacy puts it,
In fact, it is perhaps better not to call Marx’s method a method at all: it is much
more an approach to the material, a pre-established interpretative perspective. It
is an approach that “always already” contains within itself a certain conviction
about capitalism, namely, that capitalism is doomed to destroy itself.4
Third, although much of Marx’s work consists of an analysis and criticism of capital, is
the critique purely negative or does it also posit implicit (and sometimes explicit) notions
of a positive alternative to it? This study will seek to discern and analyze the indications
of the future that flow from his critique of the present. Fourth, relatively few scholars
today would contend that Marx’s philosophic perspective had much to do with the
totalitarian, single-party states that ruled in his name. His emphatic support for
Allan Megill, The Burden of Reason (Why Marx Rejected Politics and the
Market) (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 240.
4
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democracy, free association, and critique of statist domination, which is found from his
earliest to last writings, offers strong support for this claim. What is far less clear,
however, is what Marx envisioned as the specific form of society that could live up to his
liberatory ideals. Does he ever address this directly?
Despite the voluminous literature on Marx, a full-scale and substantial work has
yet to appear that examines his body of thought in terms of what it suggests about a
future, postcapitalist society. It does not seem possible to fully evaluate the contributions
or limitations of Marx’s legacy in the absence of such an investigation. This study seeks
to fill this gap by exploring Marx’s concept of the transcendence of value production
through an examination of his body of work, as found in his major published and
unpublished writings.
This study does not pretend to be a comprehensive study of Marx. Nor does it try
to put forward a model of a postcapitalist society. Although I consider efforts to produce
the latter to be of great importance, I have a more modest aim: to survey Marx’s work
with one aim: to see what implicit or explicit indications it contains about a future, nonalienating society. I will not only utilize Marx’s major and well-known works, but also
his notebooks, drafts, letters and marginalia that are now being compiled as part of the
MEGA2 project.
This study focuses on Marx’s concept of the transcendence of value production
because he held that capitalism is defined by the production of value and surplus value.
Value is not the same as material wealth; it is wealth computed in monetary terms. Marx
acknowledges that value “exists initially in the head, in the imagination, just as in general
ratios can only be thought if they are to be fixed, as distinct from the subjects which are

7
5

in that ratio to each other.” However, this does not mean that Marx considered value to
be a purely mental category, let alone a dialectical illusion. Value, he held, expresses a
real social relationship, since “As value, the commodity is at the same time an equivalent
for all other commodities in a particular ratio.”6 Value is the name given for a real,
material relationship, in so far as “value is a commodity’s quantitatively determined
exchangeability.”7
The peculiar feature of capitalism, Marx held, is that all social relations become
governed by the drive to augment value, irrespective of humanity’s actual needs and
capacities. He therefore treats value production not as a transhistorical feature of human
existence but rather as a specific characteristic of capitalist society. Marx was of course
fully aware that commodity exchange predates the existence of capitalism. He does not,
however, simply equate value production with the exchange of equivalents on the market.
In pre-capitalist societies, he argues, goods and services were primarily exchanged on the
basis of their material utility, not on the basis of their (abstract) exchange value. Only
with capitalism—that is, only when commodity exchange becomes the primary and
indeed universal medium of social interaction through the commodification of labor
power—does value becomes the defining principle of social reproduction. Marx also
5

Karl Marx, Outlines of the Critique of Political Economy (Rough Draft of 185758), in Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 28 (New York: International Publishers,
1986), 81. This is how the editors of MECW have chosen to name the Grundrisse. For the
sake of convenience, we will refer to it by its better-known name, the Grundrisse, in the
rest of this study.
6

Ibid., 78-79.

7

Ibid., 78.
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denied that value production would characterize a postcapitalist society. He wrote in
response to one of the few critiques of his theoretical corpus that appeared in his lifetime,
Value. According to Mr. Wagner, Marx’s theory of value is the “cornerstone of
his socialist system.” As I have never established a “socialist system,” this is a
fantasy of Wagner, Schäffle e tutti quanti.8
He added, “In my investigation of value I have dealt with bourgeois relations, not with
the application of this theory of value to a ‘social state not even constructed by me but by
Mr. Schäffle for me.”9 According to Marx, social relations were not governed by the
drive to augment value prior to capitalism and they will not governed by it after
capitalism.
Popularizations of Marx often reduce his theory of value to the notion that labor is
the source of all value. However, Marx never claimed originality for this idea; he adopted
it from classical political economists like Adam Smith. Marx’s main object of concern is
not with the source of value. His primary concern is with the way social relations in
modern society take on the form of value. His main object of critique is the inverted
character of social relations in capitalism, wherein human relations take on the form of
relations between things. There is little doubt that Marx’s critique of capitalism centers
upon a critique of value production. What is far less clear, however, is exactly what is
needed, in Marx’s view, to surmount value production. The aim of this study is to

8

Karl Marx, “Notes on Wagner’s Lehrbuch der politischen Ökonomie,” in MarxEngels Collected Works, vol. 24 (New York: International Publishers, 1989), 533.
9

Ibid., 536-7.
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discover the elements, however implicit, that he thought are needed to overcome value
production.
Our approach in this study is to investigate Marx’s theoretical corpus on its own
terms and not to conflate it with that of his close colleague and follower, Friedrich
Engels. Although Marx and Engels’ name are often hyphenated and some have even
treated their works as interchangeable, they actually co-authored very few works.10 Marx
often expressed surprise that he and Engels were viewed as identical twins. As he wrote
to Engels in 1856, “What is so very strange is to see how he treats the two of us as a
singular: ‘Marx and Engels says’ etc.”11 Since this study is not the place to enter into a
comparative examination of whether or not Engels’ views coincided with those of Marx,
we will bracket out Engels’ contribution by focusing primarily on the philosophic works
composed by Marx himself.12

10

Marx primarily wrote even those works that listed himself and Engels as coauthors. Though Engels’ name precedes Marx’s in the title page of The Holy Family,
Engels wrote about 20 pages of the book while Marx penned over 200. And although
Marx and Engels are listed as co-authors of The Communist Manifesto, it was largely
written by Marx. Capital, Marx’s most important work, was written without Engels’
collaboration at all; Engels edited the manuscripts of vols. 2 and 3 for publication after
Marx’s death but was not involved in their original composition. Engels did not even see
the manuscript for vol. 1 until Marx sent him the galley proofs, shortly before the book’s
publication in 1867.
11

See Marx to Engels, Letter of August 1, 1856, in Marx-Engels Collected Works,
vol. 40 (New York: International Publishers, 1983), 64.
12

An exception to this will be the discussion of The German Ideology, which was
presumably co-written by Marx and Engels. A number of Marx scholars, including the
editors of MEGA2, have been engaged in a longstanding debate concerning how much of
the work was actually written by Engels and which specific parts were composed by
Marx. Although we cannot explore the matter in this study, it appears that Marx wrote the
bulk of the book, with the exception of Part I.
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It is one thing to unearth Marx’s view of what is needed to transcend
capitalism, and quite another to determine its validity. The latter cannot be established,
however, without first disclosing the former. The aim of this study is to facilitate a
critical re-examination of Marx’s work by focusing on an area of his thought that has
heretofore received far too little attention.
A Review of Recent Literature on Marx’s Philosophic Contribution
To ground the approach that will be taken in this study, I will first take up a
number of reexaminations of Marx’s work issued over the past two decades, to see what
illumination they provide on the subject matter of our investigation.
Two major strains of thought over the past two decades have sought to come to
grips with the contemporary relevance of Marx’s critique of capitalism. One strain
contends that Marx’s most important contribution lies in his understanding of capital as
an autonomous force that takes on a life of its own, totally subsuming the will and actions
of the human subject. In this perspective, Marx analyzes capital as a peculiar object of
knowledge invested with characteristics that parallel Hegel’s delineation of the logic of
the concept in the Science of Logic. These thinkers hold that capital, like Hegel’s doctrine
of the concept, possesses the distinct ontological property of complete indifference to
anything that lies outside its logic of self-movement. They therefore view capital not only
as the subject of Marx’s theoretical work but also as the Subject of modern society. I call
these theorists objectivist Marxists, because they contend that Marx’s critique of capital is
best understood as an analysis of objective forms that assume complete selfdetermination and automaticity. The objectivist Marxists include several distinct
groupings: (1) The Japanese theorist Kozo Uno and his followers, which include Thomas
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Sekine, Robert Albritton, and John Bell; (2) The German philosopher Hans-Georg
Backhaus and U.S. social theorist Moishe Postone, both heavily indebted to the work of
the Frankfurt School; and (3) the proponents of “Systematic Dialectics” in the U.S. and
Western Europe, such as C.J. Arthur, Patrick Murray, Geert Reuten and Tony Smith.13 At
the other end of the philosophical spectrum, a radically different strain of thinkers
contends that Marx’s most important contribution lies in his understanding of the
subjective human forces that struggle against and strive to annul capital’s drive for
hegemony.14 They emphasize not the self-determining and automatic character of capital
but the limits and barriers that it repeatedly encounters. I call these theorists subjectivist
Marxists because they emphasize the subjective human forces that seek to subvert and
contain the logic of capital. The subjectivist Marxists primarily include “autonomist
Marxists” such as Mario Tronti, John Holloway, Antonio Negri, and Michael Hardt.15

13

Although Tony Smith is part of the “systematic dialectics” school that has
emerged in the last decade, he has a radically different interpretation of the Hegel-Marx
relation than the other theorists of this tendency. This will be discussed below.
14

This divide between subjectivist and objectivist readings of Marx has earlier
antecedents—such as in the debates in the early twentieth century between Georg Lukács
and Rosa Luxemburg, who tended to emphasize subjectivity and mass self-activity,
versus Karl Kautsky, Georgy Plekhanov and other “orthodox” Marxists who emphasized
the importance of objective material conditions. In some respects this debate was
replayed in Jean-Paul Sartre’s exchange with Althusser and Levi-Strauss in the midtwentieth century. Debates within Marxist theory, as is the case with philosophy as a
whole, often take the form of matters of philosophia perennis.
Hardt and Negri are currently the most widely read Marxist philosophers of any
discussed in this review. Their book Empire (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2000) was an international bestseller.
15
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While these schools of thought have made a number of important contributions
to the understanding of Marx’s work over the past few decades, I will critically examine
them in light of what illumination they shed on the task of unearthing Marx’s concept of
the transcendence of capitalist value production.
The version of objectivist Marxism of Kozo Uno and his followers holds that
Marx analyzed capitalism as a self-contained logical system. The logic of capital, they
contend, is not the same as historically existing capitalism since (as Thomas L. Sekine
puts it) “the subsumption of real economic life by the commodity-economy is never
perfect or absolute.”16 There is no direct homology between capitalism as it historically
exists and the logic of capital. The latter is the real object of Marx’s critique, since Marx
aims to show that generalized commodity production is defined by a “dehumanizing
logic, which, once it catches on, pervades the world until much of direct human contact
or community is obliterated.”17 Commodity-economic logics “seem to have a certain
automaticity”18 and expansiveness that can only be properly understood by discerning its
abstract universal “laws.”

16

Thomas T. Sekine, An Outline of the Dialectic of Capital, vol. 2 (London:
MacMillan, 1997), 212.
17

Thomas T. Sekine, “Socialism as a Living Idea,” in Socialist Dilemmas, East
and West (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1990), 131.
18

Robert Albritton, Dialectics and Deconstruction in Political Economy (London:
MacMillan, 1999), 13.

13
Sekine therefore argues that capital is best understood from the vantage point of
the logic of capital rather than from the proletariat, non-commodified social relations, or
precapitalist modes of production. When capital is viewed,
from without, as, for instance, from the point of view of the revolutionary
proletariat, one ends up assuming the position of the blind man touching an
arbitrary part of the elephant. In the dialectic of capital the teller of the story (the
subject) is capital itself, and not “we” the human beings.19
What is achieved by focusing on the pure, abstract logic of capital? We learn that
capitalism becomes the more “perfect” the more value production overcomes restrictions
imposed by use-values. The more efficient capital is in achieving this, the higher the rate
of profit. The drive for profit is the absolute idea of capital, it the quest for an infinite
surpassing of all limits: “As soon as the rate of profit becomes the ‘subjective notion’ (in
the Hegelian sense) of capital, every individual firm strives for a maximum rate of profit,
by the mercantile practice of buying cheap and selling dear.”20
The Unoists argue that before we can begin to envision a future free of capitalism
we must “first come to grips with the inner law of motion (or logic) of capitalism.” If the
idea of capital remains unclear, the understanding of its transcendence will be “haphazard
and arbitrary.” Hence, we should follow Marx who “forgets about blueprints for the
future and concentrates on economics.”21

Sekine, “Socialism as a Living Idea,” 129-30.

19

Sekine, An Outline of the Dialectic of Capital, 2:7.

20

Sekine, “Socialism as a Living Idea,” 128-9.

21
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There is much to be said of the view that Marx does not analyze a historically
existing capitalism but rather a chemically pure capitalism that does not exist and never
will exist. He utilized this approach in order to discern capital’s “law of motion” instead
of getting bogged down in secondary or nonessential features. However, questions can be
raised about whether Uno and his followers succeed in correctly identifying the essential
features of capital.
Sekine argues, “Capitalism is based on self-regulating markets and anarchic
production of commodities.”22 Robert Albritton likewise contends, “Economic reification
implies a market-governed society: a society in which the actions of human agents are
directed and subsumed by market forces beyond their control.”23 There is no doubt that
self-regulating markets and anarchic production were important factors in capitalism’s
historical development. But is this the same as claiming that the existence of an anarchic
market serves as a defining feature of the logic of capital? Moreover, is it the market that
generates “economic reification” or is it produced instead by the alienation of labor?
One of the aims of this study is to investigate whether Marx considered the
existence of the market and private property to be defining factors of the logic of capital.
Albritton and other followers of Uno clearly insist that they are intrinsic to the logic of
capital: “Pure capitalism involves the subsumption of the labor and production process to
a system of interlocking markets that are self-regulating in the sense that no extra-

Ibid., 135.

22

23

Robert Albritton, Dialectics and Deconstruction in Political Economy (London:
MacMillan, 1999), 17.
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economic force (state, monopoly, trade unions and so on) can interfere with the
markets.”24 Albritton writes, “Pure capitalism is based on the absolute right of private
property.”25
Since the Unoists contend that unregulated markets, anarchic competition and
private property serve as the inner core of the logic of capital, they conclude that
contemporary society is no longer capitalist—since unregulated markets and anarchic
competition are a thing of the past. As Sekine puts it, the contemporary world “cannot
constitute a world-historic stage of development of capitalism, since it fails to embody
the logic of capital.”26 One is left wondering what theoretical significance Marx’s work
still has if this is in fact the case.
Most importantly, the great stress that the Unoists place on unregulated markets,
anarchic competition, and private property leads them to deny that alienated labor
constitutes the defining feature of capitalism. Sekine writes, “Marx wrote a great book on
capital (or commodities) not a book on labor (or production).”27 For the Unoists, forms of
labor and the struggles against it are not intrinsic to the logic of capital: “What we are
trying to determine is the material reproduction of social life entirely through a

Ibid., 18.

24

Ibid., 20.

25

Sekine, An Outline of the Dialectic of Capital, 2:216.

26

27

Sekine, “Socialism as a Living Idea,” 130.
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commodity-economic logic without any human resistance or intervention of any form
of extra-economic force.”28
This view is not easily reconciled with the connection Marx makes between the
alienation of labor, value production and capital. Marx held that capital is not simply an
instrument of production; it is the expression of a specific kind of labor—abstract or
undifferentiated labor. As he wrote it the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844, capital is the expression of “a special sort of work which is indifferent to its
content, of complete being-for-self, of abstraction from all other being.”29 In capitalism
“all the natural, spiritual and social variety of labor” is extinguished. This makes
humanity “ever more exclusively dependent on labor, and on a particular, very one-sided
machine-like labor at that.” As a result the individual becomes “depressed spiritually”;
from “being a man [he] becomes an abstract activity.”30 In volume one of Capital he
further developed this with his concept of the “dual character of labor.” All labor, he
held, is simultaneously the concrete exertion of living labor and the reduction of that
activity to abstract, alienated labor. Abstract labor is the substance of value and capital is
self-expanding value. Marx considered this concept of the dual character of labor so

Albritton, Dialectics and Deconstruction in Political Economy, 38.

28

Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in Marx-Engels
Collected Works, vol. 3 (New York: International Publishers, 1975), 286.
29

Ibid., 236-8.

30
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important that he referred to it as his original contribution and “the pivot on which a
clear comprehension of political economy turns.”31
This poses problems for the Unoists, who see the logic of capital as freeing itself
from such contingent factors as forms of labor. They are especially uncomfortable with
the discussion of the dual character of labor in chapter one of Capital, which they leave
out of their reconstructions of the dialectic of capital.32
This is not to suggest that Uno and his followers set aside labor altogether. They
seek to take account of it by utilizing levels theory. The logic of capital corresponds to
one level of analysis. The other level is actual history, which only approximates the logic
of capital. Contingent factors like conditions of labor, production relations, and resistance
to capital occur on the level of historical analysis. Through this approach Albritton seeks
to account for subjective resistance even though his understanding of the logic of capital
completely abstracts from it: “Thus, although capital’s logic is always a totalizing force
in modern history, to the extent that it runs up against resistances, it can never
consummate a totality that is unified around an essence at the level of history.”33
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There are benefits to such a levels approach, since a major problem faced by
many philosophers is the temptation to conflate the logical analysis of a phenomenon
with its actual development. Kierkegaard spoke to this in writing,
A person can be a great logician and become immortal through his services and
yet prostitute himself by assuming that the logical is the existential and that the
principle of contradiction is abrogated in existence because it is indisputably
abrogated in logic; whereas existence is the very separation that prevents the
logical flow.34
As Albritton and other followers of Uno emphasize, the actual historical
development of capitalism often upsets the “logical flow” of capital’s drive to selfexpand irrespective of human resistance or natural limitations. Marx seems to have been
conscious of this as well, as seen from his comment in Capital:
Capitalist production . . . ruthlessly enforces its will despite obstacles which are in
any case largely of its own making. At all events, in order to portray the laws of
political economy in their purity we are ignoring these sources of friction, as is
the practice in mechanics when the frictions that arise have to be dealt with in
every particular application of its general laws.35
Nevertheless, the way in which Albritton views the relation between the logical
and historical raises many questions. Although Marx analyzed capital as a product of
specific conditions of production in which concrete labor becomes dominated by abstract
labor, Albritton defends Uno’s view that “value must be thoroughly established and
understood as a circulation form before its substantive grounding in the production
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process can be understood.” In doing so he takes issue with Marx for what he calls
the “weak and at times ambiguous presentation of the labor theory of value in the early
pages of Capital.”37 He argues that Marx was “not fully cognizant of the above points and
hence does not theorize capital‘s inner logic as a rigorous dialectical logic.”38
The view that forms of circulation and the market define the logic of capital leads
Uno and some of his followers to conclude that the key to transcending capitalism is to
abolish markets and establish state control of production.39 Albritton writes,
The USSR represented a huge effort to realize socialism and its failure to do so is
tragic. It was relatively successful in some areas and less so in others. . . . I
disagree with [the] view that a planned economy can be capitalist.40
The Unoists are not wrong to contend that grasping the logic of capital
predetermines the understanding of its alternative. The problem is that their view of the
logic of capital comes to grief in light of this very insight. Their claim that alienated labor
is extrinsic to the logic of capital, whereas market anarchy and private property is
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intrinsic to it, leads them to conclude that the abolition of the latter is the central
precondition for a postcapitalist society. This leads them to hold onto a rather traditional
view of “socialism,” one that is not likely to spark the imagination of a humanity that has
absorbed the disastrous experiences of centrally planned economies in East Europe and
the USSR.41
Another version of objectivist Marxism is found in the work of a number of
thinkers associated with the latter-day Frankfurt School, such as Hans-Georg Backhaus.
They seek to critically build on the insights of such pioneering figures of the Frankfurt
School such as Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Habermas while placing greater
emphasis than they on political economy and the exegesis of Marx’s Capital. In his
influential and comprehensive work Dialektik der Wertform. Untersuchungen zur
Marxschen Ökonomiekritik (1997), Backhaus argues that Marx’s object of critique is not
an empirically existing capitalism but rather the abstract logic of capital.42 Like Uno and
his followers, he emphasizes that for Marx the universal forms of capital are the object of
investigation, not its actual unfolding in history. Backhaus considers this of cardinal
importance, since failure to grasp this leads to making the personifications of capital
(businessman, speculators, etc.) the object of critique instead of capital’s deep structure.
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For Backhaus the determining force of modern society is not the capitalists but capital,
which takes on a life of its own in a manner analogous to Hegel’s concept of the absolute
subject. He writes, “The fusion of the subject-object inversion with the problem of the
concept of capital is the fundamental theme of Marx’s oeuvre.”43
Marx’s basic thought, hitherto ignored by all economists, is that human beings
confront their own generic forces, that is their “collective forces” or “social
forces” as an autonomous, alien being. This thought culminates in the conception
of the autonomous totality of social capital as a real total subject, which abstracts
itself from the weal and woe of individual subjects and is “indifferent” to them.44
Backhaus attempts to show that “Marx describes capital as subject or as selfrelation.”45 In an argument that parallels the position of Uno and his followers, he
contends that Hegel’s Absolute Idea is “adequate” to the Marxian concept of capital.
Capital, he argues, is not Marx’s least Hegelian work but his most Hegelian work—even
more “Hegelian” than the 1844 Manuscripts.
Despite his affinity with some positions of the Unoists, there are major
differences between Backhaus and their approach. The most significant is that Backhaus
contends that the core of the logic of capital is not the market and private property but the
social form of labor. He argues that capital can take the form of a self-determining
subject that disregards contingency only because the labor that produces it is reduced to
an abstraction. Whereas the Unoists downplay the category of the dual character of labor
43
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in explicating capital’s drive for self-expansion, Backhaus posits the concept of
abstract labor as central to it.46
These themes are further elaborated in Moishe Postone’s Time, Labor and Social
Domination: A Reinterpretation of Marx’s Critical Theory (1995).47 Postone’s work
centers on a critique of what he calls the central flaw of “traditional Marxism”: its
transhistorical view of labor. By this he means the view of labor as an instrumental and
socially mediating activity that expresses the natural, species-essence of humanity.
Although this view has been widely attributed to Marx by both his critics and followers,
Marx himself held, Postone shows, that labor in this sense exists only in capitalism. Only
in capitalism does labor become the all-determining social relation, because only in
capitalism does labor take on a dual character. Its dual character lies in the opposition
between concrete labor and abstract labor. Concrete labor is the array of differentiated
forms of exertion that create useful products; abstract labor is undifferentiated human
labor, “labor in general.” The reduction of concrete to abstract labor through the medium
of socially necessary labor time posits an undifferentiated, abstract, “universal” kind of
activity that comes to dominate all social interaction. To Marx this kind of labor is the
basis of value production, which is specific to capitalism.
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The problem with traditional Marxism, Postone suggests, is that it naturalizes
the form of labor specific to capitalism by viewing it in metaphysical terms. Traditional
Marxism becomes so enamored of the expansive power of labor in transforming
conditions of natural existence that it adopts an affirmative attitude toward the very
object of Marx’s critique—the reduction of human contingency to the exigencies of
abstract labor. It assumes that the source of capitalism’s contradictions lies not in its
alienating mode of labor but rather in unequal forms of distribution. The market and
private property are seen as the main problem. Instead of grasping value as the expression
of the specific kind of labor in capitalism, it becomes understood as a “blind” mechanism
regulating the exchange of commodities. For traditional Marxism, the abolition of this
blind mechanism through state planning and nationalized property is “socialism.” The
“new society” is defined as having the nature of labor under capitalism—its role as a
rational regulator of social relations—come into its own, unimpeded by “market
anarchy.” According to “the interpretation of value as a category of the market,” avers
Postone, “the same forms of wealth of labor that are distributed mediately in capitalism
would be coordinated in socialism.”48 Traditional Marxism assumes that “in socialism the
ontological principle of society appears openly, whereas in capitalism it is hidden.”49
Postone’s critique of traditional Marxism illuminates important dimensions of the
contemporary period. Many presume that the crisis of the welfare state in the West and
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the collapse of “actually existing socialism” in the East provide ample proof that
capitalism has irretrievably triumphed over “socialism” and that “Marxism” is dead. Yet
such a viewpoint is valid only if the aporias of traditional Marxism are accepted. Marx
held that the production of wealth is not the same as the production of value. The latter is
historically specific and emerges only when labor assumes a dual character. This, not the
existence of private property or the market, constitutes the core of the logic of capital.
Whether surplus value is appropriated by the state or the market is of secondary
importance. Capitalism exists wherever the defining principle of social organization is the
reduction of human labor to ever-more abstract forms of value-creating labor. In this
sense, what passed for “socialism” turns out to be the very object of Marx’s critique of
capitalism. Postone concludes,
Far from demonstrating the victory of capitalism over socialism, the recent
collapse of “actually existing socialism” could be understood as signifying the
collapse of the most rigid, vulnerable and oppressive form of state-interventionist
capitalism.50
Postone also contends that traditional Marxism errs in proclaiming the working
class as the subject of social transformation. Postone argues, as do other objectivists, that
the subject of modern society is not the human being but capital. Capital takes on a life of
its own because the subjectivity of workers is subsumed by abstract labor. Neither the
workers nor any other social force can therefore be considered subjects of liberation.
Since self-initiative and creative unfolding characterizes capital and not labor, we must
look not to proletarian class struggle but to capital to point the way towards the
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transcendence of capitalism. Indeed, Postone goes as far as to contend that dead labor
is the emancipatory alternative.
Postone grounds this argument in the claim that the individuality of the laborer
cannot be distinguished from the value-form of labor power. Since workers cannot be
separated from the value-form of their laboring activity (at least in so far as they function
as workers) critiquing capitalism from the standpoint of the laborer leads to adopting an
affirmative attitude toward the value-form of labor power. Such a standpoint makes
unequal forms of distribution instead of the nature of labor under capitalism the object of
critique. Traditional Marxism goes no further than stressing the difference between the
value of labor-power and the value of the total product created by wage labor. While such
a standpoint may appear “radical,” it really goes no further than the position of such
classical political economists as David Ricardo. Postone argues, “The identification of
the proletariat (or the species) with the historical Subject rests ultimately on the same
historically undifferentiated notion of ‘labor’ as does Ricardian Marxism.”51
But if the working class or any other human agent is not the principle of
emancipation, how can capitalism be overcome? It is overcome, Postone submits, by
capital itself. He addresses this by focusing on “the central contradiction of capitalism”—
the drive to increase material wealth versus the drive to augment value. Capitalism is
driven not only to produce material goods and services but also to augment value. Labor
is the source of value and the magnitude of value is determined by the amount of socially
necessary labor time it takes to produce a commodity. There is a continual contradiction
Ibid., 80.
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between drive to produce material wealth and to augment value. As productivity rises,
more goods are produced in the same unit of time and so the value of each commodity
falls. The increase in material wealth corresponds with a decline in the magnitude of
value. Costs of production fall and prices tend to fall as a result. This presents the
capitalist with a knotty problem: the relative fall in the value of each commodity risks
leaving him short of the funds needed to maintain his level of productive output. He
responds by trying to further boost productivity, since the greater the quantity of goods
produced, the better the opportunity to realize the value of his initial investment. The best
way to increase productivity is to invest in labor saving devices. The resulting growth in
productivity, however, reproduces the problem, since the increase in material wealth
leads to a further decrease in the relative value of each commodity. Capitalism is thus
based on a kind of treadmill effect in which it is constantly driven toward technological
innovation regardless of its human or environmental cost. The result is as follows:
A growing disparity arises between developments in the productive powers of
labor (which are not necessarily bound to the direct labor of the workers), on the
one hand, and the value frame within which such developments are expressed
(which is bound to such labor), on the other. The disparity between the
accumulation of historical time and the objectification of immediate labor time
becomes more pronounced as scientific knowledge is increasingly materialized in
production . . . a growing disparity separates the conditions for the production of
material wealth from those for the generation of value.52
The resulting “shearing pressure” renders the system unstable. But how exactly
does this lead to an emancipatory future? Postone does not say. On the one hand, he is
trying to counter the pessimism of earlier theorists of the Frankfurt School like Adorno
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and Marcuse by insisting that capital is a two-dimensional entity that does not
foreclose the possibility of liberation. Yet on the other hand he leaves us with little sense
of how to close the gap between is and ought— especially since, as he emphasizes, there
is no reason to presume that capitalism will “automatically collapse.” He writes,
“overcoming the historical Subject”—i.e., capital—“would allow people, for the first
time, to become the subjects of their own liberation.”53 However, by refusing to identify
human agents in the present who can help realize such a future, it becomes hard to see
how capital can actually be “overcome.” Posing dead labor as the emancipatory
alternative by pointing to the “shearing pressure” can hardly suffice so long as an
automatic collapse of capitalism is ruled out of consideration.
Postone therefore has little to say either about a postcapitalist future or how to get
there. What may be making it hard for him to do so is the theoretical conception he is
most attached to—that capital is subject. Postone’s view of this is based on a specific
reading of Hegel. As he sees it, Hegel’s concept of the absolute subject bears a striking
similarity to the concept of capital, since it is a self-moving substance that “grounds
itself.” He argues that Hegel’s Absolute, as a self-referential entity, expresses the logic of
capital as self-expanding value. He contends that Marx based his analysis of capital on
this Hegelian notion, as seen from “The General Formula of Capital,” in Capital, volume
one. Marx there writes, “value is here the subject,” “an automatic subject”; he calls value
“the dominant subject [übergreifendes Subjekt] of this process . . . ”54

Ibid., 224.

53

54

Marx, Capital 1:255.

28
Though this may appear to confirm the claim that Marx views capital as the
absolute subject, the appearance is deceptive. It is important to keep in mind the context
of “The General Formula of Capital.” Marx is discussing the process of circulation, as
embodied in the movement from money to commodity to more money (M-C-M’). This
movement creates, of necessity, the appearance that value “has the occult ability to add
value to itself.”55 However, Marx later shows that this appearance is dispelled once we
enter the labor process and encounter’s capital’s dependence on living labor. As Marx
shows in the ensuing chapter, “Contradictions in the General Formula,” value appears to
self-expand on its own account so long as we restrict ourselves to the process of
circulation. When we move to the production process, however, we find that capital’s
claim to be the self-moving subject encounters internal limits, flowing from the dual
character of labor. Which is why Marx did not use the phrase “value as subject” when he
moved into the analysis of the production process of capital.56 As Marx wrote in the
Grundrisse, capital
. . . cannot ignite itself anew through its own resources. Circulation therefore does
not carry within itself the principle of self-renewal. . . . Commodities therefore
have to be thrown into it anew from the outside, like fuel into a fire. Otherwise it
flickers out in indifference.57
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These and other passages indicate that Marx does think that capital takes on the
form of a self-moving substance or subject—in so far as we view capital from the
viewpoint of the process of circulation. Postone, as noted above, criticizes “traditional
Marxism” for emphasizing the process of circulation at the expense of the forms of
production. In opposition to this standpoint of “traditional Marxism,” he seeks to redirect
radical theory toward a thoroughgoing critique of the production relations of
contemporary society. In doing so, however, Postone imports a category that Marx uses
to express the circulation process into an effort to highlight the dynamics of the
production process. Despite his emphatic opposition to theoretic approaches that view
production relations as a mere reflection of the process of circulation, he prioritizes a
category that is actually adequate to the sphere of circulation. In a word, by conflating
Marx’s discussion of value as “an automatic subject” at a specific point in the analysis of
capitalist circulation with value as the absolute subject in Marx’s analysis of capitalism as
a whole, Postone contravenes his own insistence about the importance of not elevating
the sphere of distribution or circulation above that of production.
Since Postone thinks that capital is the subject of modern society, and not the
workers or other forces of liberation, he is led to argue that the alternative to capital will
ultimately emerge not from the development of human agents like the proletariat but
rather from capital itself. Capital is indeed for Postone the emancipatory alternative. Yet
what are the emanciptory forms that we can expect to see emerge from the selfdevelopment of capital? Aside from mentioning in passing the way in which capital
generates new needs and desires, he does not say. Postone appears to find himself in
something of an impasse when it comes to addressing the specific forms of life can
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replace the logic of capital, especially since he (correctly) realizes that simply
abolishing the market is not a solution.
The third grouping of objectivist Marxists are those who subscribe to “systematic
dialectics,” an independent school of thought developed over the past decade. The most
prominent of these theorists is C.J. Arthur, author of The New Dialectic and Marx’s
Capital (2002). Arthur’s work falls in-between the positions of the Unoists and Postone.
Like the Unoists, he emphasizes the distinction between the logic of capital and
capitalism’s historical development. Like Postone, he emphasizes the homology between
Marx’s delineation of the logic of capital and Hegel’s logic of the concept. However, he
differs from Postone in placing more emphasis on forms of circulation and monetary
relations than on production relations, and he differs from the Unoists in placing more
emphasis on subjective forms of resistance to capital.
Arthur contends that most commentators of Marx have failed to come to grips
with the complexity of his ideas because they conflate historical dialectics with
systematic dialectics. Historical dialectics deals with the rise and fall of actual social
systems. Systematic dialectics, on the other hand, deals with “a given whole and
demonstrates how it reproduces itself: thus the ordering of the categories is in no way
determined by the recapitulation of a historical chain of causality; it is articulated on the
basis of purely systematic considerations.”58 Marx’s Capital, he argues, is best
understood as “the articulation of categories to conceptualize an existent concrete whole.”
The order in which Marx presents the categories does not correspond to “the order of
58
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their actual appearance in history.” Capital consists of a sequential ordering of
abstract categories, not a consequential ordering of how they actually unfold in history.
Arthur shows that conflating the historical with the systematic has led to gross
misunderstandings of Marx’s work, beginning with Marx’s closest colleague and
follower, Friedrich Engels. Marx’s discussion in chapter one of Capital on the
commodity-form and the forms of value is notoriously difficult, which has given rise to
numerous efforts to justify or reject its apparent fidelity to what Rosa Luxemburg once
called “its Hegelian rococo.”60 An early attempt to make sense of these difficulties was
offered by Engels, who held that the development from the “simple” to the “general” or
universal commodity-form in chapter one referred to the historical development from
small-scale commodity-production to more complex forms in advanced industrial
capitalism. He held that chapter one is best understood by discerning the historical
sequence implied by Marx’s analytical categories. Arthur finds this highly specious.
Chapter one, he says, has nothing to do with a historical delineation of commodity
production. Although it begins with the “simple” exchange of one product of labor for
another, Marx is referencing not a particular historical stage (like small-scale or petty
commodity exchange) but rather the determinate social form that characterizes a
chemically pure capitalism. Marx begins with the most simple or abstract expression of
the social form that characterizes capitalism in order to draw out the developmental logic
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of capital as a whole. Just as Hegel begins his Science of Logic with the most
elementary and barren category, “Being,” that nevertheless implicitly contains the whole,
so Marx begins Capital with the most elementary expression of the commodity-form that
contains within itself the elements that call for systematic elaboration. Marx’s historical
account of capitalism appears only at the end of volume one of Capital, not at the
beginning, because the historical phenomenon of capitalism can only be comprehended
from the vantage point of the systemic and abstract logic of capital.61
The impatience to leap from the abstract to the concrete, from the systematic to
the historical, explains why many have found Marx’s Capital difficult to grasp. Even
Engels conceded to Marx, as he was reading the galley proofs of chapter one, that he
found it hard to follow the argument. To adequately comprehend Marx we need to
recognize that “The key transition in Capital is not from the ‘sphere of simple circulation
or the exchange of commodities’ to capitalist production, but from ‘the sphere of simple
circulation or the exchange of commodities’ to ‘the hidden abode of production.’”62
Like other objectivist Marxists, Arthur sees a homology between Marx’s Capital
and Hegel’s Science of Logic. The homology may not be self-evident, since Arthur
assumes that “Hegel was an idealist” whereas Marx was a “materialist.”63 The homology
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nevertheless exists, he argues, because capitalism is above all a monetary economy
characterized by the same kind of “immanent abstractness” found in Hegel’s delineation
of the logic of the concept. He writes, “In value-form theory it is the development of the
forms of exchange that is seen as the prime determinant of the capitalist economy.”64
Hence, the forms of value and capital analyzed by Marx “are in effect of such abstract
purity as to constitute a real incarnation of the ideas in Hegel’s logic.”65 On these grounds
“capital may be seen as the avatar of Hegel’s absolute concept.”66
This places Arthur closer to the Unoists than to Postone, who contends that
production rather than exchange or monetary relations constitute the inner core of the
logic of capital. Whereas Postone ties value production to the dual character of labor,
Arthur asks “but can it make sense to speak of value where there are no markets?”67 As
Arthur sees it, labor can be brought into the dialectic of capital only after the general
form of value, or money, has been delineated. He denies that the social form of labor is
the defining or constitutive feature of capital: “Labor and value are not to be positively
identified with each other.”68 As he sees it, it is not that labor becomes abstract in the
process of production which then lends an abstractive character to value and capital;
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instead, it is monetary or exchange relations that reduce labor to an abstraction: “It
may still be the case that labor becomes ‘abstract’ only when products are priced.”69
On these grounds Arthur takes issue with chapter one of Capital, which discusses
the dual character of labor prior to discussing the forms of value and money. Arthur
writes, “It is notorious that Marx dives down from the phenomenon of exchange-value to
labor as the substance of value in the first three pages of Capital and people rightly
complain that they do not find any proof there.”70 In contrast to Marx’s approach, he
thinks that it is best to
. . . leave aside initially any labor content—in this way I am departing from Marx
who analyzed both together. . . . I differ from Marx in that I refuse to find it
necessary to come to labor until after conceptualizing capital as a formdetermination. Bringing in labor too early risks giving the appearance of modelbuilding.71
He contends that in Capital “Marx has a dogmatic beginning insofar as he presupposes
the items exchanged are labor products.”72
The question that this raises is whether Arthur truly does justice to the content of
Capital given the overriding importance that Marx ascribed to his category of the dual
character of labor. How do we square Arthur’s claim that his “systematic dialectical”
approach is best suited to understanding Marx’s actual aim and intent in Capital, when
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that very approach compels him to call into question Marx’s exposition of what he
called his “original contribution” and “the pivot on which a clear comprehension of
political economy turns”?
At the same time, Arthur also distances himself from the Unoists by arguing that
labor is not extrinsic to the dialectic of capital. Although he thinks that Marx was
mistaken to bring forms of labor into chapter one of Capital, he thinks that the logic of
capital never succeeds in completely freeing itself from dependence on living labor. “The
problem for capital,” he writes, “is that it needs the agency of labor” in order to create
surplus value. In his view, labor needs to be brought into the logic of capital to explain
how the capitalist manages to compel workers to produce more value than they
themselves consume. At this level of the logic of capital—that of the discrepancy
between the value of labor power and the value of the total product—resistance is bound
to occur:73
The former “subjects” of production are treated as manipulable objects; but it is
still a question of manipulating their activity, not of depriving them of all
subjectivity. They act for capital, indeed as capital, but still in some sense act. . . .
Thus, even if Marx is right that the productive power of labor is absorbed into that
of capital to all intents, it is necessary to bear in mind that capital still depends on
it. Moreover, the repressed subjectivity of the workers remains a threat to capital’s
purposes in this respect.74

73

Albritton responds thusly: “Because of the way Arthur inserts class struggle into
the dialectic of capital, it becomes impossible to theorize capital’s inner logic as a whole
dialectically. . . . Class struggle, strictly speaking, is outside the theory.” See Robert
Albritton, “How Dialectics Runs Aground: The Antimonies of Arthur’s Dialectic of
Capital,” Historical Materialism, 13, no. 2 (2005): 179, 182.
74

Arthur, The New Dialectic and Marx’s Capital, 52.

36
What does Arthur’s “systematic dialectics” suggest about a possible alternative
to capitalism? Like most objectivists he prefers to say little about the future on the
grounds that the main burden of a Marxian critique consists of tracing out the trajectory
of capital. Although he finds a place for subjective resistance within the logic of capital,
he refrains from suggesting that it contains any immanent indication of the content of a
new society. Still, the considerable emphasis that he places on market and monetary
relations suggests that he considers the abolition of the market the pons asini of the
negation of capitalism. On these grounds he rejects Postone’s characterization of the
USSR and other state-command economies as “state-capitalist.” At the same time, he is
very critical of Soviet-type regimes because their reliance on extra-economic force to
spur economic growth led to gross inefficiencies. He writes, “A negation of capital that
fails to go beyond capital is necessarily a negation of capital that falls behind capital.”75
What might constitute a negation of capital that truly transcends capital, however, is a
matter that his work leaves largely unaddressed.
A diverse group of thinkers who have developed a very different approach from
the objectivists are autonomist Marxists. I refer to them as subjectivists because they
contend that the focus of Marx’s work is delineating the forms of subjective resistance
that arise against the logic of capital. They distance themselves from the arguments of the
objectivists in a number of important ways. First, instead of viewing labor and capital as
distinct, externally connected entities, they hold that capital emerges and develops in
response to struggles against oppression and exploitation. It is not only that workers resist
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the development of capital; it’s that workers’ resistance is responsible for the
constitution of capital. Mario Tronti articulated this as early as 1964:
We too have worked with a concept that puts capitalist development first, and
workers second. This was a mistake. And now we have to turn the problem on its
head, reverse the polarity and start again from the beginning: and the beginning is
the class struggle of the working class.76
Each stage of capitalist production, Tronti and other autonomists argue, took shape in
response to specific forms of mass resistance. Though it appears that capital is in control
of modern society, it is actually a reactive, not creative force.77
Second, instead of viewing capital as a self-determining movement that effaces
barriers to its self-expansion, they argue that it is an inherently unstable and antagonistic
form constantly torn between the drive to augment value and the struggles that resist
value production. Antonio Negri writes, “The focus in Marx is always the actuality and
the determinancy of the antagonism.”78 John Holloway elaborates upon this as follows:
The defining feature of Marxist economics is the idea that capitalism can
be understood in terms of certain regularities (the so-called laws of motion of
capitalist development). These regularities refer to the regular (but contradictory)
pattern of the reproduction of capital, and Marxist economics focuses on the study
of capital and its contradictory reproduction. . . .
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The attempts to use Marx’s own categories to develop a social of
capitalist reproduction are, however, always problematic, in so far as the
categories of Marxism derive from a quite different question, based not on the
reproduction but on the destruction of capitalism, not on positivity but on
negativity. . . . By a strange twist, Marxism, from being a theory of the destruction
of capitalist society, becomes a theory of its reproduction.79
Third, whereas the objectivists emphasize Marx’s contributions to economics and
the intersections between philosophy and economics, the autonomists see Marx’s project
primarily in political terms. Negri writes, “Clearly, profit and wage continue to exist, but
they exist only as quantities regulated by a relation of power. . . . If anything, the
marketing of labor-power today has become a totally political operation.”80
Fourth, whereas all of the objectivists agree that Marx is deeply indebted to
Hegel, the autonomists see Marx’s philosophic lineage quite differently. Negri argues
that Marx’s thought draws most of all from the philosophy of Spinoza, while Holloway
argues that Marx’s work can best be understood from the vantage point of Theodor
Adorno’s Negative Dialectics.
Since the writings of the autonomist Marxists are numerous and diverse, I will
focus on what many consider the defining text of the tendency: Antonio Negri’s Marx
Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse.
Negri’s influential work81 consists of a close analysis of Marx’s Grundrisse, his
“rough draft” of Capital that was written in 1857-58. This massive, 900-page tome was
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unknown prior to the 1930s, and it has long been considered one of Marx’s most
enigmatic and difficult texts. Negri focuses on this work because it is “the point where
the objective analysis of capital and the subjective analysis of class behavior come
together.”82 It is a counter to what he considers “the blind objectivism of a certain
Marxist tradition.”83 As he sees it, the Grundrisse is superior to Capital because the latter
suffers from precisely what the Unoists and systematic dialectics theorists find attractive
in it—“a certain objectivism” in which economic categories take on a life of their own:
The movement of the Grundrisse toward Capital is a happy process; we cannot
say the same of the reverse movement. The Grundrisse represents the summit of
Marx’s revolutionary thought. . . . Capital is this text which served to reduce
critique to economic theory, to annihilate subjectivity in objectivity, to subject the
subversive capacity of the proletariat to the reorganizing and repressive
intelligence of capitalist power.84
The Grundrisse, writes Negri, is “an essentially open work . . . the categories are
not flattened out, the imagination does not stagnate.”85 What many find forbidding about
work—what Marx called “its sauerkraut and carrots shapelessness”—is seen by Negri as
a virtue, since it allows the antagonistic and unstable nature of the Marxian value
categories to come more readily to the fore.

World Social Forum since 2000 in Brazil, Venezuela, and Kenya. His Marx Beyond Marx
is also the point of departure for all of his later work, including Empire and Multitude.
82

Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse (New York:
Autonomedia, 1984), 9. The book was first published in French and Italian in 1979.
83

Ibid., 13.

84

Ibid., 18-19.

85

Ibid., 12.

40
This is most directly seen in how “in the Grundrisse work appears as
immediately abstract labor.”86 Although the book begins with a lengthy chapter on
Money, Marx makes it clear (more so than in Capital, according to Negri) that money
can serve as a universal equivalent of commodity exchange only if living labor is already
reduced to a disembodied abstraction. Money conceals this process, since (as Marx put it)
“all inherent contradictions of bourgeois society appear extinguished in money relations
as conceived in a simple form.”87 Negri contends that Marx’s genius is expressed in his
ability to analyze the fetishized forms of money in light of the hidden social relations of
labor. Money can become the universal equivalent only if concrete labor is reduced to
abstract labor; but abstract labor is produced in the same instant as concrete labor by the
living laborer. An internal tension is built into all of Marx’s value-theoretic categories,
including such abstract ones as money. The subjectivity of the laborer can therefore never
be abstracted out of the logic of capital. Negri writes, “Marx characterizes the working
class as a solid subjectivity . . . as an historical and social essence . . . its essence as
creator of value is engaged in a continual struggle.”88
Negri argues that this subject-object dynamic is especially pronounced in Marx’s
theory of crisis, which was first formulated in the Grundrisse. Central to this theory of
crisis is the concept of the tendency for the rate of profit to decline. In the Grundrisse,
Negri writes, the decline in profit rates is not treated as a function of quasi-automatic
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economic laws operating on their own. Capitalists try to maintain or boost profit rates
by increasing the proportion of surplus labor (labor time that is beyond that needed to
reproduce the laborer) relative to necessary labor (labor time needed to reproduce the
laborer). However, there are “rigid limits” beyond which necessary labor cannot be
further reduced, since capital needs the living laborer to produce value. Capital
nevertheless pushes against this rigid limit, and the laborers responds by intensifying
their resistance to the drive to diminish the sphere of necessary labor. As a result,
capitalism is unable to extract as much surplus value as previously, leading to a decline in
the rate of profit. Negri concludes, “The law of the tendency to decline represents,
therefore, one of the most lucid Marxist intuitions of the intensification of the class
struggle in the course of capitalist development.”89
As Negri acknowledges, Marx revised his concept of the tendency of the rate of
profit to decline in Capital, volume three. Marx there ties the decline not only to the
contradiction between necessary and surplus labor but also to the rising organic
composition of capital. As capitalists invest in greater amounts of technology and labor
saving devices the amount of value-creating labor declines relative to constant capital,
precipitating a decline in profit rates. Negri finds this to be a step backward from the
Grundrisse, since it attributes the decline in profit rates to purely objective factors. In
Capital, he contends, “The entire relation will be dislocated on an economistic level and
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objectified improperly.” It is an approach that “eliminates the class struggle as a
fundamental and rigid variable.”90
No part of the Grundrisse better exemplifies its prioritization of subjective
resistance, he argues, than its discussion of the cooperative form of labor. Marx indicates
that the “real” or total subsumption of labor by capital does not efface agency, since
workers forge bonds of association and cooperation as they are brought together in
productive enterprises. The centralization of capital necessitates a greater socialization of
labor. The more that laborers are socialized, the more they learn how to cooperatively
battle capital: “This objective process, dominated by capital, begins to reveal the new
subjective level of the working class. A qualitative leap occurs: the unity of working class
behaviors begins to be self-sufficient.”91 Living labor develops from being a component
part of capital to taking on “constituent power.” This “power is established politically on
that social cooperation that is congenital to living labor . . . in the cooperative immediacy
of living labor, constituent power finds its creative massification.”92
This reading of the Grundrisse, which informs all of his later work, takes Negri
far from objectivist readings of Marx. He sums up his position as follows:
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In so far as we refuse the objectivist interpretations of the “school of capitallogic”—which infinitely assert the power of capital to possess and command all
development—in so far as we reject this, it seems to us that we must also avoid
the path of subjectivity which imputes capital to an objectification tout court.93
Instead of focusing one-sidedly on capital as subject, we should recognize that all of the
categories employed by Marx are two-dimensional and inherently antagonistic. Hence,
capital cannot “self-expand” unless labor does as well:
The other subject, the worker, must emerge, since capitalist subsumption does not
efface its identity but just dominates its activity: this subject must emerge
precisely at the level to which the collective force of social capital has led the
process. If capital is a subject on one side, on the other labor must be a subject as
well.94
Although Negri’s effort to account for agency illuminates important aspects of
Marx’s work, one can ask whether his interpretation takes matters too far. Is it really the
case that every stage of capitalist development is a product of heightened subjective
resistance? Negri thinks so, as seen from his analysis of the major changes in
contemporary capitalism. In Empire and Multitude, Negri and Hardt identify two such
shifts: one is the 1970s, when capitalism abandoned the “Fordist” model of mass
industrial production stimulated by Keynesian fiscal policies, and the other is the 1990s
and 2000s, when the axis of power shifted from imperial nation states towards an
integrated global system. Both changes, they contend, represented capital’s response to
intensifying subjective resistance. The first came in response to the increased bargaining
power and strikes of workers as well as the mass movements of the 1960s, while the
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second, they contend, came in response to more diffuse forms of resistance as
proletarian or industrial labor was replaced by struggles of the “mass” or “social
worker”—those employed in the service sector, the domestic sphere, etc. It seems highly
questionable, however, that the move toward a globally integrated world capitalism
(assuming that has actually taken place) was a response to intensifying struggles by “new
forms of constitutive power,” given the political quiescence that has prevailed in the West
especially over the last several decades. It also seems questionable whether the decline of
corporate profit rates claimed by some analysts has come as a direct result of intensified
social struggles.
Even more questions can be raised about whether the autonomist approach takes
us further than the objectivists when it comes to envisioning an alternative to capitalist
value production. According to Negri “there is no value without exploitation”; hence, a
postcapitalist society is “the destruction at the same time of the law of value itself, of its
capitalist or socialist variants.”95 A new society can only mean,
the destruction of capital in every sense of the term. It is non-work, it is the
subjective, collective and proletarian planning of the suppression of exploitation.
It is the possibility of a free constitution of subjectivity.96
But what specific forms of social organization are needed to end value production and
capital? What model or arrangement of society can allow for the “free constitution of
subjectivity”? Negri thinks it is pointless to try to answer such questions, since a new
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society can only emerge from the forms of socialization and cooperation arising from
spontaneous struggles:
In [Marx’s] materialist methodology the only kind of anticipation allowed is the
one that moves in the rhythm of the tendency. This is therefore a complete refusal
of utopia and a limitation on his research on the contemporary historical limits of
capitalist development.97
Negri and Hardt make this explicit in Empire by suggesting that the quest for a
new society is so immanent in everyday struggles that there isn’t a need to theoretically
articulate an ultimate goal: “Empire creates a greater potential for revolution than did the
modern regimes of power because it presents us . . . with an alternative: a multitude that
is directly opposed to Empire, with no mediation between them.”98 The transcendence of
capital occurs quasi-automatically, from the exuberance of the multitude overflowing the
boundaries of capital.
Although Negri is highly critical of theories that emphasize the automaticity of
capital’s self-expansion, he seems to fall prey to embracing automaticity in another guise,
in so far as he thinks that an alternative to capitalism will arise spontaneously without the
mediation of theoretical labor that tries to envision future modes of social organization.
“Exuberance,” after all, has no necessary connection to thought—let alone conceptual
thought that tries to envision the future. Despite (or perhaps because of) his subjectivist
approach, he does not have much more to say about a postcapitalist society than do the
objectivists.

97

Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State, 264.

98

Negri, Empire, 393.

46
Although most of the re-examinations of Marx’s work over the last several
decades can be characterized as objectivist or subjectivist, the work of several thinkers
does not fall neatly into these categories, even if they share some similarities with them.
One such thinker is Tony Smith. Although he advocates systematic dialectics, he has
major differences with some of its proponents. He places much more emphasis on labor
and resistance than Arthur, and he also has a very different view of the Hegel-Marx
relation. In contrast to all of the objectivists reviewed in this study, Smith does not agree
that there is a homology between the logic of capital and Hegel’s logic of the concept in
the Science of Logic. He writes,
The picture of Hegel trying to deduce the content of nature and spirit from his
logical categories is a myth that caricatures what we now know of his actual
working procedures. . . . . Those who go to the chapter on the Absolute Idea
looking for some metaphysical supersubject will be disappointed; it consists
entirely of an account of the dialectical methodology used in the Logic as a
whole.99
Smith does not deny that capital is a “supersubject.” He does deny that Marx based his
view of capital on Hegel’s logic of the concept, since the latter does not blot out or annul
particularity and contingency.
This has important ramifications for the subject of this study, since Smith
contends that Hegel’s “Doctrine of the Concept,” which centers on his concept of the
Syllogism, actually “provides the framework for comprehending socialism, not
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Through a close textual reading of the Science of Logic, he argues that

Hegel does not privilege any of the three terms of the syllogism—Universal, Particular,
and Individual—but rather presents them as irreducible components. Universality does
not “blot out” the particular or the individual; it rather enables both to be expressed and
cognized. Therefore, he argues, the logic of the concept cannot be the correlate of
capital’s abstract universality, which is completely indifferent to particularity and
contingency. As he sees it, Hegel, like Marx, “wants a totality that does not blot out the
principle of subjectivity, individuality, personality. And this is what is termed
socialism.”101
The implication is that we can gain greater insight into Marx’s concept of a new
society by exploring more closely the actual content of Hegel’s most abstract works,
including the conclusion of his Science of Logic.102
Another thinker that does not readily fit into the category of subjectivist or
objectivist is Raya Dunayevskaya. Not unlike the autonomists, she stresses that all of
Marx’s value-theoretic categories are tightly tied to conditions of labor and struggles that
challenge the hegemony of value production. She writes,
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Economics is a matter not only of the economic laws of breakdown of
capitalism, but of the strife between the worker and the machine against dead
labor’s domination over living labor, beginning with hearing the worker’s voice,
which has been stilled “in the storm and stress of the process of production.”103
However, unlike Negri and the autonomists, she does not deny that capital is
defined by a “law of motion” that develops on its own independent of the will of the
producers (notice her use of the phrase “not only of the economic laws” in the above).
Instead of reducing every stage of capitalism to a response to subjective revolt, she argues
that Marx has a more nuanced view that does not pose a one-to-one relation between the
objective and subjective. Moreover, she rejects Negri’s contention that Capital is more
“objectivist” and “economistic” than the Grundrisse, even though she acknowledges that
it analyzes a chemically pure capitalism. She writes,
In the last part of the work, “Accumulation of Capital,” as we approach the most
“economist” and “scientific” development—“the organic composition of
capital”—Marx reminds us all over again that this organic composition cannot be
considered outside of its effects “on the lot of the laboring classes.”104
Marx, she says, traces out the logic of capital as an objective movement while keeping his
finger on the pulse of human relations.
Dunayevskaya also has a rather distinctive view of the Hegel-Marx relation. First,
she does not accept the prevailing assumption that Hegel was an “idealist” and Marx a
“materialist.” She notes that Hegel has a materialist dimension and that there are idealist
components in Marx. Second (not unlike Smith), she argues that Hegel’s “Doctrine of the
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Concept” does not annul particularity and contingency. She especially calls attention to
the inclusion of the chapter on “Life” in the Science of Logic. This indicates that Hegel’s
logic of the concept should be viewed not as “a mere abstract Universal, but as a
Universal which comprises in itself the full wealth of Particulars.”105 Hegel in fact
repeatedly emphasizes that the “Idea has its reality in some kind of matter.”106 As she
sees it, the “whole Logic (both logic and Logic) is a logic of self-determination,” but that
does not mean that it annuls objectivity. The logic of the concept cannot be so easily
reduced to the logic of capital. Third, she argues that the last chapter of the Logic, the
“Absolute Idea,” which centers on the “the negation of the negation,” is of great
importance in illuminating Marx’s concept of a new society, since both the 1844
Manuscripts and Capital explicitly refer to the transcendence of capitalism in terms of
“the negation of the negation.”107
At the same time, Dunayevskaya does not argue that Marx’s work is a mere
application of Hegelian categories. Although Capital owes much to Hegel’s Logic, she
argues that it also represents a sharp departure from it. This is because the subject of
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Hegel’s dialectic is disembodied thought, whereas the subject in Capital is the human
being that resists capital’s “process of suction.” She writes,
Capital . . . is the Great Divide from Hegel, and not just because the subject is
economics rather than philosophy. . . . . It is that Great Divide because, just
because, the Subject—not subject matter, but Subject—was neither economics
nor philosophy but the human being, the masses. Because dead labor (capital)
dominates over living labor, and the laborer is the ‘gravedigger of capitalism,’ all
of human existence is involved. This dialectic is therefore totally new, totally
internal, deeper than ever was the Hegelian dialectic which had dehumanized the
self-development of humanity in the dialectic of Consciousness, SelfConsciousness, Reason. Marx could transcend the Hegelian dialectic not by
denying that it was “the source of all dialectic”; rather, it was precisely because he
began with that source that he could make the leap to the live Subject who is the
one who transforms reality.108
The philosophic literature on Marx over the past several decades clearly reveals a
wide disparity of interpretations and approaches. That Marx would be subject to such
widely varying interpretations should only be expected, given the expansive and
contentious nature of his philosophic project. Marx is a difficult thinker and grasping the
internal coherence of his thought is an extremely challenging task. What this review
indicates, however, is that many of the approaches towards Marx settle for analyzing one
aspect of his oeuvre at the expense of others. Except for Backhaus, all of the objectivists
considered in this study focus on Capital while passing over the work of the young Marx,
especially the 1844 Manuscripts. Negri and the autonomists, on the other hand,
emphasize the Grundrisse at the expense of Capital and say little about volumes two and
three of Capital. Almost none of the thinkers surveyed say anything about the last decade
of Marx’s life, when he turned his attention to the study of precapitalist societies. The
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tendency to fragment Marx by studying aspects of his work in isolation from others has
not only made it difficult to evaluate whether or not Marx’s body of work is internally
coherent. It has created a major obstacle to coming to grips with Marx’s concept of the
transcendence of value production. Since Marx never wrote a work on the alternative to
capitalism, and since any implicit or explicit suggestions on his part about an alternative
have to be gleaned from a careful study of an array of diverse and difficult texts, the
tendency to analyze one part of Marx’s oeuvre at the expense of others has made it all the
harder to discern whether he has a distinctive concept of a new society that speaks to the
realities of the twentyfirst century.
Bertell Ollman addresses this problem in noting that the theorists of systematic
dialectics are unable to take account of the whole of Marx’s Capital, since it clearly
contains not only logical but also historical analysis. He writes, “Capital I contains whole
sections that, according to the proponents of Systematic Dialectics . . . simply don’t
belong there or are simply out of place.”109 I would add that this also applies to many of
the subjectivist theorists covered in this review who cannot account for parts of Marx’s
work that emphasize systematic and objective approaches. It is possible, of course, that
different philosophic tendencies can latch onto one or another angle of Marx’s thought
because he was an inconsistent and contradictory thinker who invites divergent
interpretations. Yet it is also possible, as Ollman notes, that many interpretations of his
work represent “misguided attempts to reduce Marx’s varied strategies to a single one . . .
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It is possible that Marx employed a host of

argumentative and conceptual strategies based on his specific concerns and object of
investigation, and it is all too easy to fall into one-sided readings that fail to take account
of his work as a whole. However, if we cannot make sense of Marx’s work as a whole, is
it really possible to discern whether or not his work contains a concept of a new society
that is worth re-examining today?
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CHAPTER TWO
THE TRANSCENDENCE OF ALIENATION IN THE WRITINGS
OF THE YOUNG MARX

In the general relationship which the philosopher sees between the world and
thought, he merely makes objective for himself the relation of his own particular
consciousness to the real world.
—Karl Marx (1841)1
Marx’s Beginnings, 1837-41
The writings of the young Marx may not appear to be the best place to begin a
study of his conception of the alternative to capitalism. Marx’s writings from 1837 to
1843 were largely composed when he was still a liberal democrat who had not yet broken
with capitalism, and they contain little or no explicit critique of capitalist value
production. Moreover, the numerous writings composed by him in the years immediately
following his break with capitalism (1843/44 to 1847) do not contain the extensive
analyses and criticisms of value production that defines his later work, such as Capital.
Nevertheless, I will seek to show that these early writings constitute the basis of
Marx’s conception of the alternative to capitalism that become fleshed out in his later
work.
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Two aspects of Marx’s early work concern us here. One aspect is the values
and principles upheld by the young Marx that he brought to bear on his subsequent
analysis of capitalist production. It is hardly conceivable that Marx developed such a
thoroughgoing and virulent criticism of capitalism merely on the basis of a descriptive
analysis of contemporary conditions. What normative standpoint led him to call into
question the central principles and practices of capitalism in the first place? Why did he
come to find such formations as private property, alienated labor, class society, and the
separation of the state and civil society so objectionable? An analysis of Marx’s early
writings—including those composed before his break with capitalism—are of
indispensable importance in answering these questions. The second aspect is the specific
indications provided by his early writings, especially those composed from 1843/44 to
1847, of what might constitute an alternative to capitalism. Although his early works
rarely specify the institutional forms needed to replace capitalism,2 Marx’s philosophic
engagement with the social and intellectual realities of the 1840s led him to develop a
specific conception of the transcendence of alienation that is of indispensable importance
in understanding his overall understanding of the alternative to capitalism.
I will seek to demonstrate this by beginning with Marx’s earliest extant writings.
One of the first, an 1837 letter to his father, represents a kind of philosophic conversion
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statement. After having been under the “spell” of Kant and Fichte, the 19-year old
Marx declares that he has now become committed to Hegelianism. What drives this
change of mind is his dissatisfaction with the “opposition between what is and what
ought to be.”3 Attacking his earlier views as “entirely idealistic” and “formalist,” he
proclaims that “the object must be studied in its development; arbitrary divisions must
not be introduced, the rational character of the object itself must develop as something
imbued with contradictions in itself and find its unity in itself.”4 He considers his prior
philosophic standpoint, which counterpoised form and matter, an egregious error and
contends that he has now “arrived at the point of seeing the idea in reality itself. If
previously the gods had dwelt above the earth, now they became its center.”5
This conception of the idea as immanently contained within the real does not
mean that Marx has decided to reject “idealism” in favor of “materialism.” As he writes a
few years later, in his doctoral dissertation on ancient Greek philosophy, “Idealism is no
figment of the imagination, but a truth.”6 Marx is searching for a way to conceptualize
the ideal as integrally connected to the real. This is but the first expression of a theme that
3
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will show up again and again in Marx’s work and which will largely determine his
attitude toward efforts to propose alternatives to existing realities.
This is not to suggest that the integrality of ideality and reality are the only
normative concerns of the young Marx. His very earliest writings also display a powerful
feeling for social justice. As he wrote in his very first extant piece, ”The chief guide
which must direct us in the choice of a profession is the welfare of mankind and our own
perfection . . . man’s nature is so constituted that he can attain his own perfection only by
working for the perfection, for the good, of his fellow men.”7
What is important to watch is how these two seemingly separate8 concerns—
social justice and a philosophic commitment to the immanence of the ideal within the
real—helped to predetermine and shape Marx’s approach to a host of different problems.
Marx’s interest in the relation between philosophy and reality dictated the subject
matter of his first theoretical work, his doctoral dissertation On The Difference Between
the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. Although a detailed analysis of
the work is beyond the confines of this study, several aspects of it are worth reexamination. Marx is drawn to Epicurus because he “applauds sensuous existence” while
highlighting the idea of freedom in his theory of declination of the atom. Whereas
Democritus’ theory, in which atoms fall in straight lines, stresses predictability and
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determinism, Epicurus, who focuses on the swerving of the atom from straight lines,
emphasizes chance and free will. Marx sees Democritus as “throw[ing] himself into the
arms of positive knowledge” whereas Epicurus has philosophy “serve freedom itself.”9
He singles out Seneca’s summation of Epicurus: “It is wrong to live under necessity; but
no man is constrained to under necessity. . . . On all sides lie many short and simple paths
to freedom.”10
What is perhaps more telling is Marx’s critique of Epicurus. Marx contends that
while Epicurus strives to emphasize sensuous reality and freedom, “the concept of the
atom and sensuous perception face each other as enemies.”11 The declination of the atom
is posed as an abstraction from determinant being: “The atom abstracts from the
opposing being and withdraws itself from it.”12 His atomic theory posits the ideal side,
“according to which all relation to something else is negated and motion is established as
self-determination.”13 Epicurus’ concept of freedom is that of abstract individuality:
“abstract individuality is freedom from being, not freedom in being. It cannot shine in the
9
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light of being . . . Epicurus grasps the contradiction at its highest peak and objectifies
it.”14
Marx considers Epicurus’ position an advance from that of Democritus, who fails
to posit the “ideal side”—the principle of freedom. Yet Epicurus “objectifies” a kind of
dualism, in that freedom becomes defined only negatively, as absence of pain and undue
stress (ataraxy). Whereas Democritus submerges subject into substance, Epicurus
detaches subject from substance. Epicurus “has carried atomistics to its final conclusion,
which is its dissolution and conscious opposition to the universal.”15
Although Marx does not always make this explicit in the text of the dissertation,16
he is clearly exploring the aporias of post-Aristotelian Greek philosophy with an eye to
more contemporary realities. As one important study of Marx’s dissertation put it,
The atom is “the full” as opposed to “the empty”: it is matter. It is subject to
“dependent motion,’” to falling down. But at the same time as an absolute unit the
atom is free and independent. In emphasizing the distinction, Marx had in mind
the contrast between material necessity and formal civic liberty, or, in the
language of the Young Hegelians, between “bourgeois society” and “the political
state.” Figuratively speaking, the atom as an aspect of materiality is nothing but a
bourgeois; as an absolute form of existence it is a citizen of the French
Revolution. Epicurus had emphasized the principle of atomicity, that is,
independence and hence individual freedom; but the contradictions of this
principle were obvious even in this “atomistic science”17
14

Ibid., 62.

15

Ibid., 73.

16

Marx does make it explicit that his study of Democritus and Epicurus is driven
by his concern with the fate of philosophy in the aftermath of Hegel in his “Notebooks on
Epicurean Philosophy.”
17

Mikhail Lifshitz, The Philosophy of Art of Karl Marx, trans. Ralph B. Winn
(London: Pluto Press, 1973), 23-24.

59
As Marx sees it, the central problem with Epicurus is that his philosophy mirrors
the contradictions of the modern world in so far as freedom and self-determination are
posited at the expense of maintaining a substantial connection with the material world.
The idea of freedom and sensuous reality confront each other as mortal enemies. PostAristotelian Greek philosophy therefore typifies the pitfall that Marx had earlier indicated
that he seeks to extricate himself from: the separation of ideality and reality.
In sum, just as Stoicism, Skepticism, and Epicureanism constituted a regression
from the “acme” of philosophy reached with Aristotle, so post-Hegelian philosophy
constitutes a subjectivist regression from the Hegelian synthesis.18 Marx is exploring this
as part of envisioning a reversal of such regression: “The modern rational outlook on
nature must first raise itself to the point from which ancient Ionian philosophy, in
principle at least, begins—the point of seeing the divine, the Idea, embodied in nature.”19
Marx sees the breakdown of the Hegelian synthesis as inevitable, since the unity
of reason and reality proclaimed by his philosophy now confronts a new set of realities
that it cannot account for. Reason and reality oppose each other as “two worlds,” “one
edge turned against the world, the other against philosophy itself.” “The party of the
concept,” which turns against reality, battles it out with “the party of reality,” which turns
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against philosophy. Both sides “place themselves behind a philosophic giant of the
past”—but, Marx notes, “the ass is soon detected under the lion’s skin.”21
Marx is, of course, far from reconciled to this situation. He seeks a new beginning
to overcome the diremption of reason and reality—although he is still feeling his way as
to how to go about it. He recalls how “Themistocles, when Athens was threatened with
destruction, tried to persuade the Athenians to abandon the city entirely and found a new
Athens at sea, in another element.”22 He has not yet discovered what that new “element”
might be. Yet he sees the path forward in “turning” philosophy towards the material
world—in a way that would not represent its abandonment but rather its realization. In
noting “there are moments when philosophy turns its eyes to the external world,”23 he
adds: “But the practice of philosophy is itself theoretical. It is the critique that measures
the individual existence by the essence, the particular reality by the idea.”24
As we shall show, Marx’s effort to discern the idea of freedom “in reality itself” is
a theme that will govern all of his subsequent work, and it has a direct bearing on his
understanding of how to posit an alternative to capitalist value production. Although that
20
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can be demonstrated only through the course of this study, there is another concept in
his dissertation that becomes especially important for understanding his subsequent
development. That concept is inversion.
A great deal of Marx’s criticism of both capitalism and speculative philosophy
will center on the notion of the inversion of subject and predicate, in which the products
of human activity become invested with an autonomous power that determine and
constrain the will of the subjects that engender them. Although many commentators
assume that Marx drew the concept of inversion from Feuerbach’s critique of religion,25
Marx’s use of the concept actually predates Feuerbach’s Essence of Christianity, in
which the concept of inversion takes on considerable importance.26 Marx first utilizes the
concept of inversion in his dissertation, in the course of a critique of Plutarch’s Colotes.
Marx takes issue with Plutarch for writing, “so that of every quality we can truly say, ‘It
no more is than is not’; for to those affected in a certain way the thing is, but to those not
so affected it is not.” Marx notes that in doing so Plutarch “speaks of a fixed being or
non-being as a predicate.” However, “the being of the sensuous” is not a predicate; it is a
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subject. Marx concludes, ‘Ordinary thinking always has ready abstract predicates
which it separates from the subject. All philosophers have made the predicates into
subjects.”27
Marx also discusses inversion in criticizing those who adhere to “the party of
reality”—that is, those who turn away from philosophy in light of the “duality of selfconsciousness” that characterizes the contemporary world. Despite the one-sidedness of
the “party of the concept,” it nevertheless “makes real progress” since it takes
responsibility for developing ideas. The “party of reality,” in contrast, makes no progress
because it imputes its ideas to “reality” instead of taking responsibility for developing
them. Marx writes that for this party “the inversion, we may well say the madness,
appears as such.”28 Marx is making a pun out of the fact that Verkehrtheit (inversion) is
often identified with Verrücktheit (madness). An inverted world is indeed a mad world, in
so far as the subject becomes the predicate and the predicate becomes the subject.29
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This is not in any way to suggest that Marx originates the critique of an
inversion of subject and predicate, since it has a long trajectory in the history of
philosophy.30 It is to suggest, however, that Marx utilized this concept from very early
on—and not simply on the basis of such figures as Feuerbach. The critique of subjectpredicate inversion is one of the major normative principles that Marx will bring to bear
on his understanding of both philosophy and reality as he increasingly turns his attention
to “material matters” in the period following the completion of his dissertation.
Marx’s Critique of Politics and Philosophy, 1842-43
Marx turned to “material matters” following the completion of his dissertation by
directly engaging in active politics, in becoming a radical journalist. The choice was not
completely of Marx’s making. March 1842 represented a critical turning point in Marx’s
life because the increasingly conservative turn in the German (and especially Prussian)
political scene closed off Marx’s hope for an academic career. In that month Young
Hegelian associates of Marx such as Bruno Bauer were fired from their university
positions; new censorship restrictions were imposed; and Friedrich Wilhelm II of Prussia
made it clear that he would rule in the name of absolutism. The response of the liberals

30

The critique of subject-predicate inversion—also known as the reversal of
ontological priority—goes back at least as far as Aristotle’ criticism of Plato’s theory of
Forms. Aristotle takes issue with Plato for posing particulars as the dependent entities and
the Forms as the independent entities. Aristotle argues, in contrast, that particulars are
ontologically prior. See Posterior Analytics: “Things are prior and more familiar in two
ways; for it is not the same to be prior by nature and prior in relation to us, nor to be more
familiar and more familiar to us. I call prior and more familiar in relation to us what is
nearer to perception, prior and familiar simpliciter what is furthest away.” See Aristotle,
Posterior Analytics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, edit. Jonathan Barnes
(Princeton: Bollington, 1984), 115-6 [71b 34-72a 6].

64
to these events was a great disappointment to Marx and his associates, since they
essentially capitulated to Friedrich Wilhelm II without a fight. Propelled by the
philosophic problematic formulated in his doctoral dissertation as well as by the actual
social conditions, Marx threw himself into an intense engagement with political realities.
Marx’s main political concerns in 1842-43 centered on a virulent defense of
freedom the press, a critique of religion, and an opposition to social inequality. He takes
issue with the “shallow, superficial rationalism”31 of the censor, calling it a “bureaucracy
of intelligence.”32 He opposes any form of press censorship on the grounds that a free
press is “the spiritual mirror in which a people can see itself, and self-examination is the
first condition of wisdom.”33 He critiques religion on the grounds that “Morality is based
on the autonomy of the human mind, religion on its heteronomy.”34 Although Marx had
earlier expressed hostility to religion in his dissertation,35 his objection to linking religion
with politics now become much more pronounced: “Just as you do not ask the physician
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whether he is a believer, you have no reason to ask the politician either.” He opposes
social inequality—though this is not yet his main concern—by taking issue with viewing
“freedom as merely an individual property of certain persons and social estates.”37
These political positions are underpinned by a thick set of normative or even
ontological considerations. Marx does not oppose press censorship on pragmatic or
utilitarian grounds—for instance, by suggesting that it is not effective or that it violates
the greater good of the greater number. He contends that press censorship is wrong
because “Freedom of the will is inherent in human nature.”38 Since “we must take the
essence of the inner ideas as the measure to evaluate the existence of things,” it follows
that “from the standpoint of the idea, it is self-evident that freedom of the press has a
justification quite different from that of censorship because it is itself an embodiment of
the idea, an embodiment of freedom, a positive good.”39 He develops this by arguing that
“no man combats freedom; at most he combats the freedom of others.”40 Since to be free
defines our nature as human beings, not even the censor opposes freedom; he instead
proclaims his freedom in acting as one. The censor affirms freedom as a particular
privilege instead of as a universal right. This distinction between particular and universal
interests will later come to play a central role in Marx’s critique of capitalism.
36

Karl Marx, “Leading Article in No. 179 of Kölnische Zeitung, in MECW 1:201.

37

“Debates on the Freedom of the Press,” in MECW 1:151.

38

Ibid., 137.

39

Ibid., 154.

40

Ibid., 155.

66
The normative stance adopted by Marx in his early writings is that freedom is
an ontological characteristic of human beings as against something that ought to exist. He
asks,
Is there no universal human nature, as there is a universal nature of plants and
stars? Philosophy asks what is true, not what is held to be true. It asks what is true
for all mankind, not what is true for some people. Its metaphysical truths do not
recognize the boundaries of political geography.41
It is therefore not surprising that Marx returns—within these political writings—to the
central theme of his doctoral dissertation: the relation between ideality and reality. The
ideality posited by Marx is that human beings are inherently free beings. In these early
political writings he is trying to “measure” political realities by the ideality that resides
within them. He therefore writes,
Philosophy does not exist outside the world any more than the brain exists outside
man because it is not situated in the stomach. . . . Since every true philosophy is
the intellectual quintessence of its time, the time must come when philosophy not
only internally by its content, but also externally through its form, comes into
contact and interaction with the real world of its day . . . philosophy has become
worldly and the world has become philosophical . . . 42
This understanding of the relation of philosophy and reality also underpins
Marx’s conception of law. Marx affirms the importance of laws and legal statutes on the
grounds they serve as the “positive, clear, universal norms in which freedom has acquired
an impersonal, theoretical existence independent of the arbitrariness of the individual. A
statute-book is a people’s bible of freedom.”43 However, legal statutes are adequate to
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their concept only insofar as they correspond to “the natural laws of [humanity’s] own
reason.”44 He adopts an attitude to the law and political actuality that is largely drawn
from natural law theory; indeed, Marx readily cites such thinkers as Hobbes, Spinoza,
Grotius and Rousseau in discussing the “deducing” of natural laws from rationality. He
writes, “The legal nature of things cannot be regulated according to the law; on the
contrary, the law must be regulated according to the legal nature of things.”45
This conception in turn serves as Marx’s standpoint for criticizing the elevation of
particular over universal interests—a theme that will become more pronounced in his
later work. As early as his first articles against press censorship, Marx took issue with
those who defend freedom of the press on the grounds of freedom of commerce—even
though he had not turned his attention to economic issues. He argues that “freedom of
trade” is a particular freedom that must not be used to measure other freedoms, since
“every particular sphere of freedom is the freedom of a particular sphere, just as every
particular mode of life is the mode of life of a particular nature.”46 The elevation of the
private over the general strikes Marx as unacceptable because it disturbs the “natural”
ability of human beings as a whole to express their aspirations for free development:
Interest by its very nature is blind, immoderate, one sided; in short, it is lawless
natural instinct, and can lawlessness lay down laws? Private interest is no more
made capable of legislating by being installed on the throne of the legislator than
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a mute is made capable of speech by being given an enormously long speakingtrumpet.47
It is important to note that as of the start of 1843 Marx has neither turned to a
study of political economy nor has he broken from capitalism. His first mention of
“communism” appears in an essay of October 1842, but he mentions it only to dismiss
it.48 He appears to have studied Fourier, Leroux, Considerant, and Proudhon by early
1843, but he takes only passing note of their criticisms of capitalism. Although he attacks
“pseudo-liberalism” on several occasions,49 he remains a radical democrat. It is not until
late 1843—when Marx makes direct contact with French socialists and members of secret
societies of German communists—that he breaks decisively with capitalist society.
That Marx remains within the parameters of a radical but non-revolutionary
critique of politics in 1842-43 has important ramifications for his effort to turn
philosophy to “material matters.” Although he is still seeking to overcome the
philosophic dualities criticized in his doctoral dissertation, he has not yet found the “new
element” upon which to do so. Despite feelings of sympathy for those of the “poorest
estates,” he does not accord them any special role in transforming society, nor does he
indicate how political conditions can actually be changed. His effort to connect ideality
and reality therefore suffers from a tendency to abstractness, as when he writes: “In a true
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state there is no landed property, no industry, no material thing, which as a crude
element of this kind could make a bargain with the state. . . . The state pervades the whole
of nature with spiritual nerves.”50 By “true state,” of course, Marx means one in
conformity with the idea of freedom. However, since he has not yet discovered a material
force that can realize this idea, he dismisses “material” entities such as things and
industry as “crude.” Marx’s political-philosophic project therefore remains quite
incomplete as of this point.
Although it is unclear as to whether Marx was fully aware of these limitations, in
the spring of 1843 he decides to deepen his understanding of the problems associated
with political reality as well as philosophy by both engaging in further studies of modern
politics51 and engaging in a critical commentary on Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The
latter should not be viewed as a departure from his earlier political concerns. Instead, he
turns to the Philosophy of Right because it represents the most comprehensive
philosophic analysis of the political realities that he began to analyze in 1842-43.52
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Marx’s “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right” is one of
his most extensive treatments of Hegel and has become the subject of a considerable
body of scholarly work.53 My aim here is not to engage in a detailed analysis of the
Critique, nor is it to assess the merits or demerits of Marx’s interpretation of Hegel. My
aim is rather to draw out the central ideas of Marx’s Critique that help disclose the
normative principles that he will subsequently employ in his criticism of capitalism as
well as in his elaboration of a possible alternative to it.
Marx’s critique of the Philosophy of Right centers on Hegel’s view of the relation
of civil society and the state. Marx credits Hegel for sharply differentiating them—
something that was not done by Hobbes, Locke, or Rousseau. At one and the same time,
Marx critiques Hegel for inverting the relation between civil society and the state.
Whereas civil society, in Marx’s view, governs the formation of the state, Hegel makes
the state govern the formation of civil society. Hegel posits the state as an “external
necessity” that is above civil society—even though the “abstract” character of the private
sphere of civil society is responsible for the “abstract” character of the modern state.
Marx is not satisfied with simply criticizing Hegel for presenting civil society as the
expression of the state instead of the state as an expression of civil society. He asks why

Right, while marking an important development in his thought, represented a continuation
and indeed culmination of the concerns that characterized his writings of 1842-43.
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Hegel does so. The answer, Marx contends, is that Hegel posits the idea as the subject
instead of as the predicate of the “real subject”—live men and women. He writes, “The
idea is made the subject, and the actual relation of family and civil society to the state is
conceived as its imaginary activity.”54
In Hegel, Marx contends, everything becomes a mere “attribute of the idea, a
result, a product of the idea.” And since the idea is made the subject, “the real subjects,
namely civil society, family . . . become unreal objective elements of the idea with a
changed significance.”55 It therefore follows that in Hegel “it is always on the side of the
predicate . . . that development takes place.”56 Marx writes,
Hegel transforms the predicates, the objects, into independent entities, but
divorced from their actual independence, their subject. Subsequently the actual
subject appears as a result, whereas one must start from the actual subject and
look at its objectification . . . the real subject appears as something else, as an
element of the mystical substance.57
Marx sees a number of problems with Hegel’s inversion of subject and predicate
when it comes to the relation of civil society and the state. First, it makes the state the
active agent and civil society the passive object. Second, although Hegel treats the state
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as an “organism” (which Marx sees a “great advance” ) he fails to explain exactly
how the state is the organic expression of the idea. Third, since the state is presented as
the expression of the idea, Hegel adopts an uncritical attitude towards the state. The state
necessarily becomes viewed uncritically if it is assumed ahead of time that it is an
instantiation of the self-determining idea. Fourth, in presenting the state as the subject
and civil society as the predicate, Hegel fails to explain what mediates their inter-relation.
Hegel at times presents forms of political representation as the mediation between civil
society and the state, while at other times he identifies such forms with the state.
Although the bulk of Marx’s Critique focuses on his disagreements with the
Philosophy of Right, it soon becomes clear that Marx does not just object to Hegel’s
ideas. He objects to the way in which the relation between subject and predicate becomes
inverted in real life—a situation, as noted earlier, that Marx finds akin to madness.
Although civil society, in Marx’s view, is the active principle that brings the modern state
into being, the latter becomes a “person apart” that dominates, controls, and restricts civil
society. Nor does such real inversion stop here. The law is a result and manifestation of
human activity; yet over time it takes on a life of its own and treats the actual subject,
human beings, as its object. The same is true of bureaucracy: a product of subjective
human interaction becomes “a circle from which no one can escape”—it becomes “the
imaginary state alongside the real state.”59 This is also true of political forms of
representation: the legislators present themselves as the subjects who make the law, when
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in fact “the legislature does not make the law; it only discovers and formulates it.”

The critique of inversion extends to Marx’s view of civil society. Although Marx views
civil society as logically prior to the state, he subjects it to critical examination:
Present day civil society is the realized principle of individualism; the individual
existence is the final goal: activity, work, content are mere means. . . . Instead of
the individual function being a function of society, it turns, on the contrary, the
individual function into a society for itself.61
Civil society as well, for Marx, becomes a “person apart” in so far as it is a product of
humanity’s social, communal being—and yet the latter is prevented from being realized
because of civil society’s fostering of individual egoism and self-interest. Marx may
consider civil society the subject of modern society, but it is an abstract subject in that it
represents the separation or alienation of humanity from its communal essence. As a
result, its product, the state, must of necessity assume an abstract form as well. As he puts
it, “In modern times the idea of the state could not appear except in the abstraction of the
‘merely political state’ or the abstraction of civil society from itself.”62
Critical as Marx is of Hegel, it would be wrong to conclude that Marx accuses
him of failing to grasp the realities of the modern era. Marx’s view is that Hegel captures
the realities of the modern era all too well. Hegel expresses in thought the inverted reality
of the social relations of modernity. By identifying the state with the idea—with an
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abstraction—Hegel adequately conveys the abstract (or separate ) nature of the state.
Hegel creates a veritable monument to present-day reality in the form of a philosophic
system. His philosophy thereby does a tremendous service in so far as it helps bring to
consciousness the realities of the world that it is the expression of.
Marx writes, “Hegel is not to be blamed for depicting the nature of the modern
state as it is, but for presenting that which is as the nature of the state.”64 He adds, “Hegel
has often been attacked for his exposition of morality. He has done no more than expound
the morality of the modern state and modern civil law.” Marx refers to this as Hegel’s
“great merit.”65 Marx actually praises Hegel on many occasions in the Critique.66
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Despite claims to the contrary by numerous writers, Marx does not accuse Hegel
of being an apologist for the existing Prussian state. Although it is a commonplace in
much of the secondary literature on Marx to claim that he accused Hegel’s Philosophy of
Right of being an apology for Prussian absolutism, no such claim on Marx’s part appears
in any of his writings. Marx criticized Hegel for accommodating to existing reality
because he seeks a philosophic justification for the relation of civil society and the state;
but he does not accuse Hegel of justifying the specific political practices of the Prussian
government. It was not Hegel, but the late Schelling, whom Marx considered an apologist

75
What Marx’s Critique does not do is accuse Hegel of being an “idealist”
instead of a “materialist.” Although many commentators have presumed that Marx
attacks Hegel for “inverting” the ideal and the real in privileging the former at the
expense of the latter, the criticism never appears once in the 1843 Critique.67 Marx does
not accuse Hegel of neglecting reality, nor does he counterpoise idealism to materialism.
He instead writes that “abstract spiritualism is abstract materialism; abstract materialism
is the abstract spiritualism of matter.”68 Marx does not criticize Hegel for treating reality
abstractly; he criticizes him for treating the subject abstractly—that is, as a mere
embodiment of predicates of consciousness. The latter defect enables Hegel to provide an
adequate description of the actual (abstract) political realities of modern society.
While inversion is a major theme of Marx’s 1843 Critique, it is not the only one.
Marx also critiques modern society for treating “activity, work, content” as mere means
to an end instead of as ends in themselves. As far back as his 1842 writings on freedom
of the press, Marx wrote, “An end which requires unjustified means is no justified end.”69

for Prussian absolutism: “Schelling’s philosophy is Prussian policy sub specie
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He added, “The writer does not look on his work as a means. It is an end in itself; it is
so little a means for him himself that, if need be, he sacrifices his existence of its
existence.”70 This echo of the second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative is no
accident; Marx explicitly refers to the principle on numerous occasions.71 The principle
becomes integral to his “On the Jewish Question,” written shortly after the Critique.
Marx refers to “life in civil society, in which he acts as a private individual, regards men
as a means, degrades himself into a means, and becomes a plaything of alien powers.”72
In the modern world, “political life declares itself to be a mere means, whose purpose is
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Marx’s first explicit reference to the categorical imperative appears in the
“Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy,” in MECW 1:439. That Marx made use of this
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5 (New York: International Publishers, 1976), 193-5. That Marx was highly critical of
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Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, in The Cambridge Edition of
the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, trans. and edit. Mary J. Gregor
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 80: “So act that you use humanity,
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can never be treated merely as a means to the purposes of another to be put among the
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the life of civil society.” On this basis Marx contrasts political emancipation with
human emancipation. In political emancipation civil society is “freed” from the state, but
at the price of turning political life into a mere means for the satisfaction of private,
selfish interests. Although political emancipation is “a big step forward”74 in relation to
despotic world of medieval absolutism, it produces an “upside-down” world in which
“the aim appears as the means, while the means appear as the aim.” Human
emancipation, in contrast, transcends the bifurcation of civil society and the state—it is
the not-yet realized realm in which individuals treat themselves and their fellow humanity
as ends in themselves, never only as a means.75
What Marx draws from his critique of modern politics and Hegel’s Philosophy of
Right is the need to transform the human relations that compels individuals to
subordinate themselves to products of their own creation. He states this principle as: “All
emancipation is a reduction of the human world and relationships to man himself.”76
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Although Marx never uses, as far as I am aware, Kant’s formulation of “the
kingdom of ends,” he does write: “Hence law withdraws into the background in the face
of man’s life as a life of freedom.” See “Proceedings of the Six Rhine Assembly,” in
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“On the Jewish Question,” in MECW 3:168. Emphases are in the original. It is
left unclear as of this point in Marx’s writings as to whether human emancipation would
require the abolition of the state per se as well as the abolition of the separation of the
state from civil society. As I will attempt to show later in this study, in his later writings
Marx does explicitly call for the abolition of the state.

78
Given Marx’s sharp critique of modern society in the 1843 Critique and “On
the Jewish Question,” it is tempting to ask what he envisions as the alternative to its
“abstract” and inverted conditions. While Marx does not directly address the question,
several points seem to be implied by his analysis. One, the individualistic and atomized
nature of civil society needs to be changed so as to accord with the communal nature of
humanity. Two, the separation of the state from the citizenry must be overcome—not
only through the development of representative institutions but also by the transformation
of egotistical civil society. Three, political and social power should not be monopolized
by particular interests at the expense of the general interests of the mass of citizenry, as is
the case with modern bureaucracy. Four, a genuine “mediation” between a transformed
civil society and the state is needed—as against the false forms of mediation suggested by
Hegel’s limited discussion of representative institutions.
Other interpretations of the implications of Marx’s Critique for envisioning an
alternative are possible and the above is by no means an exhaustive list.77 However, we
need to be especially cautious about drawing inferences about Marx’s view of an
alternative from the 1843 Critique. This is not only because it does not explicitly address
alternatives. Most of all, it is because it was composed prior to Marx’s full break with
capitalism. The Critique never so much as mentions either the proletariat or socialism and
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He will later use a similar phrase in his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of
1844—except that he will there refer to communism as the “solved riddle.”79 The Critique
also states, “Only democracy, therefore, is the true unity of the general and the
particular.”80 Although Marx will remain a firm defender of democracy for the rest of his
life, he writes very differently on “On the Jewish Question” (written only a few months
later) in distinguishing political from human emancipation. Political democracy, he
argues, does not end the separation of man from man; instead, it elevates the particular
over the general. “It makes every man see in other men not the realization of his own
freedom, but the barrier to it.”81 Marx therefore speaks of the need to “suppress” the
“prerequisite” of civil society by “declaring the revolution to be permanent.”82 By the
time of his 1843-44 essays in Deutsch-Franzöischer Jahrbücher, Marx realizes that a
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Marx’s 1843 Critique and his Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, in that by
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expression of this abolition. Löwy himself contends that in the 1843 Critique Marx
remains “ideologically confused.” See Michael Löwy, The Theory of Revolution in the
Young Marx (Chicago: Haymarke Books, 2005), 41-45.
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thoroughgoing social transformation is needed in order for society to become
expressive of humanity’s “species being”—its capacity for free, conscious, purposeful
activity.83
There may be a philosophic basis to the political limitations in the 1843 Critique,
in that in some passages Marx seems to remain under the spell of Young Hegelian
assumptions—even while trying to become free from them. At one point, in objecting to
Hegel for positing “self-knowing and self-willing mind” as the subject, he says he prefers
that “actual mind [be] the starting point.”84 This seems some ways from his later
emphasis on stressing the material conditions of society as the starting point.
Despite these limitations, the 1843 Critique marks a crucial moment in Marx’s
evolution, since through his study of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right he has come to a much
richer understanding of the contradictions and defects of modern political reality. As a
result, he now turns to ponder the future, in asking what kind of society can overcome
these defects. He is not at all sure of the answer. As he writes to Arnold Ruge upon
completing the Critique, “Not only has a state of general anarchy set in among the
reformers, but everyone will have to admit to himself that he has no exact idea of what
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the future ought to be.” So how is one to proceed? Marx reiterates his preoccupation
with discerning the ideal from within the real. He writes, “Constructing the future and
settling everything for all times is not our concern.” He does not want to “dogmatically
anticipate” the new world. Instead, he wants “to find the new world through criticism of
the old one.”86 He says the task is to “develop new principles for the world out of the
world’s own principles.” He wants to “merely show the world what it is really fighting
for, and consciousness is something that it has to acquire, even if it does not want to.”87
That Marx is reiterating some of the same concerns expressed in his dissertation,
only now mediated by a much-richer understanding of the defects of contemporary
politics, is shown by his “Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.
Introduction.”88 The ideal towards which we must strive, Marx contends, is to unmask
and transcend “human self-estrangement” in the “unholy forms” of existing society. This
cannot be achieved without a philosophy based on “the categorical imperative to
overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable
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being.” At the same time, “revolutions require a passive element, a material basis. . . .
It is not enough for thought to strive for realization, reality must also strive towards
thought.”90 Marx is clearly reaching for an element within reality that can realize the
ideal—without putting aside the need to philosophically elucidate the ideal. For this
reason he takes issue with two “parties”—the “practical political party,” which turns to
reality at the expense of philosophy, and the “party of philosophy,” which turns away
from reality. Marx is reiterating, on a higher level, his critique of “the party of the
concept” and “the party of reality” that he took issue with in his dissertation.91
So what is the element within reality that is capable of realizing his philosophic
ideals? None other than “a class of civil society which is not of civil society, an estate
which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal character by its
universal suffering and claims no particular right”—the proletariat.92 Hence, “as
philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its
spiritual weapons in philosophy.” With his discovery of the proletariat as the
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revolutionary class, Marx has resolved—or so he thinks—the problematic that
preoccupied him for years concerning the need to overcome the diremption of philosophy
and reality. “Philosophy cannot be made a reality without the abolition of the proletariat,
and the proletariat cannot be abolished without philosophy being made a reality.”93
It is important to note that Marx’s discovery of the proletariat as the revolutionary
class precedes his study of “economic matters,” which began later in 1844. His
conception of the proletariat was part of an effort to resolve a philosophic problematic.94
Now that he has fully broken from capitalist society, he will utilize the concepts he had
developed in his work of 1842-43—such as subject-predicate inversion, treating oneself
and others as ends in themselves, and the need to transform the human relations between
individuals—as he turns to explore the economic conditions of modern existence.
Marx’s Critique of Economics and Philosophy, 1843-44
Marx follows his 1842-43 criticism of politics and philosophy with a wideranging critique of economics and philosophy, beginning in 1844. He plunges into an
extensive study of economic literature, taking voluminous notes on Smith, Ricardo, Say,
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This is not to suggest that Marx’s discovery of the proletariat was purely a
product of philosophic reasoning, let alone a “literary myth,” as some have argued. Upon
moving to Paris in November 1843, Marx for the first time directly meets with French
workers and groups of German communists in exile, whose membership consisted
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MacCulloch, James Mill, List, Skarbek and many others. He also makes direct
contact with secret societies of self-proclaimed “materialist communists,” in April or
May 1844. These groups were distinguished from the utopian socialists in emphasizing
the need to abolish private property in the means of production through a social
revolution. Unlike many of the utopian socialist groupings, they were largely composed
of proletarians.96
As Marx comes to a deeper understanding of the nature of capitalism, he becomes
more specific about what he sees as its problems. Of foremost importance in this regard is
his attitude towards private property and the market. In an early writing that has often
been overlooked in the critical literature on Marx—his 1844 “Comments on James Mill,
Élémens d’économie politique”—he sharply attacks the market, exchange relations, and
money, seeing in them “the social act which man’s activity is alienated from itself.”97 He
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finds commerce and trade to be an “estranged form of social intercourse.” The
problem that he has with commerce is that,
the mediating process between men engaged in exchange is not a social or human
process, not human relationship: it is the abstract relationship of private property
to private property, and the expression of this abstract relationship is value,
whose actual existence as value constitutes money.99
Exchange represents an object-object relation, in which the subject has little or no say.
Chance and accident rules in relations of exchange, not the deliberate acts of human
beings.100 Whereas in pre-capitalist societies people oppress people, in capitalism things
oppress people. “What was the domination of person over person is now the general
domination of the thing over the person, of the product over the producer.”101 Marx is
measuring market and exchange relations against the normative principle, voiced by him
in 1843, that “all emancipation is a reduction of the human world and relationships to
man himself.”
Marx’s objection to exchange relations and the market is clearly stated. What is
not so clear from the Mill excerpts is why do exchange relations take on an alienated
form? Is it because of the nature of exchange as such? Or is it because of the social
relations that they are the expression of?
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Marx provides a possible answer when he writes, “The relationship of
exchange being presupposed, labor becomes directly labor to earn a living.”102 The
meaning of this phrase is not transparent, since Marx must have known that exchange
relations long precede the emergence of wage labor. He mentions that in “primitive”
exchange relations prior to a developed division of labor, what enters the market is only
the laborer’s surplus product. Wage labor cannot become the medium of social
reproduction under such a “primitive form of alienated private property.” It is only later,
when “the division of labor, the product, the material of private property, acquires for the
individual more and more the significance of an equivalent” that universalized market
relations emerge. At that point,
[T]he individual no longer exchanges only his surplus, and the object of his
production can become simply a matter of indifference to him, so he too no longer
exchanges his product for something directly needed by him. The equivalent now
comes into existence as an equivalent in money, which is now the immediate
result of labor to gain a living and the medium of exchange.103
It therefore appears that it is not exchange as such that is the problem but
conditions in which exchange becomes depersonalized. No longer is one person
exchanging a surplus product with another who has his own to exchange. Now all
products, regardless of their material content and the needs that they may fulfill, are
treated as expressions of an abstract equivalent—money. Generalized commodity
exchange therefore leads to wage labor. Marx sees this as an adverse development, since

102

Ibid., 219.

103

Ibid., 221.

87
“The complete domination of the estranged thing over man has become evident in
money, which is completely indifferent . . . to the personality of the property owner.”104
In issuing this criticism, Marx introduces a new concept—alienated labor. He
refers to it as “labor to earn a living.” Alienated labor reaches its “highest peak,” he
writes, when “he who buys the product is not himself a producer, but gives in exchange
what someone else has produced.”105 He does not say much more about alienated labor,
returning instead to the problems that he sees with exchange. It is therefore left unclear as
to whether alienated labor produces alienated exchange relations or whether it results
from generalized commodity exchange. Marx has not yet clarified the relation between
alienated labor on the one hand and the market and private property on the other.
At the end of the piece he suddenly writes, “Let us suppose that we had carried
out production as human beings.” For the first time he ventures into a discussion of a
postcapitalist society, writing: (1) “In my production I would have objectified my
individuality, its specific character”106—that is, alienated labor would no longer exist. I
would now enjoy my activity as well as its products, since the products would express the
specific character of my individuality. (2) In doing so I would have the satisfaction of
meeting another person’s need through the objectification of my activity. (3) “I would
have been the mediator between you and the species”—and so I would see the other
person not as a hostile competitor but as a necessary complement to myself. (4) “In the
104
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individual expression of my life I would have directly created your expression of your
life”—that is, the separation of private from general interests would be overcome. “Our
products would be so many mirrors in which we saw reflected our essential nature”—
because “my work would be a free manifestation of life,” as would yours.107
Curiously, it is only in discussing this vision of a new society that Marx indicates
that the limitations of the market and exchange result from alienated labor. However,
since the discussion of alienated labor is very brief and in the context of a lengthy critique
of exchange relations, it is possible to read the Mill excerpts as suggesting that his main
object of criticism is the “arbitrary” or “irrational” character of the market.108 How the
piece is read largely hinges on determining exactly when Marx composed the Mill
excerpts. If he did so before writing the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
it would indicate that there was an evolution of his thinking in which the question of
alienated labor took on new importance. If he did so after writing the 1844 Manuscripts,
it could indicate that he considered the critique of market and exchange relations as of
equal or even of greater importance than alienated labor. Although there is no scholarly
consensus as to the exact dating of the respective manuscripts, it appears from the most
recent research that the Mill excerpts precede the 1844 Manuscripts.109
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The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 are the most famous of
Marx’s early works. To see how it marks a further development of the project that he
embarked upon from his earliest writings, it is important to grasp the philosophic
underpinning of his critique of political economy as well as the economic ramifications of
his critique of Hegelian philosophy. The two sides have not always achieved sufficient
attention. For instance, although Hal Draper devotes considerable attention to Marx’s
work of the 1840s in his multi-volume Marx’s Theory of Revolution, he pays scant
attention to the Hegelian inheritance, scornfully dismissing it as something Marx
“sloughed off” as he clarified his new world view.110 At the other extreme, Michel Henry
provides a close reading of Marx’s debt to Hegel in Marx: A Philosophy of Human
Reality while passing over its implications for the critique of political economy.111 I will
seek to show that Marx’s encounter with Hegel—as well as the concepts elaborated by
him prior to his break with capitalism—directly impacted his understanding of capital as
well as his conception of the alternative to it.
In the 1844 Manuscripts Marx follows the classical political economists in
defining capital as congealed labor. However, he introduces the important additive that
capital is not the congealment of any kind of labor. It is congealed abstract or alienated
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labor. As he writes in the Second Manuscript, capital is the expression of “a special
sort of work [which is] indifferent to its content, of complete being-for-self, of
abstraction from all other being.”112 Though Marx has not yet developed his concept of
the dual character of labor that will become so central to Capital (and which he defines as
his unique contribution to the critique of political economy), in 1844 he already defines
capital as congealed abstract labor. He writes in the First Manuscript,
The proletarian . . . lives purely by labor, and by a one-sided, abstract labor . . .
what in the evolution of mankind is the meaning of this reduction of the greater
part of mankind to abstract labor? Political economy considers labor in the
abstract as a thing, labor as a commodity. . . . Capital is stored up labor.113
The worker is forced to live “purely by labor” in becoming an instrument of
production—a mere appendage to a machine. He writes, “The machine accommodates
itself to the weakness of the human being in order to make the human being into a
machine.”114 The workers’ activity is reduced to an “abstract mechanical movement.”
What makes this development possible is the separation of labor from the objective
conditions of production. By tearing the laborers from their connection to their “natural
workshop” of the land, capitalism denies workers a direct connection to the means of
production. The workers “own” nothing but their capacity to labor115 and are compelled
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to sell it to individual property owners. Private interest prevails over general interest in
the form of private ownership of the production process. As noted earlier, Marx views the
predominance of the former over the latter as a violation of the communal or social
nature of humanity. He therefore aligns himself with the main demand of the socialist and
communist movements of his time—the abolition of private property.116
However, Marx brings a distinctive perspective to demands to transform property
relations by arguing that the abolition of private property does not necessarily lead to the
abolition of capital. To liberate the worker, he argues, it is necessary to go deeper than
the property relation and deal with “the direct relation of the worker and production.”
In doing so, we discover that in the production process “labor itself becomes an
object.”117 Labor, as a subjective activity, becomes thingified. It is not hard to notice the
separation or alienation of the product from the producer on the basis of the principles
enunciated by the classical political economists, since they argued that labor is the source
of all value. It stands to reason, once this premise is accepted, that the workers receive
less value in the forms of wages and benefits than is contained in the value of their
products. However, classical political economy conceals what Marx considers the more
important problem—the separation or alienation of labor from its own activity. When we
116
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directly examine what happens to the worker in the process of production, we see that
his own activity “is turned against him, [becomes] independent of him.”118 Marx is now
applying his critique of subject-predicate inversion to the labor process. The very activity
of the subject becomes the predicate—a thing apart that dominates and controls the real
subject.
Marx also critiques existing society for treating labor into a mere means to an end
instead of as an end in itself. As he puts it, “In the wage of labor, the labor does not
appear as an end in itself but as the servant of the wage.”119 The products of labor are
likewise not treated as ends in themselves, but only as means to satisfy egotistical need.
Although Marx begins his criticism by showing that workers are alienated from
the product of their labor, he takes great pains to show that the source of this inequity lies
in the alienated character of labor itself. By reducing labor to a mere means to earn a
living in which all joy and satisfaction is banished, the workers no longer feels at home in
their own labor. This necessitates the existence of an alien class which extracts forced
labor from the worker. Only then does it become possible for the product of labor to
become alienated from the worker. For this reason Marx writes, “The relationship of the
worker to labor creates the relation of it to the capitalist (or whatever one chooses to call
the master of labor).”120 He concludes:
Private property is thus the result, the necessary consequence of alienated labor,
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of the external relation of the workers to nature and to himself . . . though
private property appears to be the reason, the cause of alienated labor, it is rather
its consequence, just as the gods are originally not the cause but the effect of
man’s intellectual confusion.121
Marx thinks he is onto something important here; he explicitly says it “sheds light
on various hitherto unresolved conflicts.”122 The inattentive reader may pass over the fact
that it resolves a conflict that Marx himself has been struggling with. As we saw from the
“Comments on James Mill,” Marx initially focuses his critique of capitalism on the
existence of private property and relations of exchange. For this reason, his first
encounter of Proudhon’s work—which held that “property is theft”—was highly positive.
He now takes a very different view. Classical political economy, he notes, “starts from
labor as the real soul of production” and yet never directly analyzes the relation of the
worker and production. It instead “gives” everything to its defense of private property.
However, “when one speaks of private property, one thinks of dealing with something
external to man.”123 Property is, after all, the product of human activity. Classical
political economy reverses matters, by presenting the predicate—property relations—as
the determining factor while ignoring the estranged nature of the workers’ activity. Marx
now realizes that Proudhon fails to break from this inversion. “Proudhon has decided in
favor of labor against private property”124 since he opposes private property. However, he
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does not recognize that capitalism’s property relations are themselves a product of “the
contradiction of estranged labor with itself.”125 Much like the classical political
economists, Proudhon is “dealing with something external to man.”
Marx, on the other hand, sees the need to go much further. As noted earlier, in
“On the Jewish Question” Marx wrote, “All emancipation is a reduction, of the human
world and relationships to man himself.”126 He reaches this view through a critique of
religion. In contrast to Bruno Bauer and the Hegelian Left, Marx does not see religion as
the cause of secular distress; he rather sees secular distress as the cause of religion. He
proceeds to try to comprehend the reasons for secular distress. As he comes into contact
with socialist and communist currents and engages in a serious study of political
economy in 1844, he sees that the existence of private property is a major reason for such
distress. However, since private property is an objectified product of human activity, the
critique of private property does not satisfy the requirement of reducing all emancipation
to “relationships to man himself.” The critique of private property still deals with what is
“external to man.” Marx’s normative principle of human emancipation—which he
reiterates in 1844 as “man’s relation to himself only becomes for him objective and
actual through his relation to the other man”127—drives him to look deeper than the
property relation. This takes him to his theory of alienated labor. As he puts it, “When
one speaks of labor, one is directly dealing with man himself. This new formulation of
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How does it contain its solution? It follows from the analysis that while private
property must be abolished—since it separates workers to from the conditions of
production—that alone does not get to the heart of the problem. The heart of the problem
is abolishing capital itself, by ending the estrangement in the very activity of laboring. We
have reached the conceptual pivot of what Marx sees as the alternative to capitalism.
Marx comes to this conclusion by proceeding phenomenologically. As noted
earlier, the “Comments on James Mill” begins by taking issue with the most obvious,
phenomenal manifestations of distress in capitalist society: the inequalities generated by
private property and the market. As he deepens his critique of capitalism on the basis of
the normative principles projected in his early writings, he emphasizes the essential
determinants responsible for private property and the market. By the end of the 1844
Manuscripts he has reached a self-clarification that was not yet evident in his earlier
writings.129 Marx’s process of coming to terms with the alienation of labor is a vivid selfconfirmation of his statement that “the transcendence of self-estrangement follows the
same course of self-estrangement.”130
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Now that Marx has penetrated to the root of the problem of capitalism, he
becomes more specific about the postcapitalist society he is reaching for. Wages, he
writes, are a form of private property, since they are paid to the worker on the basis of the
capitalist’s ownership of the products of labor. He has shown that private property is not
the cause but the consequence of alienated labor. It follows that paying everyone an equal
wage—as proposed by many utopian socialists—fails to address the issue of alienated
labor. In fact, Marx writes, “the equality of wages, as demanded by Proudhon, only
transforms the relationship of the present-day worker to his labor into the relationship of
all men to labor. Society is then conceived as an abstract capitalist.”131 This is in many
respects a remarkable passage, for it anticipates the problems with many of the social
experiments that will be carried out (ironically enough) in Marx’s name in the twentieth
century. Two points are worth noting from this. First, wages, like property, are results of
human activity. They are made necessary by the existence of alienated labor. To ignore
alienated labor while altering wage and property relations through the elimination of
private capitalists does not undermine the necessity for a ruling class to impose forced
labor on the workers. Society has a whole now becomes the “abstract capitalist.” One
form of oppression is ended by instituting an ever more egregious form of oppression.
Second, if everyone is paid the same wage, labor becomes treated as a uniform
abstraction. Treating labor as an abstraction, however, is precisely the problem with
alienated labor. Proudhon reduces property to “labor”: but he has failed to notice that this
is precisely what capitalism does by treating “labor” as a producer of value irrespective of
131
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In the name of “liberation,” Proudhon is

fulfilling the central mission of capitalism—to reduce labor to an undifferentiated
sameness, which Marx calls “abstract labor.”
Since Marx’s 1844 critique of Proudhon represents the first time that he has
distinguished his understanding of a postcapitalist society from that of a fellow socialist,
we need to look more closely at the issue. Although it may not be obvious from a first
reading, the concepts that Marx employs in his critique are largely drawn from Hegel’s
dialectic. Marx’s expression that capital is the expression of “a special sort of work
[which is] indifferent to its content, of complete being-for-self, of abstraction from all
other being,” indicates that he is utilizing Hegelian categories to describe capital. Capital,
as self-expanding value, is “indifferent” to otherness, be it of nature or human
sensuousness, which it seeks to subsume under its self-movement; yet at the same time,
capital must take on a material, externalized form. Hegel presents a similar dynamic in
discussing “being-for-self” in the Science of Logic:
We say that something is for itself in so far as it transcends otherness, its
connection and community with other, has repelled them and made abstraction
from them. . . . Being for self is the polemical, negative attitude towards the
limiting other, and through this negation of the latter is a reflectedness-into-self,
although along with this return of consciousness into itself and the ideality of the
object, the reality of the object is also still preserved, in that it is at the same time
known as an external existence.133
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Marx’s employment of Hegelian categories to delineate the logic of capital will
take on even greater significance in the Grundrisse and Capital. Yet this does not mean
that Hegel was important to Marx only insofar as he helps reveal the nature of capital.
Hegel’s dialectic also impacted Marx’s conception of what is needed to transcend capital.
This is especially seen from his critical appropriation of Hegel’s dialectic of negativity
“as the moving and creating principle” in the 1844 Manuscripts. In Hegel, all movement
proceeds through the power of negativity, the negation of obstacles to the subject’s selfdevelopment. The actual transcendence of these obstacles is reached not through the
negation of their immediate and external forms of appearance (which Hegel calls first
negation), but through “the negation of the negation.” In the “negation of the negation,”
the power of negativity gets turned back upon the self, upon the internal as well as
external barriers to self-movement. The negation of the negation, or absolute negativity,
posits from itself the positive, the transcendence of alienation. For Hegel second
negativity “is the innermost and most objective moment of life and spirit, by virtue of
which a subject is personal and free.”134 As he wrote in the Science of Logic
But in all this, care must be taken to distinguish between the first negation as
negation in general, and the second negation, the negation of the negation: the
latter is concrete, absolute negativity, just as the former on the contrary is only
abstract negativity.135
Marx enters into a direct engagement with Hegel’s concept of negativity in the
final part of the Third Manuscript, the “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic.” He focuses
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on the concluding chapter of the Phenomenology of Mind, “Absolute Knowledge,” as
well as the Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences. The chapter on “Absolute
Knowledge” contains Hegel’s fullest discussion of self-movement through self-reflected
negativity, and Marx believes that he has found within it the merits as well as demerits of
Hegel’s philosophical system as a whole. The significance that Marx accords the chapter
on “Absolute Knowledge” is indicated by the fact that he devotes more direct and
detailed investigation of it than to any other single chapter of Hegel’s writings.136
In his “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic,” Marx is first of all scathingly critical
of what he finds in “Absolute Knowledge,” which represents a summation of the stages
of consciousness traversed in the Phenomenology as a whole. He argues that the chapter
shows that the structure of the Phenomenology is fatally flawed because the subject of
the dialectical movement is disembodied self-consciousness instead of as live men and
women. Marx writes, “For Hegel the human being—man—equals self-consciousness.”137
This dehumanization of the Idea has critical ramifications for Hegel’s philosophic
system as a whole. Since Hegel presents the subject as disembodied thought, the
externalization (or alienation) of the subject’s creative capacities is treated as mere
objects of thought. Or as Marx puts it, “the products of men appear as the products of the
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And since externalized objects are mere thought-forms, Hegel

poses the transcendence of externalization or alienation as the return of thought to
itself—“Absolute Knowledge”—and not as return of humanity to itself.
In sum, the structure of Hegel’s philosophic system inverts the relation of subject
and predicate. Marx contends that even when the Phenomenology brilliantly illuminates
the nature of real phenomena—such as civil society, the family, and the state—it does so
by treating them as emanations of the Idea. What Marx had earlier pinpointed as the
central flaw in the Philosophy of Right—the inversion of subject and predicate—is now
seen by him as the Achilles heel of Hegel’s entire philosophy. Marx is here clearly
relying heavily on Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity, the work in which Feuerbach
made much of Hegel’s inversion of subject and predicate.139
It is important to recognize, however, that by inversion Marx is not referring to
Hegel’s prioritizing of “idealism” over “materialism.” Marx’s critique of the
Phenomenology no more counterpoises “materialism” to Hegel’s “idealism” than does his
earlier analysis of the Philosophy of Right.140 As he did earlier, Marx credits Hegel for
his realistic insight into actual material conditions. This is especially the case when it
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comes to the concept of labor. Marx writes that the “outstanding achievement” of
Hegel’s Phenomenology “and of its final outcome”—a direct reference to the chapter on
“Absolute Knowledge”—is its treatment of labor:
Hegel conceives the self-creation of man as a process, conceives objectification as
loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this alienation; that he
grasps the essence of labor and comprehends objective man—true, because real
man—as the outcome of man’s own labor.141
Marx adds, “The only labor which Hegel knows and recognizes is abstractly
mental labor.”142 Many commentators have taken this to mean that Marx is accusing
Hegel of dealing only with intellectual labor, not the corporeal labor of the actual process
of production.143 On these grounds they argue that Marx is counterpoising a “materialist”
conception of labor to Hegel’s “idealism.” However, a careful examination of the text
raises serious questions about this interpretation. First, it is hard to imagine that Marx
would have so superficial an understanding of Hegel as not to realize that the
Phenomenology discusses labor in concrete terms in numerous places—such as in the
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master-slave dialectic. Second, the above interpretation fails to account for Marx’s
view that the Phenomenology gives a real account of human relations—labor among
them.
So why does Marx write that Hegel recognizes only abstractly mental labor?
Nicholas Lobkowicz, who takes issue with many traditional readings of Marx’s critique
of Hegel in Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx, helps
supply us with the answer:
In short, Marx does not accuse Hegel of having treated labor as if it were a
thought activity. Rather, he accuses him of having in the Phenomenology
described human history in terms of a dialectic of consciousness, not in terms of
[a] dialectic of labor. When he says that the only labor which Hegel recognizes is
abstract mental labor, he has in mind the structure of the Phenomenology and in
fact of Hegel’s whole [philosophy], not the passages on labor in the
Phenomenology and other writings by Hegel. For what Marx wants to say is that
Hegel’s description of the movement of self-consciousness is an adulterated
description of the historical movement of laboring humanity.144
According to this reading, Hegel sees labor as the creative self-expression of
human creativity unfolding through the dialectical process of externalization and the
transcendence of externalization. Marx was greatly indebted to Hegel for this insight.
However, Marx recognizes that by structuring his system upon the notion of a
disembodied subject Hegel lacked access to a vantage point from which to envision the
actual transcendence of alienated labor in capitalist society. Like the classical political
economists, he failed to distinguish between labor as a transhistorical, creative expression
of humanity’s “species being” and labor as the perverse reduction of such activity to an
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absolute abstraction—value production. In sum, Marx accuses Hegel of seeing only
the positive and not the negative side of labor.145 By conflating alienated labor and
“labor,” Hegel uncritically accommodates himself to the peculiar social form of labor in
capitalism. As a result, his philosophic system becomes the expression of alienation
itself. As Lobkowicz succinctly puts it:
Marx claims that the very fact that Hegel translates the real dialectic of laboring
humanity into a dialectic of mentally laboring self-consciousness is itself a
reflection of alienated labor. . . . Hegel’s description of history as a movement of
mentally laboring self-consciousness is nothing but “the self-objectification . . .
of the alienated mind of the world within its self-alienation.”146
Once again, the problem is not that Hegel fails to grasp reality. The problem is that he
grasps reality all too well. By inverting the relation of subject and predicate, Hegel has
provided a philosophic expression of “the general estrangement of the human being and
therefore also of human thought.” Hegel has “brought these together and presented them
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In doing so the Phenomenology provides

the philosophic expression of the very realities that Marx is determined to criticize.
Apprehending the reason that Marx accuses Hegel of knowing “only abstractly
mental labor” is of critical importance in pinpointing exactly what he objects to in Hegel.
The inversion that Marx objects to is not that Hegel gets things upside-down by dealing
with mental instead of material entities. He objects to the way in which Hegel inverts the
relation of subject and predicate, regardless of whether he is dealing with mental or
material entities. Raya Dunayevskaya argues, “Deeply rooted as Marx’s concept of
Alienated Labor is in Hegel’s theory of alienation, Marx’s analysis is no simple inversion
(much less a Feuerbachian inversion) of dealing with labor when Hegel was dealing only
with Consciousness.” 148 For all of its critical defects, Hegel’s Phenomenology, Marx
contends, nevertheless grasps, in abstract form, the “actual movement of history.”
We are now in the position to discern the similarities as well as differences
between Marx’s 1843 critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and his 1844 critique of the
Phenomenology of Spirit and Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences. Marx turns to a
critique of the Philosophy of Right in the midst of an intense engagement with political
reality, as part of his effort to discern the limitations of existing political formations. He
finds that the Philosophy of Right provides the philosophic expression of these
limitations. In 1844, he turns to a critique of the Phenomenology of Spirit in the midst of
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an intense engagement with economic reality, as part of his effort to discern the limits
of existing economic formations. He finds that the Phenomenology provides the
philosophic expression of these limitations. In posing the subject of dialectical movement
as disembodied self-consciousness, the “gallery of images” and entities analyzed in the
Phenomenology are treated as mere thought forms. Since actual entities are treated as
emanations of the Idea, Hegel adopts an uncritical attitude towards them. Hegel’s Logic,
Marx writes, is “the money of the spirit”—“its essence which has grown totally
indifferent to real determinateness.”149 Hegel’s philosophic system therefore expresses,
Marx argues, the very economic process of abstraction that is at the core of capitalism.
However, there is also a critical difference between Marx’s attitude towards the
Philosophy of Right and the Phenomenology of Spirit. Although Marx credits the
Philosophy of Right with expressing the alienated nature of modern politics, he never
suggests that it intimates the transcendence of such realities. The matter is very different
when it comes to the Phenomenology. Instead of completely rejecting the concept of selfmovement through second negativity, Marx argues that it contains a key insight: namely,
that the transcendence of alienation is reached as a result of a movement through second
negativity. Marx sees in this an “estranged insight” that points to an alternative to
capitalism—“positive humanism, beginning from itself.”150
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Marx appropriates Hegel’s discussion of the dialectic of negativity in the
Phenomenology and Encyclopedia by arguing that the first negation is the abolition of
private property. Yet this negation by no means ensures liberation; on the contrary, “this
type of abolition of private property is . . . only a retrogression, a sham universality.” He
calls it “the abstract negation of the entire world of culture and civilization.”151 This
“vulgar communist” negation of private property must itself be negated in order to reach
liberation. Whether this type of communism is “democratic or despotic” makes little
difference; it is defective because it is infected with its opposite in focusing exclusively
on the question of property. To abolish capital the negation of private property must itself
be negated. Only then will there arise “positive Humanism, beginning from itself.” For
this reason, Marx calls genuine communism (which he equates to “a thoroughgoing
Naturalism or Humanism”) “the position of the negation of the negation.”152
It is on this issue of the negation of the negation that Marx parts company with
Feuerbach, who rejected the concept tout court as a mystical abstraction that has no
bearing on reality. Marx writes:
Feuerbach thus conceives the negation of the negation only as the contradiction of
philosophy with itself—as the philosophy which affirms Theology (the
Despite the importance of his critique of the Philosophy of Right, it is circumscribed by
the limits of its subject matter—Hegel’s political theory, which does not intimate a
transcendence of capitalist alienation. Marx returns to “settle accounts” with Hegel in
1844 because the Phenomenology discloses something that is not found in the Philosophy
of Right—an intimation, “estranged” as it is, of the transcendence of alienation through
double negation.
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transcendent, etc.) after having denied it. . . . But because Hegel has conceived
the negation of the negation from the point of view of the positive relation
inherent in it, to that extent he has discovered, though only as an abstract, logical,
and speculative expression, the movement of history . . . 153
Marx then writes, “It is now time to formulate the positive aspects of the Hegelian
dialectic within the realm of estrangement.” What he praises is nothing less than Hegel’s
concept of the transcendence of alienation through second negativity:
Supersession as an objective movement of retracting the alienation into self. This
is the insight, expressed within the estrangement, concerning the appropriation of
the objective essence through the supersession of its estrangement: it is the
estranged insight into the real objectification of man, into the real appropriation
of his objective essence through the annihilation of the estranged character of the
objective world . . . 154
Marx contends that the transcendence of alienation in Hegel represents the mere return of
thought to itself because Hegel treats the subject of the dialectic as disembodied selfconsciousness. However, Marx holds that when this defect is corrected by treating “real
corporeal man”155 as the subject of the dialectic, this same concept of the transcendence
of alienation through double negation expresses the path to freedom—which he refers to
as the “return of man from religion, family, state, etc., to his human, i.e., social
existence.”156
Marx’s intense focus on Hegel’s concept of “the negation of the negation” is
also evident in his Notes on the chapter “Absolute Knowledge,” composed around the
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same time as the 1844 “Critique.” Although Hegel actually never explicitly mentions
the “negation of the negation” in the chapter on “Absolute Knowledge,” Marx singles it
out as a conceptual determinate underpinning that chapter and the Phenomenology of
Spirit as a whole.157
Through his critical appropriation of the concept of self-movement through
absolute negativity, Marx’s 1844 Manuscripts projects a truly new and revolutionary
world conception, one which takes him far from the positions held by other socialists and
communists of the time.158 He sees the process of revolutionary transformation not as a
singular act, as the negation of private property and political overthrow of the
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bourgeoisie, necessary as that is, but as a consistently self-critical social revolution,
that is, as a process of permanent revolution. Crude communism—the abolition of private
property—is only the first negation. It is a necessary but insufficient step towards
liberation. To achieve “positive humanism, beginning from itself” much more is
needed—the negation of the negation. Although Marx is highly critical of the way Hegel
presents the dialectic of negativity, he appropriates Hegel’s concept of self-movement
through absolute negativity when it comes to projecting his own conception of the
future.159
He goes so far as to write, “Communism is the necessary form and dynamic
principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human
development, the form of human society.”160 But if communism is only the immediate
but not ultimate goal, what is Marx really striving for? It appears that it is what he calls
“a totality of human manifestations of life.”161 He refers to a new society as one that
“produces man in this entire richness of his being—produces the rich man profoundly
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This is far beyond crude

communism, which like capitalism reduces human sensuousness to one sense—the sense
of having. Yet it is not clear that Marx considers even genuine communism or “positive
humanism” as the end or goal of human development, in that manifesting a totality of
latent and acquired sensuous abilities is an endless process of becoming. Perhaps it was
not without good reason Marx spoke of continuing the revolution “in permanence.”
Marx peers into the future in the 1844 Manuscripts in asking what would happen
when we “Assume man to be man, and his relationship to the world to be a human
world.” When that is achieved there would be exchange—but an exchange of “love only
for love, trust only for trust, etc.” If one wants to enjoy any manifestation of life, be it art
or anything else, one would need to develop a sense for it. Simply obtaining things in lieu
of such attunement leaves one impoverished. “Every one of your relations to man and to
nature must be a specific expression, corresponding to the object of your will, of your
real individual life”163—which is one more way of saying that “All emancipation is a
reduction of the human world and relationships to man himself.”164
It can be argued that much of what Marx is discussing about the future is vague
and indeterminate. He surely provides little or no discussion of the institutional forms165
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that might help promote a totality of manifestations of life. Yet it would be a mistake
to interrupt the apparently ethereal character of much of Marx’s discussion to mean that
he was either unclear about the kind of society that he wanted or that he saw no need to
envision the nature of one at all. He writes in the 1844 Manuscripts,
In order to abolish the idea of private property, the idea of communism is quite
sufficient. It takes actual communist action to abolish actual private property.
History will lead to it; and this movement, which in theory we already know to be
a self-transcending movement, will constitute in actual fact a very rough and
protracted process. But we must regard it as a real advance to have at the outset
gained a consciousness of the limited character as well as of the goal of this
historical movement—and a consciousness that reaches out beyond it.166
Far from refraining from any discussion about the future, Marx is here reflecting
on the future on two levels. One is the idea of communism—the immediate principle of
the future—that has as its task the elimination of private property and alienated labor.
The other is a realization of the idea of freedom that is much more open-ended and harder
to define or even give a name to, since it involves the return of humanity to itself as a
sensuous being exhibiting a totality of manifestations of life. Marx considers it a “real
advance” to be able to say this much about the future. We now need to see how he will
further specify this when faced with an array of specific social tendencies and problems.

advocates an “association” of producers that “shares the economic advantage of largescale landed property” as well as “the original tendency” towards equality. He does not
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Discerning the Idea Within the Real, 1845-47
Upon completing the 1844 Manuscripts, Marx becomes directly involved in
workers’ movements and writes a series of works to further clarify his break from
capitalism and the need to replace it with a totally new kind of society, culminating in his
famous Communist Manifesto, written at the very end of 1847.167 His writings of 1845-47
contain especially rich reflections about the alternative to capitalism. The central issue
that concerns him is summed up in a passage in The German Ideology:
Individuals always proceeded, and always proceed, from themselves. Their
relations are the relations of their real life process. How does it happen that their
relations assume an independent existence over against them? And that the forces
of their own life become superior to them?168
Marx is specifying the inversion of subject and predicate as the defining feature of
modern social existence, in that the relations formed by individuals becomes a “person
apart” that govern their lives without their consent. His primary criticism of
contemporary thinkers is that they fall prey to this inversion. In The Holy Family he
critiques Bruno Bauer and other Young Hegelians for presenting “truth as an automaton
that proves itself.” For them, “history, like truth, becomes a person apart, a metaphysical
subject of which the real human individuals are mere bearers.”169 He writes in reply:
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History does nothing, it “possesses no immense wealth,” it “wages no battles.”
It is man, real, living man who does all that, who possesses and fights: “history” is
not, as it were, a person apart, using man as a means to achieve its own aims;
history is nothing but the activity of man pursuing his aims.170
On these grounds he rejects the view that history unfolds in necessarily progressive
stages. He pours scorn upon Bauer’s contention that socialists and communists endorse
unilinear theories of progressive improvement. Marx insists that the very opposite is the
case, since figures like Fourier considered “progress” to be no more than an “abstract
phrase.” Marx writes, “In spite of the pretensions of ‘Progress,’ continual retrogressions
and circular movements occur . . . the category, ‘Progress’ is completely empty and
abstract.”171 Holding that history is destined to proceed along fixed “progressive” lines
assumes that we are helpless victims (or beneficiaries) of what we ourselves create.
On the same grounds he attacks those who pose “society” as a quasi-autonomous
force. He writes in The German Ideology, “Society is abstracted from these individuals, it
is made independent, it relapses into a savagery of its own, and the individuals suffer as a
result of their relapse.”172 Marx is further developing his understanding of the relation
between civil society and the state that he first formulated in his critique of Hegel’s
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Philosophy of Right. He attacks the notion that the state holds together civil society.
On the contrary, it is civil society that holds together the state.173 This is in keeping with
his view that the state is an edifice created by mutually interacting individuals instead of
being some autonomous force that shapes civil society of its own accord. Marx is not
satisfied, however, with simply pointing out the logical priority of civil society over the
state. He wants to know why the state appears to have priority over civil society. The
answer lies in the limits of civil society itself. He asks,
How is it that personal interests always develop, against the will of the
individuals, into class interests, into common interests which acquire independent
existence in relation to the individual persons, and in their independence assume
the form of general interests? . . . How is it that in this process of private interests
acquiring independent existence as class interests the personal behavior of the
individual is bound to be objectified, estranged, and at the same time exists as a
power independent of man and without him?174
His answer is that “definite modes of production” arise that compels civil society to take
the form of incompatible relations between private and general interests. The abstraction
of individual from general interests makes it necessary for a state to persist that externally
mediates the relation between these mutually antagonistic forces. The state, a product of
human activity, now takes on a life of its own and governs the behavior of individuals
behind their backs—because of the limitations of civil society. He therefore argues in
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“Theses on Feuerbach,” “The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; that of
the new is human society, or social humanity.”175
“Social humanity” is not, however, a “person apart” that externally imposes its
will upon individuals. It is rather a state in which individuals freely relate to themselves
and each other on the basis of their self-activity.176 Marx refers to this in the 1844
Manuscripts as: “Above all we must avoid postulating ‘society’ again as an abstraction
vis-à-vis the individual. The individual is the social being.” Marx is not trying to wall
humanity into the “social”; he rather seeks a mutual compatibility between individual and
general interests.177
Yet exactly how does the present mode of production compel civil society to
assume an abstract form? The answer is the social division of labor. By forcing
individuals to adhere to a social division of labor, individuals become radically separated
from one other. This separation takes on a fixed form, regardless of their actual talents
and abilities. Society becomes an abstraction that governs the lives of individuals instead
of the other way around:
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As long as man remains in naturally evolved society, that is, as long as the
cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, so long,
therefore, as activity is not voluntary, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed
becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being
controlled by him.178
We have reached the acme of subject-predicate inversion. Marx is now supplying
a historical, materialist explanation for the inversion that he objected to so strongly in his
analyses of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and Phenomenology of Spirit.
How is this inversion to be overcome? By abolishing the social division of labor.
Once individuals are allowed to freely pursue a variety of talents and tasks as befits their
particular nature, instead of having their role be “fixed” by some preordained social
power “above” them, a new society would exist. Such a society is described as follows:
[I]n communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the
general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and
another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the
evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without every becoming a
hunter, fisherman, shepherd, or critic.179
Marx clearly has some idea of what a postcapitalist society would be like. Yet he
remains wary as of this point about saying much more about it. Instead, he writes,
It is not a question of what this or that proletarian, or even the whole proletariat, at
the moment regards as its aim. It is a question of what the proletariat is, and
what, according to this being, it will historically be compelled to do.180
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I would argue that Marx’s reticence about indulging in detailed speculation about the
future society in favor of what the proletariat itself is and is compelled to do is closely
connected to his opposition to subject-predicate inversion. Posing a vision of the new
society for the proletariat or irrespective of what it is amounts to foisting a product of
intelligence or imagination upon the actual subject of history. Much of what Marx has
criticized in capitalism in his early writings centers on the tendency to foist the products
of human development upon the subject, irrespective of its own needs and desires. Why
would he now favor promoting a vision of the new society irrespective of the proletariat’s
needs and desires?
Furthermore, a major theme that Marx has emphasized since his doctoral
dissertation (if not earlier) has been the need to discern the ideal from within the real.
Indulging in speculation about the future irrespective of the subjective force that can
realize the ideal amounts to a violation of one of Marx’s primary normative standpoints.
Early in 1845, not long after composing The Holy Family, Marx develops a new
concept that represents a further expression of his effort to discern the forms of the future
from within the contours of the present. In his “Draft of an Article on Friedrich List’s
Book Das Nationale System der Politicshen Ökonomie,” he poses the development of
modern industry as providing the material conditions for a postcapitalist society. He
writes of “the power which industry has without knowing or willing it and which destroys
it and creates the basis for a human existence.”181 This power is in the proletariat, which
is produced by modern industry. Utilizing a metaphor he will later employ in Capital and
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other writings, the proletariat is the “human kernel” contained within the “shell” of
industry that will burst forth from its further development. Industry, the product of human
activity, takes on a life of its own and becomes the subjective force of capitalist society.
Although Marx opposes this inversion, he now sees in it the seeds of an inversion of the
inversion, since the point will one day be reached when the product of industry—the
workers—will step forth as the real subject, as the “bearers of human development.”
History in the modern era takes on a life on its own and operates behind the backs of its
participants; but in doing so, it brings forth the subjective force that can dissolve this
upside-down world. Genuine history will at that point finally begin.
The German Ideology further develops this by emphasizing the development of
the productive forces as the precondition for communism. The productive forces include
technology, scientific knowledge, and the overall level of industry. The most important
productive force is the proletariat, which is generated by all three. Any effort to create a
communist society without the development of these productive forces, he argues, will
ensure that communism remains a local and transient phenomenon. “The proletariat can
thus exist only world-historically, just as communism, its activity, can only have a
‘world-historical’ existence.” What will help bring communism into being is capitalism’s
drive to subject all human relations to value production through the creation of a world
market. He concludes, “Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be
established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the
real movement which abolishes the present state of things.”182
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This does not mean, however, that consciousness of a future communist
society is unnecessary. He argues that “communist consciousness” on a mass scale is
needed because “an alteration of men on a mass scale is necessary.” It is needed not just
to overthrow the bourgeoisie but in order for a revolution to “succeed in ridding itself of
all the muck of the ages and become fitted to found society anew.”183 Marx has not
departed from his insistence, voiced in a letter to Ruge in 1843, that “consciousness is
something that [humanity] has to acquire, even if it does not want to.”184
There is something of a tension between these two sides of formulating the issue.
On the one hand, communism is a state of affairs that will emerge immanently from the
contradictions of capitalism; yet at the same time, it remains necessary to develop an
awareness of a future communist society in order for a revolution to succeed in radically
altering human relations. Marx holds that the immanent rhythm of reality will prepare the
way for an alternative; yet he does not appear to assume that its emergence is for that
reason guaranteed. Consciousness, or theoretical labor, is needed to help bring it forth.
Marx therefore feels that nothing prohibits him directly discussing the distinguishing
feature of a postcapitalist society even as he warns against engaging in idle speculation
about the nature of such a state of affairs:
Communism differs from all previous movements in that it overturns the
basis of all earlier relations of production and intercourse, and for the first time
consciously treats all naturally evolved premises as the creations of hitherto
existing men. . . . Its organization is, therefore, essentially economic, the material

183

Ibid., 53.

184

Ibid., 144.

120
production of the conditions of this unity; it turns existing conditions into
conditions of unity. The reality which communism creates is precisely the true
basis for rendering it impossible that anything should exist independently of
individuals, insofar as reality is nevertheless only a product of the preceding
intercourse of individuals, insofar as reality is nevertheless only a product of the
preceding intercourse of individuals.185
Marx is here defining the new society that he is striving for on the basis of a
critique of subject-predicate inversion and the normative principle that “All emancipation
is a reduction of the human world and relationships to man himself.”186
He further specifies additional aspects of a postcapitalist society in his writings of
1845-47. He argues that in such a society the proletariat does not become the ruling class,
since there are neither classes nor a proletariat. The proletariat simply ceases to exist:
“When the proletariat is victorious, it by no means becomes the absolute side of society,
for it is victorious only by abolishing itself and its opposite. Then the proletariat
disappears.”187 He also writes that since “the communist revolution is directed against the
hitherto existing mode of activity” it “does away with labor.”188 Marx does not suggest
that laboring activity literally comes to an end but that “the whole opposition between
work and enjoyment disappears.”189 “Labor” as an activity that is distinct from the
enjoyment of a wealth of sensuous possibilities no longer mediates social interaction and
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reproduction. Labor in this sense is abolished. Along these lines, he further develops
the emphasis of the 1844 Manuscripts on developing “a totality of manifestations of life”
as a defining feature of the new society. He now speaks of the “development of a totality
of desires,” arguing that individuals become fixated on a small number of desires when
society prevents them from pursuing a wide range of them. Marx thinks it is an
“absurdity” to presume that one can satisfy one passion or desire “apart from all others.”
When one passion is pursued at the expense of a multiplicity of desires, the passion
becomes interminable; it “assumes an abstract, isolated character” and confronts the
individual as “an alien power.”190 He reiterates his earlier critique of the desire to have,
which becomes overwhelming in capitalism.
Partly on these grounds, he mentions (in passing) in the Communist Manifesto
that “buying and selling”—the market—disappears in a communist society. Yet he
reserves his harshest words for the market in labor power: “Communism does not deprive
man of the power to appropriate the products of society; all that it does is to deprive him
of the power to subjugate the labor of others by means of such appropriation.”191
In the Manifesto Marx also writes that “the theory of the Communists may be
summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.”192 It may seem that
Marx has muted, if not moved away from, his perspective of 1844, in that the abolition of
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private property seems to be posed not just as a mediatory stage but as the ultimate
goal. However, this would be too facile a reading. Marx focuses on the need to negate
private property because it is the most immediate expression of the power of bourgeois
society over the worker. Through the bourgeois property relation, the workers are forced
to sell themselves for a wage to the owners of capital, who appropriate the products of
their productive activity. Without the abolition of this property relation, the economic and
political domination of the bourgeoisie remains unchallenged. However, this does not
mean that Marx has forgotten about or is downplaying alienated labor. Though the phrase
“alienated labor” does not appear in the Manifesto, it does single out the need to uproot
the conditions of labor. Right before citing the need to abolish private property it states:
Owing to the extensive use of machinery and to division of labor, the work of the
proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the
workman. He becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most
simple, most monotonous and most easily acquired knack, that is required of him.
. . . In proportion, therefore, as the repulsiveness of the work increases, the wage
decreases.193
In another passage that is reminiscent of the language found in the 1844
Manuscripts, he writes, “In bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality,
while the living person is dependent and has no individuality.”194 He goes on to say that
the abolition of this condition is the essence of proletarian revolution: “The proletarians
cannot become masters of the productive forces of society, except by abolishing their
own previous mode of appropriation, and thereby also every other previous mode of
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Only after writing this does he state:

The distinguishing feature of Communism is not the abolition of property
generally, but the abolition of bourgeois property. But modern bourgeois private
property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and
appropriating products that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of
the many by the few. In this sense, the theory of the Communists may be summed
up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.196
It is important not to read the Manifesto selectively, by skipping over the phrase “in this
sense” in the last sentence and the word “but” in the previous one. That Marx did not
alter his view of the relation between alienated labor and private property between 1844
and 1847 is further confirmed by what he writes in another document written around the
same time as the Manifesto:
[P]rivate property, for instance, is not a simple relation or even an abstract
concept, a principle, but consists in the totality of the bourgeois relations of
production . . . a change in, or even the abolition of, these relations can only
follow from a change in these classes and their relationships with each other, and
a change in the relationship of classes is a historical change, a product of social
activity as a whole.197
Most importantly, Marx emphasizes the need to address the goals of a new society
in the section of the Manifesto dealing with “the relation of communists to the
proletarians as a whole.” He singles out the distinctive contributions of communists as: (l)
Internationalism instead of nationalism; and (2) “always and everywhere [they] represent
the interests of the movement as a whole.” He then states that the communists project
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This raises an important

issue: if the defining role of the communist party is to understand and transmit the
“ultimate results” of the struggle, how can Marx, who is authoring the Communist
Manifesto, claim not to have some idea of those results? Moreover, the Manifesto begins
by stating, “It is high time that Communists should openly . . . publish their views.”199
And it concludes by stating, “The Communists fight for the attainment of the immediate
aims, for the enforcement of the momentary interests of the working class; but in the
movement of the present, they also represent and take care of the future of that
movement.”200
It appears that Marx is not opposed to addressing the ultimate goal of a new
society. At issue is how to go about doing so. Marx opposes any tendency to project a
vision of a postcapitalist society that comes out of one’s own head, independent of the
actual struggles of the proletariat. But that does not mean that he opposes projecting a
conception of the ultimate goal that is based on “the actual struggles springing from
existing class struggles.”201 It is important not to conflate these two. Marx opposes the
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utopian socialists for projecting a view of the future that comes out of their heads,
regardless of the actual struggles of the real subject—the proletariat. Although many of
the utopians were familiar with Feuerbach’s critique of subject-predicate inversion,
Marx’s position seems to be that they fall into this very same inversion on another level
by posing the results of their thinking as the subject of history. Marx’s criticism of
subject-predicate inversion not only underlies his critique of bourgeois society as well as
of Hegel’s philosophy, it also underlines his understanding of how to bring to
consciousness the ultimate goals that he believes are worth living and dying for.
Evaluating the Young Marx’s Conception of a Postcapitalist Society
This study of the young Marx indicates that his approach to articulating an
alternative to existing society centers on viewing the ideal as immanent within the real.
He therefore opposes any effort to introduce a speculative discussion of the future
irrespective of actual material conditions and forces of liberation. That does not mean,
however, that Marx opposes positing any conception of an alternative at all. His main
concern is with the manner of projecting an alternative, not whether or not to do so.
This study has also so far shown that Marx came to view such phenomena as
private property, alienated labor, and the separation of civil society and the state as
problematic because of a set of normative concerns that he brought to bear upon his study
of capitalism. Without these normative concerns, his critique of capitalism would hardly
have been possible. This raises the question of how his normative standpoint impacted
Marx’s view of the market. A recent study by Allan Megill—The Burden of Reason (Why
Marx Rejected Politics and the Market)—raises important questions about this issue.
Megill contends that Marx was not so much a “materialist” as a rationalist who
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privileged universality, necessity, and predictability in his approach to historical
phenomena. Like Hegel, he “aimed to discover underlying logical essences that, he
claimed, could not be discovered merely by generalizing from empirical data.”202 He
therefore finds the claim that Marx was a “materialist” as constituting a superficial and
one-sided reading of his work. Marx did not privilege matter over consciousness; on the
contrary, he argues, Marx raised consciousness or reason to a veritable universal in
emphasizing how it is embedded in historical phenomena. Megill writes,
Marx was profoundly influenced by a Hegelian conception of rationality, in which
logic equates to ontology and in which ontology thus equates to mind, or spirit,
thinking. Hegel’s ontologization of logic resonated in Marx’s work throughout the
whole of his intellectual career. It is thus an egregious error to think that Marx can
be adequately characterized as a materialist, at least as the term materialist is
normally used. . . . Hegel and Marx, like many other nineteenth century thinkers,
adhered to the notion of embedded rationality.”203
Notions of embedded rationality involve a privileging of universality, necessity,
and predictivity. “Chance” becomes the enemy of a theory based on a notion of
embedded rationality. Megill argues that Marx’s adherence to this notion explains his
hostility to the market. Market relations are defined by chance and irregularity. Marx did
not oppose the market, Megill argues, because of authoritarian tendencies. He opposed
the market because it “is not, and cannot be, subsumed under laws”204 that are universal,
necessary, and predictable. For Megill, this is Marx’s gravest error. His uncritical
acceptance of the notion of embedded rationality—a theme that appears in his work from
202
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as early as his very first writings, in 1837—inexorably led Marx, he argues, to assume
an unrealistically negative attitude toward any form of the market.
Megill makes a powerful case that the interpretation of Marx as a “materialist”
fails to do justice to the nuances of his thought. As I have shown above, Marx did not
critique Hegel simply for being an “idealist.” He writes, “Hegel often gives a real
presentation, embracing the thing itself, within the speculative presentation.”205 And
although Marx often calls himself a materialist after 1844, he criticizes the “one-sided”
and “abstract” materialism of the British empiricists as well as of Feuerbach.206 Most
important of all, in the 1844 Manuscripts he explicitly affirms the unity of idealism and
materialism in spelling out his own philosophic worldview.
Megill is also correct that Marx opposes market and exchange relations in his
early writings, even if their critique does not serve (as I have argued above) as the crux of
his critique of capitalism. He finds the market to be irrational in that prices are
determined by arbitrary vacillations of supply and demand instead of by the human
relations of person to person. As Marx writes in The Holy Family,
Value is determined at the beginning in an apparently rational way, by the cost of
production of an object and by its social usefulness. Later it turns out that value is
determined quite fortuitously and that it need not to bear any relation to either the
cost of production or social usefulness . . . 207
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Marx is highly critical of arbitrary and fortuitous social relations such as the market
because they represent “relations [which] become independent of individuals” and
become “subordinated to general class relations.”208 The market, as Marx sees it, is a
product of the social division of labor—which is what produces the very separation of
individual and general interests that he finds so offensive in capitalism.
There is also no question that Marx was committed to a notion of embedded
rationality. As I have shown, Marx contends that reality must embody a “rationality” that
can enable the idea of freedom to be ultimately realized. If reality lacks such rationality,
even the most noble and inspired efforts at social change will prove quixotic. However,
the critical issue is, what is the agent or subject within reality that embodies reason? What
is the “internal principle” that guides reality toward the idea of freedom? Megill argues
that for Marx the internal principle is human intelligence as expressed in scientific
knowledge. He writes, “The driving force of history is clearly thought—more
specifically, it is the dimension of thought that is concerned with mastering nature with a
view to satisfying human beings’ needs.” This driving force is “intellectual labor,” labor
that “involves the application of knowledge to the productive process.”209 It propels
history toward the idea of freedom by developing the forces of production, which
ultimately bring forth the social revolution against capitalism.
Despite Megill’s close engagement with the writings of the young Marx (his book
only goes up to 1846), there are many problems with his claim that Marx poses the
208
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intentional agent as science and technology. He writes, “Marx’s commitment to
natural science, and to naturalism, was in place by 1844 at the latest.”210 He refers
specifically to Marx’s embrace of “naturalism” in the concluding essay of his Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, where Marx writes:
Here we see how consistent naturalism or humanism is distinct from both
idealism and materialism, and constitutes at the same time the unifying truth of
both. We see also how only naturalism is capable of comprehending the action of
world history.211
Megill takes this to mean that for Marx, “history . . . needs to be understood in the light
of an understanding of nature—and that means, in the light of natural science.”212 He fails
to mention, however, that the passage does not equate naturalism to “natural science.” It
instead equates naturalism to humanism. In spelling out this “positive humanism,” Marx
speaks of humanity as “a suffering, conditioned, and limited creature.” As Megill
acknowledges on several occasions, rationalism and “natural science”—at least as
traditionally understood in the modern Western tradition—tends to neglect feelings,
suffering, and passions in favor of universality, necessity, and predictability. However, by
equating naturalism to humanism, by which Marx means a philosophy that grasps “actual
corporeal man” in all its sensuousness, his reference to “naturalism” emphasizes not
some predetermined pattern of predictability and certainty but that which is particular,
contingent, and unpredictable.
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Megill also fails to mention one of the most important statements found in the
1844 Manuscripts— “to have one basis for science and another for life is a priori a
lie.”213 This is not an isolated statement. Much of Marx’s work consists of an affirmation
of contingency and sensuousness against the abstractive and objectivist standpoint of
modern science. He opposed capitalism because it is based on a system of abstract labor,
in which having predominates over being. Capitalism’s necessarily abstractive character,
Marx argues, prevents us from seeing that “man is not merely a natural being: he is a
human natural being. That is to say, he is a being for himself . . . neither nature
objectively nor nature subjectively is directly given in a form adequate to the human
being.”214 He opposes the one-sidedness of natural science, even while acknowledging its
contributions, because it prioritizes universality, necessity and predictability at the
expense of human “sensuousness”—its contingency and suffering. Instead of running
away from such contingency, Marx affirms it: “To be sensuous is to suffer.”215
If Marx were the hyper-rationalist that Megill claims, it would be hard to see how
he could make such comments. Since the emphasis on contingency and “actual
sensuousness” is a major theme throughout his early work, from the doctoral dissertation
to The German Ideology, this can hardly be considered a theoretical inconsistency or an
exception from his overall perspective. In fact, one can draw the exact opposite
conclusion that Megill does on the basis of these and related passages. It appears that
213
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Marx opposed capitalism because it forecloses the possibility of contingency and
spontaneous development by positing abstract labor as the universal medium of social
interaction and reproduction.
Moreover, Marx presents the intentional agent for social transformation not as
“science” or even human intelligence but rather the proletariat. This is in keeping with his
criticism of subject-object inversion. Science and human intelligence are products of
subjective human interaction that under specific social conditions take on a life of their
own and control the actions of the producers. Marx could not pose science as the
intentional agent at the same time as maintaining his criticism of subject-predicate
inversion—a criticism, as I have shown, that permeates all of his early writings.
Megill’s claim also makes it hard to understand the persistence of Marx’s critique
of Hegel. Marx attacks Hegel for posing disembodied thought as the subject instead of
“actual, corporeal man.” Marx does not view actual corporeal man as a mere embodiment
of abstract rational categories. He views actual corporal man as the generator of such
categories. When he speaks of the proletariat being a “bearer” of philosophy, he refers
not to Hegel’s dehumanized philosophy of consciousness but to “positive humanism,
beginning from itself.” Why would Marx spend so much time critiquing Hegel for
claiming to comprehend contingent phenomena prior to their actual empirical analysis if
he was the hyper-rationalist that Megill claims he was?
Of particular interest in this regard is that in the “Critique of the Hegelian
Dialectic” Marx takes issue with the very last sentence of Hegel’s Phenomenology, which
states that without the unity of history and its “philosophic comprehension” found in
“Absolute Knowledge,” all would be “lifeless, solitary and alone” (ohne den er das

leblose Einsame wäre).
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Marx contends on the contrary, “a being which is neither

an object itself, nor has an object . . . outside it . . . would exist solitary and alone.”217 A
being can be considered alive only if it does not embrace all of existence, only if objects
and other people exist on their own terms, independent of that being. Marx emphasizes
the irreducibly contingent and limited character of human existence in contrast to what he
sees as Hegel’s excessive rationalism. He criticizes Hegel’s deification of reason in so far
as it turns actual people into expressions of cognitive categories abstracted from real life.
It is to counter this defect in Hegel that explains why Marx calls himself a humanist. In
sum, Megill’s reading of Marx makes it difficult to understand why he poses naturalism
and humanism as interchangeable terms.
Marx’s emphasis on this factor also speaks to a criticism that is often made of his
early writings—namely, that he held that a perfectionist view of human nature. Leszek
Kolakowski argues in his major study of Marxism that Marx envisions a postcapitalist
society as “a society of perfect unity, in which all human aspirations would be fulfilled,
and all values reconciled.”218 Kolakowski views this radical utopianism as a major defect,
since it led “Marxist” regimes of the twentieth century to attempt to forcefully impose a
degree of social transformation that was impossible to actualize. However, it is important
to recall that Marx’s emphasis on contingency and sensuousness has him write, “to be
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sensuous is to suffer.” The phrase appears several times in the 1844 Manuscripts.
Humanity, he contends, as a sensuous being is a limited being, and a limited being is a
suffering being. Marx does not explicitly say why suffering is an inevitable part of the
human condition, but it appears related to our ability to envisage the transgression of
finite limits that our sensuous existence prevents us from actualizing. In any case, Marx’s
emphasis on achieving a “totality of manifestations of life” does not necessarily imply a
life free of pain, contradiction, and suffering. It only implies a life in which we are able to
come to terms with such afflictions now that we are no longer alienated from ourselves.
If Marx did not oppose the market because he privileged scientific necessity and
predictability above all else, why then was he was critical of it? The answer is that the
market does not meet the three normative criteria by which he measures reality in his
early writings. These are opposition to subject-predicate inversion, opposition to treating
oneself and others mere as means to an end, and the view that “all emancipation is a
reduction of the human world and relationships to man himself.” The market controls the
fate of the producer by setting prices in a way that has little or nothing to do with their
actual value or the subjective activity by which the products are created. The products
come to dominate the producer. The producer’s activity becomes a mere means to serve
the product, rather than vice versa—because the nature of the activity that creates the
product in the first place becomes a mere means to an end instead of an end in itself.
What characterize the market—at least once there is generalized commodity exchange—
are depersonalized object-object relations instead of human relations.
We need to emphasize that the critique of the market is not the pons asini of
Marx’s critique of capitalism. He sees the market, like private property, as the result of
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alienated labor, not as its cause. Moreover, his early writings contain far more
discussion of private property than the market; his comments about the latter are far from
extensive or systematic. Our study of Marx’s early writings indicates, in contrast to how
he was understood by much of twentieth century “Marxism,” that his real object of
critique was not the market or private property but rather the social relations that
underpin them.

CHAPTER THREE
THE CONCEPTION OF A POSTCAPITALIST SOCIETY IN THE DRAFTS OF
CAPITAL
The “First Draft” of Capital: The Poverty of Philosophy (1847)
The process by which Marx composed his greatest theoretical work, Capital, is a
long and complicated one. As early as 1844 Marx had sketched out plans to write a twovolume work on economics that he provisionally entitled A Critique of Politics and
Political Economy. After he temporarily put aside this work in order to concentrate on
such polemical works as The Holy Family and The German Ideology, he returned to a
direct study of economics in the late 1840s. However, the first volume of what became
Capital was not completed until 1867, after Marx had introduced numerous changes in
the form and content of his envisioned work. Marx composed a considerable number of
drafts of Capital in the two decades preceding its publication in 1867, and they have been
the subject of prolonged and detailed examination and debate by a large number of
scholars and researchers on Marx’s work over the past several decades.1
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Most commentators on Marx have considered the Grundrisse, composed in
1857-58, as the first draft of Capital. However, there are grounds for considering that
Marx’s initial conceptual outline of what later became Capital began much earlier, in
1847, with his book The Poverty of Philosophy and the associated manuscript on
”Wages.” These were composed in a period in which Marx, having completed his
criticism of the Young Hegelians, felt the need to present to the public a positive
exposition of his economic theories. Near the end of his life (in 1880) he wrote that The
Poverty of Philosophy “contains the seeds of the theory developed after twenty years’
work in Capital.”2 A considerable number of critical concepts that became central to
Capital—such as surplus value (although the phrase itself does not explicitly appear in
The Poverty of Philosophy), the relation between production and distribution, the
“reserve army of labor,” the distribution of the elements of production, and the distinction
between actual labor time and socially necessary labor time—first appear in his writings
of 1847.
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For this reason we will follow the approach taken by a recent study of Marx’s
economic theory3 by considering The Poverty of Philosophy and related manuscripts
composed in 1847 as the “first draft” of what later became Capital. The Grundrisse will
be treated as the second draft, and the manuscript of 1861-63 as the third draft.4
The Poverty of Philosophy (1847) represents Marx’s first published work on
economics and marked a crucial step in the two-decades long process that led to the
publication of his greatest work, Capital. Marx had of course written extensively on
political economy prior to the Poverty of Philosophy, as seen from his Economic and
Philosophy Manuscripts of 1844 and The German Ideology. However, neither work was
published until long after his death. Moreover, a number of crucial concepts that later
became central to Capital and which are not found in either the 1844 Manuscripts or the
German Ideology make their first appearance in The Poverty of Philosophy.5
The purpose of the book was to take issue with Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s The
Philosophy of Poverty (1846), which sought to apply the insights of David Ricardo’s
economic theory in developing a criticism of the inequities of modern capitalism.
Proudhon, as Marx shows, was a rather schematic and eclectic thinker whose arguments
3
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are not always internally coherent. Nevertheless, Proudhon consistently counterpoised
the “rationality” of Ricardo’s principle of the determination of value6 by labor time to
capitalism’s “irrational” and disorganized process of exchange. Proudhon argued that
because labor is the source of all value, the costs of production represent “constituted
value”—the relative amount of labor time that it takes to produce a given commodity.
This principle of value determination, he argued, is hidden and distorted by the exchange
process, in which workers are paid on the basis of a portion of the price of the commodity
instead of upon the value of their labor. Proudhon therefore proposed altering the
exchange relations of capitalism by paying workers a “fair” equivalent of the value of
their labor in the form of labor tokens or time chits. Workers would be paid not in
money—which Proudhon saw as a wholly arbitrary and unnatural phenomenon—but
instead in tokens or vouchers that express the amount of time the laborer works in a given
period. These tokens would then be exchanged for an equivalent of goods and services
produced in the same amount of time (or which have the same “value”).
Marx is scathingly critical of Proudhon’s position on the grounds that it utilizes
the central principle of capitalist production—the determination of value by labor time—
as the defining feature of a “just” or non-capitalist society. Whereas Proudhon holds that
the inequities of capitalism result from an inadequate or incomplete application of the
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determination of value by labor time, Marx holds that this is the very basis of its
inequities:
It will think it very naïve that M. Proudhon should give as a “revolutionary theory
of the future” what Ricardo expounded scientifically as the theory of present-day
society, of bourgeois society, and that he should thus take for the solution of the
antimony between utility and exchange value what Ricardo and his school
presented long before him as the scientific formula of one single side of this
antimony, that of exchange value.7
Ricardo, Marx notes, “shows us the real movement of bourgeois production,
which constitutes value.” Proudhon leaves “this real movement out of account” and seeks
the “reorganization of the world on a would-be new formula, which formula is no more
than the theoretical expression of the real movement which exists and which is so well
described by Ricardo.” Hence, “Ricardo takes present-day society as his starting point to
demonstrate to us how it constitutes value—M. Proudhon takes constituted value as his
starting point to constitute a new world with the aid of this value.”8
In sum, Marx vigorously objects to applying categories that are specific to
capitalism—such as the determination of value by labor time—to efforts to envision the
kind of society that should replace it.
Nowhere in the text does Marx suggest that Proudhon’s error was to discuss a
future organization of society. He instead takes issue with the content of Proudhon’s
discussion—the fact that he conceives of a future society on the basis of principles that
apply to the old one. The Poverty of Philosophy indicates that Marx is not averse to
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discussing the future, since his differences with Proudhon’s understanding of the
issue grounds his entire critique. Moreover, the book also contains a detailed critique of
English socialists (such as John Bray) for importing, along similar lines as Proudhon,
categories specific to bourgeois society in envisioning a “socialist” alternative to it.
Bray had written several influential works in the 1830s arguing for “equitable
labor exchange bazaars.” A number of these were organized by utopian socialists in the
1830s in order to organize commodity exchange without a capitalist intermediary. Marx
writes, “In a purified individual exchange, freed from all the elements of antagonism he
finds in it, he sees an ‘egalitarian’ relation which he would like to see society adopt.”9
Marx argues that almost all the early English socialists—Thomas Hodgskin, William
Thompson, T.R. Edmunds, as well as Bray—“have, at different periods, proposed the
equalitarian application of the Ricardian theory.”10 He will further develop his criticism
of such positions throughout his two decades of working on Capital.
Why was Marx opposed to the “egalitarian” application of Ricardo’s theory? The
main reason is that it rests upon a fundamental theoretical error—the conflation of actual
labor time with socially necessary labor time. Marx agrees with Ricardo that labor is the
source of all value. However, he does not agree that value expresses the actual number of
hours of labor performed by the worker. If value were based on the actual hours of labor,
commodities that take longer to produce would have a greater value. Since capitalism is
based on augmenting value, that would mean that capitalists would try to get workers to
9
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work slower rather than faster. This is of course clearly not the case. The reason,
Marx argues, is that “Value is never constituted all alone. It is constituted, not by the time
needed to produce it all alone, but in relation to the quota of each and every other product
which can be created in the same time.”11 Value is not determined by the actual amount
of time employed to create a commodity; it is determined by the average amount of
necessary labor time needed to create it. If a worker in Detroit assembles an automobile
in 24 hours while one in South Korea assembles a similar model in only 16 hours, the
extra 8 hours of labor performed by the worker in Detroit creates no value. “What
determines value is not the time taken to produce a thing, but the minimum time it could
possible be produced in, and this minimum is ascertained by competition.”12
In other words, the value of the commodity is not determined by actual labor time
but by simple or equalized labor time. Labor is equalized, or reduced to an abstract
equivalent, through the “subordination of man to machine or by the extreme division of
labor.” Marx writes of how “The pendulum of the clock has become as accurate a
measure of the relative activity of two workers as it is of the speed of two locomotives.”13
As competition reveals the minimum amount of labor time necessary, on average, to
create a given commodity, the workers are forced to produce the commodity in that time
unit, irrespective of their human needs or bodily capacities. Their labor is reduced to an
11
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abstract equivalent. This abstract equivalent is the source and substance of value. In
capitalism, “Time is everything, man is nothing; he is, at most, time’s carcass. Quality no
longer matters. Quantity decides everything; hour for hour, day by day.”14
The value of the commodity is therefore determined by labor time only to the
extent that labor has been reduced to an abstract, alienating activity. The formula adopted
by Proudhon and the English socialists—the determination of value of labor time—
cannot serve as the basis of a new society, because it is the principle that governs the
alienation of the laborer. Marx argues, “It is upon this equality, already realized in
automatic labor, that M. Proudhon wields his smoothing-plane of ‘equalization,’ which
he means to establish universally in ‘time to come’!”15
Of course, Proudhon, like the English socialists, opposed the exploitation of labor.
They viewed themselves as champions of the workers, and in a sense they were since
they wanted them to obtain a “fair” share of social wealth. Yet in failing to distinguish
between actual labor time and socially necessary labor time, they ended up defining the
new society on the basis of the cardinal principle of capitalism. Marx concludes,
After all, the determination of value by labor time—the formula M. Proudhon
gives us as the regenerating formula of the future—is therefore merely the
scientific expression of the economic relations of present-day society, as was
clearly and precisely demonstrated by Ricardo long before M. Proudhon.16
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Ideas have their own logic, independent of the intentions and political agendas that
may inspire them.
Marx also shows that Proudhon confuses the value of the commodity with the
value of labor. To Proudhon, the value of the commodity is equivalent to the value of
labor that creates it. On these grounds he argues that there is no reason why workers
should not receive the same value in wages (computed in labor tokens or time chits) as
the value of the product. The exchange relation should be equalized by eliminating the
class of capitalists, usurers, and middlemen that make off with a portion of the workers’
value. Marx shows that such calls for equal exchange are based on an erroneous
conflation of the value of labor with the value of the commodity:
It is going against economic facts to determine the relative value of commodities
by the value of labor. It is moving in a vicious circle, it is to determine relative
value by a relative value which itself needs to be determined.17
In sum, instead of opposing the “equalization” that reduces living labor to an
abstraction, Proudhon endorses it as a principle of equality. He accepts the equalization
of labor as a given in order to derive from it a principle of equal exchange. He has
overlooked the contradictions inherent in capitalist production while seeking a
modification in the form and mechanism of exchange relations.
For Marx, in contrast, the problem of capitalism is not that it distributes value in
an unequal manner in contradistinction to the principle of equalization involved in its
system of production. Instead, Marx argues that the problem of capitalism, and the reason
for its unequal forms of exchange, is the equalizing tendencies of value production itself.
17
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All labor in capitalism is reduced to an abstraction, to labor in general, as a result of
the “collisions between the worker and the employer who sought at all costs to depreciate
the workers’ specialized ability.”18 The unequal distribution of wealth, Marx contends, is
a consequence of a class relationship in which labor is reduced to an equal standard—to
simple, general labor. There is no value production without the “equalization” of labor—
without the reduction of living labor to a uniform abstraction governed by socially
necessary labor time. Proudhon’s position is “accepting the present state of affairs; it is,
in short, making an apology . . . for a society without understanding it.”19
In Marx’s first public discussion of his economic theory he therefore not only
directly discusses the nature of a postcapitalist society; in doing so makes it clear that
value production is incompatible with socialism.
There is, however, an important difference between Proudhon’s position and
those of the English utopian socialists, even though their theoretical views rest on similar
premises. While Proudhon embraces payment according to labor time as the governing
principle of “socialism,” Bray “proposes merely measures which he thinks good for a
period of transition between existing society and a community regime.”20 This raises the
question of whether Marx endorsed an alteration of exchange relations based on paying
workers the value of their labor as a transitional form that could lead to a new society.
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The text of The Poverty of Philosophy suggests that the answer is in the
negative. Marx does not think that production relations can be altered by tinkering with
the form in which products are exchanged; he instead argues that alterations in the form
of exchange follow from the transformation of relations of production. He writes, “In
general, the form of exchange of products corresponds to the form of production. Change
the latter, and the former will change in consequence.”21 Moreover, he indicates that
maintaining an exchange of equivalents based on value production undermines the effort
to effect a fundamental transformation in production relations. He writes,
Thus, if all the members of society are supposed to be immediate workers, the
exchange of equal quantities or hours of labor is possible only on condition that
the number of hours to be spent on material production is agreed on beforehand.
But such an agreement negates individual exchange.22
Marx is here envisioning a situation in which a social average that operates
behind the workers’ backs—socially necessary labor time—no longer dictates the amount
of time that the worker must spend producing a given product. Instead, the amount of
time will be “agreed on beforehand” by the associated producers. Material production is
now determined by the producers’ conscious decisions instead of by the autonomous
force of value production. Such a situation “negates individual exchange” in that products
do not exchange based on the amount of labor time embodied in them. Marx appears to
be unequivocal on this point:
Either you want the correct proportions of past centuries with present-day means
of production, in which case you are both reactionary and utopian. Or you want
21
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progress without anarchy: in which case, in order to preserve the productive
forces, you must abandon individual exchange.23
Hence, although Marx notes that Bray upholds the principle of the determination
of value by labor time as a transitional form to a new society rather than the governing
principle of socialism itself, he remains sharply critical of Bray’s views. He is especially
critical of Bray for proposing a national savings bank, established by the government, to
regulate the distribution of labor tokens or time chits. Marx calls this “the golden chain
by which the government holds a large part of the working class. The workers themselves
thus give into the hands of their enemies the weapons to preserve the existing
organization of society which subjugates them.”24 He sums up his critique thusly:
Mr. Bray does not see that this egalitarian relation, this corrective ideal that he
would like to apply to the world, is itself nothing but the reflection of the actual
world; and that therefore it is totally impossible to reconstitute society on the
basis of what is merely an embellished shadow of it. In proportion as this shadow
takes on substance again, we perceive that this substance, far from being the
transfiguration dreamt of, is the actual body of the existing society.25
There is, therefore—at least for Marx—no room for a “transition” to socialism
based on the governing principles of the old society. He conceives of a sharper break
between capitalism and the transition to socialism than advocated by its neo-Ricardian
socialist critics. The manner in which he further develops this argument emerges as one
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of the central themes in his subsequent drafts of what will eventually become volume
one of Capital.
The “Second Draft” of Capital: The Grundrisse (1858)
The Grundrisse, Marx’s first book-length draft of Capital26 (although it can be
considered the “second draft” in light of his writings of 1847), is a remarkable work of
over 800 pages that contains a wealth of important philosophic insights. Written in 185758 but unknown until 1939, it has sparked numerous reexaminations and reconsiderations
of Marx’s contribution as a whole since it became widely available in the 1970s.27
What is especially striking about the Grundrisse is its wealth of discussion of the
alternative to capitalism. Indeed, it can be argued that no single work of Marx discusses a
future postcapitalist society as directly or as comprehensively.
One reason for this is that the Grundrisse begins with a lengthy criticism of the
concept of a postcapitalist society promoted by French and English socialists of the time,
Proudhon especially. The latter’s sway over the labor and socialist movements had not
receded by 1857-58; instead, in many respects his ideas had become more influential than
26
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ever. Marx was gravely concerned about this and devoted considerable space in the
Grundrisse to distinguishing Proudhon’s concept of a new society from his own. As
Marx moves on to deal with other issues in the rest of the work—such as the difference
between indirectly and directly social labor, the contradiction between necessary and
surplus labor time, and the phases that characterize human development—he discusses
the contours of a postcapitalist society to an extent not found in many of his other works.
At the same time, much of the Grundrisse’s critique of Proudhon and other
socialists returns to and further develops the points Marx had earlier formulated in 1847
in The Poverty of Philosophy. Marx begins the first chapter of the Grundrisse,28 which
deals with money, by critiquing Louis Alfred Darimon, a leading French follower of
Proudhon who advocated a reform of the banking system through the creation of a
currency based on denominations of labor time. Marx writes,
The general question is: is it possible to revolutionize the existing relations of
production and the corresponding relations of distribution by means of changes in
the instrument of circulation—changes in the organization of circulation? A
further question: can such a transformation of circulation be accomplished
without touching the existing relations of production and the social relations
based on them?29

28

Aside from the “Introduction” and the fragment on “Bastiat and Carey” (which
deals with the historical specificity of capitalism in the U.S.), the original manuscript
contains only two chapters, with no subheadings or divisions into parts. “The Chapter on
Money” is about 150 pages long, while “The Chapter on Capital” comes to over 650
pages. Marx often referred to the “shapelessness” of the manuscript in his
correspondence.
29

Karl Marx, Grundrisse, in Marx-Engels Collected Works, vol. 28 (New York:
International Publishers, 1986), 60.

149
Darimon, like Proudhon and many of the English socialists of the time,
thought that it was possible to “revolutionize” relations of production through an
alteration of the medium of exchange. Why, Darimon asks, do capitalists accumulate so
much wealth, given that labor is the source of all value? The reason, he argues, is the
“irrational” nature of the medium of exchange, money, which alters and distorts the
determination of value by labor time. Commodities are not sold at their value but instead
at their price, as denominated in money. The “unregulated” nature of the medium of
circulation, contends Darimon, is the lever that enables capitalists to “unfairly” pay
workers less than the value of their labor. He argues that if commodities were directly
sold at their “true value,” according to the actual amount of labor time that it takes to
produce them—instead of indirectly through the medium of money—the very existence
of the capitalist would become superfluous. Hence, altering the medium of circulation
would abolish class society. To achieve this Darimon proposed creating a national bank
to regulate the medium of circulation by replacing money with gold tokens representing
the amount of labor time that workers perform in producing a given set of commodities.30
Marx engages in a lengthy and complex criticism of Darimon’s position. Much of
it is based on his understanding of “the inner connection between the relations of
production, distribution, and circulation”31 as spelled out in the “Introduction” to the
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Grundrisse. He there takes issue with such political economists as John Stuart Mill
for viewing relations of production as governed by “eternal natural laws independent of
history.”32 Mill’s view that production relations adhere to eternal natural laws led him to
argue that the proper object of political economy, which deals with specific historical
formations, is the sphere of distribution. Marx objects to this on the grounds that “The
structure of distribution is entirely determined by the structure of production.”33 He
develops this by directly employing the central Hegelian categories of Universal,
Particular, and Individual.34 Production, he writes, is the determinant category of
capitalist society and therefore represents the Hegelian concept of the Universal.
Consumption—without which production cannot be realized—corresponds to the
Hegelian category of the Individual. Production and consumption are opposites and nonidentical, but one cannot exist without the other; they co-exist in a state of negative selfrelation. Distribution and exchange is the medium by which the Universal is
individualized; it corresponds to the Hegelian concept of the Particular. “Production,
distribution and exchange, and consumption thus form a proper syllogism.”35 Distribution
or exchange is not an independent sphere in its own right. It does not govern, it is
governed; it does not determine, it determines; it is a mediatory moment between

32

Ibid., 25.

33

Ibid., 32.

34

See Hegel’s Science of Logic, chap. 3, “The Syllogism,” 664-704.

35

Grundrisse, in MECW 28:27.

36

151

production and consumption. This serves as the philosophic basis of his criticism of
Darimon’s economic theories.
Marx contends that Darimon’s error lies in advocating a change in the form of
wage labor instead of calling for the abolition of wage labor itself. He wants to change
the manner in which labor is remunerated while leaving its commodification intact, since
workers are to be paid in a labor voucher instead of in money. Yet this retains the need
for a universal equivalent with which labor can be bought and sold.
In passages that recall his earlier discussion in The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx
contends that Darimon dethrones money from its special role as universal equivalent by
proposing that the quantity labor time assume that peculiar role. This is like saying “Let
the Papacy remain, but make everyone Pope. Do away with money by turning every
commodity into money and endowing it with the specific properties of money.”37 In the
name of getting rid of the prevailing universal equivalent, money, every product of labor
(as computed in labor time) gets placed in the position of serving as the universal
equivalent. This completely overlooks what allows a universal equivalent to exist in the
first place. One product of labor can be exchanged for all products of labor only if labor
itself is reduced to an abstraction, to an abstract universal—to abstract labor. Darimon
and Proudhon’s plans for the reform of money not only fail to transform relations of
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production in which labor is reduced to an abstraction. It pushes matters further in
that very direction by bestowing universal equivalency upon all commodities.
Marx is not simply arguing that their approach would fail to improve matters. He
indicates that it would actually make matters worse. He first asks if it is worthwhile to
tinker with the form of money or the market “without abolishing the production relation
itself which is expressed in the category of money; and whether it is not then necessarily
a self-defeating effort to overcome the essential conditions of relationship by effecting a
formal modification within it.”38 Marx suggests this is a waste of time since it will create
an even greater despotism than what exists under traditional market capitalism: “The
inconveniences resulting from the existence of a special instrument of exchange, of a
special and yet general equivalent, are bound to reproduce themselves (if in different
ways) in every form”—even if it may “entail fewer inconveniences than another.”39
Ironically, what Marx is critiquing is a striking anticipation of what passed for
“Marxism” in many “socialist” and “communist” regimes of the twentieth century. Such
regimes eliminated private property and the “free market” by bringing the process of
distribution and circulation under the control of the state. But they did little or nothing to
transform production relations. Concrete labor was still reduced to a monotonous,
routinized activity—to abstract labor. Abstract labor continued to serve as the substance
of value. Marx’s discussion in the Grundrisse suggests that a planned economy—so long
as there is no fundamental change in relations of production—may avoid some of the
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inconveniences of traditional market capitalism, but the problems end up becoming
reproduced on another level. For instance, instead of a surplus of products that cannot be
consumed (which characterizes traditional capitalism), there is a shortage of products that
cannot be produced (which characterized statist “socialism”). Imbalances between
production and consumption are bound to show up one way or another so long as the
relations of production are not transformed, precisely because value production rests on a
non-identity or non-equivalence between production and consumption. Marx puts the
matter as follows:
The money system in its present form can be completely regulated—all the evils
deplored by Darimon abolished—without the abandonment of the present social
basis: indeed, while its contradictions, its antagonisms, the conflict of classes, etc.
actually reach a higher degree . . . 40
One reason that Darimon and Proudhon objected so strenuously to money as the
medium of exchange is that gold and silver tend to appreciate in value relative to other
commodities in periods of economic crisis. Since the wealthier classes tend to possess
greater amount of precious metals and coinage than workers, the former’s income tends
to rise even as the latter falls. Organizing exchange through a national banking system
based on labor vouchers, Darimon claimed, would put an end to such inequities. Marx
counters that he overlooks the other side of the issue—namely, that gold and silver tend
to depreciate relative to other commodities in periods of economic growth. Marx does
not deny that prices of commodities wildly fluctuate in periods of economic growth and
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crisis, and often to the detriment of the workers. Yet he does not agree with
Darimon’s proposed solution. Does he have a solution of his own to offer? He writes,
Formulated in this way, the riddle would have solved itself at once: abolish the
rise and fall in prices. That means, do away with prices. That, in turn, means
abolishing exchange value, which, in its turn, requires the abolition of the system
of exchange corresponding to the bourgeois organization of society. This last
entails the problem of revolutionizing bourgeois society economically. Then it
would have become evident from the start that the evils of bourgeois society
cannot be remedied by banal “transformations” or the establishment of a rational
“money system.”41
Marx here appears to endorse efforts to ameliorate the deleterious impact of price
fluctuations on the agents of production. He explicitly refers to the “abolition” of prices
and exchange value. So why does he so sharply criticize the Proudhonists for proposing
alterations in the sphere of exchange? The reason is that the abolition of prices and
exchange value presuppose a revolutionary transformation of the underlying relations of
production. What Marx means by “revolutionizing bourgeois society economically” is a
radical transformation of production relations that would create, of their own accord,
correspondingly new relations of distribution. He argues that taking the contrary
approach, by focusing first of all on transforming exchange relations, not only leaves
production relations intact but also fails to resolve the problems of exchange that so
concern the Proudhonists in the first place.
Marx illustrates this by further developing the distinction posed in The Poverty of
Philosophy between actual labor time and socially necessary labor time. He argues, “Not
the labor time incorporated in [previous] output, but the currently necessary labor time
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determines value.” Proudhon and his followers conflate the two. As a result, they
fail to see that their “solution”—reorganizing exchange relations to conform to the
determination of value by labor time—would do nothing to correct the deleterious impact
of the depreciation of the medium of exchange. Marx writes,
According to the general economic law that production costs fall continually, that
living labor becomes more and more productive, and that the labor time
objectified in products therefore continually depreciates, constant depreciation
would be the inevitable fate of this gold labor money.43
Darimon sees only the appreciation of gold and silver during an economic crisis.
Yet Darimon does not realize that his labor money will tend to depreciate in value, since
the average amount of labor time necessary to produce a given commodity tends to
constantly fall. The labor tokens are bound to depreciate as the mode of production
undergoes innovation under the pressure of competition. In the long run, workers would
have less ability to “buy back” the value of their product than in a traditional monetary
economy. Marx notes that this situation would in no way be altered if workers were paid
in paper vouchers (as advocated by many English and German socialists of the time)
instead of in gold or silver labor money:
The labor time embodied in the paper itself would be of as little account as the
paper value of banknotes. The one would simply be a representative of labor
hours, as the other is of gold or silver.44
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Marx shows that all of these efforts to address social problems by tinkering
with the form of remuneration or exchange rest on the illusion that the distinction
between value and price is arbitrary and unnecessary. The French and many English
socialists consider value to be real and necessary, since it is determined by the quantity of
labor time spent in producing an object. They consider price to be fictive and
unnecessary, since it is determined by the whim of supply and demand. They therefore
want to replace commodity prices with labor tokens that express the “real” value of the
product. Marx counters that price cannot be treated as a mere nominal expression of
value. Value must diverge from price because the value of the commodity is not
determined by the actual number of hours engaged in producing the commodity but only
by the average amount of time that is socially necessary for doing so.45 This average is
established behind the backs of the producers and is never directly intuited or known by
them. Hence, commodities never sell at their value; they sell at prices that are above or
below their value. It cannot be otherwise in a society in which the value of the product is
established behind the backs of the producers, independent of their conscious activity.
Marx writes,
The market value equates itself to the real value by means of constant
fluctuations, not by an equation with real value as some third thing, but precisely
through continual inequality of itself (not, as Hegel would say, by abstract
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identity, but by a continual negation of the negation, i.e., of itself as the
negation of the real value).46
Marx finds much that is irrational in price formation under capitalism, since
prices are not determined by the conscious decisions of the agents of production. But this
is because value production is itself inherently irrational in so far as the value of the
commodity is not determined by the conscious decisions by the agents of production. To
leave production relations intact while attempting to eliminate the “irrationality” of price
formation on the market is inherently self-defeating, since it assumes away the very
irrationality of value production of which it is the expression.
The essence of Marx’s critique centers on the non-equivalence of actual labor
time and socially necessary labor time, on the one hand, and the non-equivalence of value
and price, on the other hand. Taken together, both indicate that the labor vouchers
proposed by Darimon and Proudhon are in principle non-convertible. Marx writes, “The
labor-time ticket, which represents the average labor-time, would never correspond to the
actual labor-time, and never be convertible into it.”47 Since socially necessary labor time
is a constantly shifting magnitude, the amount of value embodied in the commodity
would never be the same as the nominal “value” (or price) of the product expressed in the
labor token. It is of course possible to consciously assign a given value to a labor voucher
based on the number of hours of labor time that it expresses. However, the “value” of that
voucher will never coincide with the actual value of the commodity, which is determined
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by the average amount of time necessary to produce it—an average that cannot be
consciously assigned since it undergoes constant change and variation.48 The labor token
would never command the same “value” as the actual value of the commodity; in fact,
the value of the former would depreciate in comparison with the latter. Hence, the labor
tokens would be non-equivalent or non-convertible. But without such convertibility, the
labor token could not function as a medium of exchange—which is the entire reason for
proposing them in the first place! Marx concludes,
Because price does not equal value, the element determining value, labor time,
cannot be the element in which prices are expressed. For labor time would have
to express itself at once as the determining and the non-determining element, as
the equivalent and the non-equivalent of itself. Because labor time as a measure of
value only exists ideally, it cannot serve as the material for the comparison of
prices.49
On these grounds, he contends,
Just as it is impossible to abolish complications and contradictions arising from
the existence of money alongside specific commodities by changing the form of
money. . . . [I]t is likewise impossible to abolish money itself, so long as exchange
value remains the social form of products. It is essential to understand this clearly,
so as not to set oneself impossible tasks, and to know the limits within which
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monetary reform and changes in circulation can remodel the relations of
production and the social relations based upon them.50
So far it may seem that Marx’s critique is primarily negative, in that he
emphasizes his opposition to the Proudhonist conception of how to organize a
postcapitalist society. Does his critique posit or at least imply an alternative concept of
life after capitalism? As he further develops his discussion, a positive vision of the future
does begin to emerge—especially as he goes deeper into the reasons why the labor
vouchers advocated by the Proudhonists are non-convertible.
Later in the end of the “Chapter on Money,” he notes that “this particular labor
time cannot be directly exchanged for every other particular labor time; its general
exchangeability must first be mediated, it must acquire an objective form distinct from
itself, if it is to acquire this general exchangeability.”51 Labor time cannot be directly
exchanged for labor time because labor is indirectly social so long as capitalist
production relations prevail. We have already seen a reason for this in the distinction
between actual labor time and socially necessary labor time: the former expresses a
specific number of hours of labor engaged in by a worker, while the latter expresses a
social average that operates irrespective of that worker. Hence, the value of the product is
not determined directly by the particular acts of the producers, but indirectly, through a
social average of many acts of labor among an array of individuals.
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The indirectly social character of labor in societies governed by value
production reaches its full expression in money. Money, as the universal equivalent,
connects one individual’s labor and product of labor to someone else’s. The social
connection between individuals is established through the mediation of exchange. Yet
this social relation is indirect since one individual is connected to another through an
abstraction—a universal equivalent. Under capitalism individuals are socially connected
through the indirect medium of money because the production relation that exchange is
based upon is itself indirect. As Marx puts it, money “can possess a social character only
because the individuals have alienated their own social relationship in the form of an
object.”52
This explains why ”this particular labor time cannot be directly exchanged for
every other particular labor time.” The advocates of the labor voucher assume that value
production is compatible with direct social relations, since a given unit of labor time is
(presumably) directly exchangeable for an equivalent product created in the same amount
of time. Indeed, Proudhon and his followers assume that the determination of value by
labor time is the condition for a truly “rational” and direct system of commodity
exchange. The position becomes implausible as soon as it is recognized that value
production is anything but directly social. Proudhon wants to eliminate the indirect
character of exchange by harmonizing relations of exchange with social relations of
production that are themselves indirect.
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In the course of elaborating upon this difference between directly social labor
and indirectly social labor—the first time in his writings that he has made this
distinction—Marx enters into a discussion of what he sees as the content of a new
society. He writes,
Now if this assumption is made, the general character of labor would not be given
to it only by exchange; its assumed communal character would determine
participation in the products. The communal character of production would from
the outset make the product into a communal, general one. The exchange initially
occurring in production, which would not be an exchange of exchange values but
of activities determined by communal needs and communal purposes, would
include from the beginning the individual’s participation in the communal world
of products . . . labor would be posited as general labor prior to exchange, i.e., the
exchange of products would not in any way be the medium mediating the
participation of the individual in general production. Mediation of course has to
take place.53
This is a remarkable passage that is worth careful analysis. First, Marx
acknowledges that labor would have a “general” character in a new society. However, its
generality would be radically different from what exists in capitalism, where discrete acts
of individual labor become connected to one another (or are made general) through the
act of commodity exchange. In contrast, labor becomes general in the new society prior
to the exchange of products, on the basis of the “the communal character of production”
itself. The community distributes the elements of production according to the individuals’
needs instead of being governed by social forms that operate independently of their
deliberation. Labor is general in so far as the community directly decides the manner and
form of production. Labor is therefore directly social, not indirectly social. Second, Marx
acknowledges that exchange would exist in a new society. However, exchange would be
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radically different from what prevails in capitalism, which is governed by the
exchange of commodities. Instead of being based on exchange values, distribution would
be governed by an exchange of activities that are “determined by communal needs and
communal purposes.” The latter determines the exchange of products, instead being
determined by the exchange of commodities that operate independently of it. Third, Marx
acknowledges that social mediation would exist in a new society. However, mediation
would be radically different than under capitalism, where it has an abstract character
since “mediation takes place through the exchange of commodities, through exchange
value” and money. In socialism, in contrast, “the presupposition is itself mediated, i.e.,
communal production, community as the basis of production, is assumed. The labor of
the individual is from the outset taken as [directly] social labor.”54
Marx’s distinction between indirectly social labor and directly social labor is
central to his evolving concept of a postcapitalist society—not only in the Grundrisse but
also (as I will attempt to show) in much of his later work. He contends that in capitalism
the “social character of production is established only post festum by the elevation of the
products into exchange values and the exchange of these exchange values,” whereas in
socialism,
The social character of labor is presupposed, and participation in the world of
products, in consumption, is not mediated by exchange between mutually
independent laborers of products of labor. It is mediated by social production
within which the individual carries on his activity.55
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Marx is envisioning a totally new kind of social mediation, one that is direct instead
of indirect, sensuous instead of abstract: “For the fact is that labor on the basis of
exchange values presupposes that neither the labor of the individual nor his product is
directly general, but that it acquires this form only through objective means of a form of
money distinct from it.”56 In sum, a society is governed by exchange value only in so far
as the sociality of labor is established not through itself but through an objective form
independent of itself. Such a society is an alienated one, since (as Marx has shown from
as early as his writings of 1843-44), the domination of individuals by objective forms of
their own making is precisely what is most problematic and indeed perverse about
capitalism.
Marx proceeds to go deeper into what he means by directly social “communal
production” by addressing the role of time in a new society. He writes, “Ultimately, all
economy is a matter of economy of time.”57 All societies strive to reduce the amount of
time spent on producing and reproducing the necessities of life. No society is more
successful at doing so than capitalism, in which the production relations force individual
units of labor to conform to the average amount of time necessary to produce a given
commodity. Since this compulsion issues from within the production process instead of
from a political authority which lords over it from outside, capitalism is far more efficient
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at generating efficiencies of time than pre-capitalist modes of production. Marx
repeatedly refers to this as capitalism’s “civilizing mission.” He says this because the
development and satisfaction of the individual ultimately depends upon the saving of
time so that life can be freed up for pursuits other than engaging in material production.
But how does the economization of time relate to a new society governed by “communal
production”? Marx indicates that it becomes just as important as in capitalism, although it
is enforced in a different form and for a different purpose:
If we presuppose communal production, the time factor naturally remains
essential. The less time society requires to produce corn, livestock, etc., the more
time it wins for other production, material or spiritual. . . . Economy of time, as
well as the planned distribution of labor time over the various branches of
production, therefore, remains the first economic law if communal production is
taken as the basis. It becomes a law even to a much higher degree. However, this
is essentially different from the measurement of exchange values (of labors or
products of labor) by labor time.59
Marx does not detail exactly how the economization of time operates in a society
governed by communal production; the text mentions no single mechanism or lever for
accomplishing this. However, in light of his earlier writings, we can surmise that he sees
the motivation for the economization of time in a new society as resting upon the effort to
achieve what he called in 1844 a “a totality of manifestations of life.” When society is
58
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freed from the narrow drive to augment value as an end in itself it can turn its
attention to supplying the multiplicity of needs and wants that are integral to the social
individual. Instead of being consumed by having and possessing, individuals can now
focus upon what is given short shrift in societies governed by value production—their
being, their manifold sensuous and intellectual needs, whether “material or spiritual.” The
more people get in touch with their universality of needs, the greater the incentive to
economize time, to reduce the amount of hours engaged in material production, so that
such multiple needs can be pursued and satisfied. In a word, whereas in capitalism the
incentive to economize time is provided by an abstract standard, exchange value,60 in
socialism it is provided by the concrete sensuous needs of the individuals themselves.
The drive to economize time no longer comes from outside the individuals, from value’s
need to grow big with value, but from within, from the quest to manifest the totality of
the individuals’ intellectual, sensuous, and spiritual capabilities.
Marx further spells out his concept of a postcapitalist society in the Grundrisse by
outlining the three broad stages of human history. The first stage, which characterizes
pre-capitalist societies, is based on personal dependence. Social relations dominate and
control the individual. The individual is personally dependent on the lord or king, vizir or
pharaoh. In such societies “human productivity develops only to a limited extent and at
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isolated points.” Satisfaction is obtained on the basis of a narrow and relatively
underdeveloped, patriarchal standpoint. The second stage, which characterizes capitalism,
is “personal independence based upon dependence mediated by things.” In capitalism,
individuals are formally “free” but they are actually dominated by things—by the
products of their own hand. Dead labor, capital, dominates living labor. The social power
of the individual develops in accordance with exchange value and money; subjective
powers are now expressed in an objective form. Individuals are subsumed under social
production, even as the personal bonds that connect them are broken up and dissolved:
“Their production is not directly social, not the offspring of association distributing labor
within itself.”62 Dissatisfaction is obtained on the basis of a broad and relatively
developed standpoint. However, this “second stage” creates the conditions for the third
stage, postcapitalist society. Marx refers to this stage as follows: “Free individuality,
based on the universal development of the individuals and the subordination of their
communal, social productivity, which is their social possession.”63
Remarkably, Marx does not here use the word socialism or communism to
describe a postcapitalist society. He instead refers to it as “free individuality.” In fact,
most of Marx’s references to “socialism” in the Grundrisse are critical references to the
standpoint of Darimon, Proudhon, and the English neo-Ricardian radicals. The word
“communism” rarely appears at all. Marx appears to be trying to distinguish himself from
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other opponents of capitalism by further clarifying his understanding of the
alternative to it. The “free individuality” that defines the third stage is a very different
kind of individuality than found in capitalism, since it is based upon the “universal
development of individuals.” What predominates is “the free exchange of individuals
who are associated on the basis of common appropriation and control of the means of
production.”64 Marx is suggesting that capitalism narrows our individuality in that every
aspect of life is reduced to one and only one sense: the sense of having or possession. The
wealth and multidimensionality of the individual’s needs and desires are narrowed down
and hollowed out in capitalism, in which augmenting value—as expressed most of all in
obtaining money—is considered the greatest good. In contrast, in a socialist or
postcapitalist society the universal needs of the individual determine social development.
Marx sharply distinguishes this third stage of history from pre-capitalist
formations, in that society and/or the community no longer dominate the individual.
Relations of personal dependence are transcended. The individual now becomes the social
entity.65 He also sharply distinguishes the realm of free individuality from the second
stage—capitalism—because individuals are no longer cut off from connection or
communion with one another but instead relate to each other on the basis of their
mutually acknowledged universal needs and capabilities.
Marx elaborates upon this by writing that in capitalism, “The individuals are
subsumed under social production, which exists outside them as their fate; but social
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production is not subsumed under the individuals who manage it as their common
wealth.”66 In capitalism individuals are subsumed by social production in so far as
relations of production and exchange take on a life of their own and confront the
individual as a hostile force. Marx does not think that capitalist society respects the
freedom of the individual; it instead dominates and controls individuals under social
relations of their own making. Therein lies the perversity of capitalism. It is therefore
quite pointless to speak of a new society as one in which the freedom of individuals is
overcome by subjecting them to the control of social relations because this is exactly
what governs the social relations of capitalism.
To use Karel Kosik’s phrase, Marx does not envision a new society as one in
which the individual is “walled in” by society.67 He argues that this is what occurs under
capitalism. He conceives of the new society as the realm of free individuality.
But what about capitalism’s “civilizing mission”? Marx does not leave aside the
contributions of capitalism as he envisions a new society. He notes that “the dissolution
of all products and activities into exchange values presuppose both the dissolution of all
established personal (historical) relations of dependence in production, and the all-round
dependence of producers upon one another.”68 Capitalism gives rise to the idea of free
individuality even as it subsumes individuals under social relations of their own making.
Value production acts as the great dissolver of firm and fixed social relations, allowing
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individuals for the first time to conceive of themselves as self-determining subjects.
Hence, the “free individuality” that Marx conceives of as defining the third stage
“presupposes precisely the production on the basis of exchange value, which, along with
the universality of the estrangement of individuals from others, now also produces the
universality and generality of all their relations and abilities.”69 The achievement of a
new society based on “free individuality” depends on the formation of new needs and
capabilities generated by capitalist relations of production and exchange. Without the
generation of such new needs and capacities a new society would lack the incentivizing
principle for economizing on labor time. Largely for this reason, Marx repeatedly argues
throughout the Grundrisse that the third stage of human history arises from the “material
and spiritual conditions”70 created by capitalism itself.71
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He sums this up in writing, “It is equally certain that individuals cannot
subordinate their own social connections to themselves before they have created them.”72
It makes a huge difference as to whether the effort to create a postcapitalist society arises
from the womb of social relations already in existence or whether it must instead create
them sui generis. It is impossible to create a new society from scratch. Marx clearly
rejects the notion that a new society can be constructed by turning one’s back to history.
The “universally developed individuals” that characterizes the stage that follows
capitalism is itself a product of prior stages of historical development.
Largely for this reason, the Grundrisse contains a considerable amount of
historical analysis of the development of capitalism as well as of precapitalist forms of
production. The latter range from discussions of the economic and social formations in
the ancient Greek and Roman world to communal forms of labor and land tenure that
characterized pre-capitalist societies in India, Russia, and China. The section on “PreCapitalist Economic Formations” is one of the most famous and widely discussed
sections of the Grundrisse, and it has given rise to lively debates since it first became
widely available (at least in German, Russian and Chinese) in the 1950s.73 At issue in
many of these debates is why Marx accorded so much attention to precapitalist
formations. Was it part of an effort to extend a “historical materialist” analysis of
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capitalism to a delineation of the forms of social production that have characterized
all of human history? Or did Marx have a different aim in mind?
There is no question that Marx was deeply interested in comprehending the
manner in which capitalist social relations emerged from out of the womb of precapitalist
modes of production.74 At the same time, the Grundrisse indicates that Marx was just as
interested in how a historical understanding of the emergence of capitalist commodity
production could shed light on a future postcapitalist society. He points to this in writing,
On the other hand—and this is much more important for us—our method
indicates the points at which historical analysis must be introduced, or at which
bourgeois economy as a mere historical form of the production process points
beyond itself towards earlier historical modes of production. . . . These
indications, together with the correct grasp of the present, then also offer the key
to the understanding of the past—a work in its own right, which we hope to be
able to undertake as well. This correct approach, moreover, leads to points which
indicate the transcendence of the present form of production relations, the
movement coming into being, thus foreshadowing the future. If, on the other
hand, the pre-bourgeois phases appear as merely historical, i.e. transcended
premises, so [on the other hand] the present conditions of production appear as
conditions which transcend themselves and thus posit themselves as historical
premises for a new state of society.75
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Marx contends that the analysis of earlier historical forms facilitates the effort to
envisage future social forms. The social relations of any given society generally appear
“natural” and “normal” in the eyes of its participants, especially when they have
prevailed for a considerable length of time. This proclivity to naturalize social relations is
no less prevalent among philosophers, as he shows in his comments about John Stuart
Mill and others in the “Introduction” to the Grundrisse. One way to challenge this
tendency towards naturalization is through the historical investigation of social
formations that preceded capitalism. The peculiar and transitory nature of capitalism is
brought into focus by elucidating the marks that distinguish its relations of production
from precapitalist forms. By thusly shaking up the understanding’s proclivity towards
naturalization, the examination of the past in turn creates a conceptual lens with which to
discern intimations of the future. The antagonistic contradictions of the present historical
form are brought into focus through an examination of the past, which makes it possible
to see how such contradictions foreshadow their transcendence in a future form of social
organization. In this sense, Marx’s work does not only address the nature of a possible
postcapitalist society when he directly comments on the future; his analysis of the
contrast between capitalist and precapitalist societies does so as well.
This is illuminated in a number of ways in the Grundrisse’s discussion of
precapitalist economic forms. First, Marx argues that while capitalist wage labor is
superior in many respects to slavery in pre-capitalist societies, wage labor does not
represent a normatively “free” contractual relation between employers and employees.
Wage laborers are formally free in so far as they sell their capacity to labor to a discrete
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entity, the capitalist, in exchange for monetary remuneration. The capitalist pays the
workers not for the actual amount of time worked but rather for their potential or ability
to work.76 In contrast, slaves are not formally free since the master purchases not their
capacity to labor but their actual labor—their full physical being, the entire body of their
labor. Therefore, “labor capacity in its totality appears to the free worker as his own
property, one of his own moments, over which he as subject exercises control, and which
he maintains in selling it.”77 Since the wage laborer appears to act as a self-determining
subject in so far as a contractual relationship is established with the capitalist, it appears
to be a social form that best corresponds to the concept of freedom. For many living in
such a system, this condition of formal “equality” seems to offer the best of all possible
worlds. Matters are very different, however, in pre-capitalist societies, where no slave
considers herself the equal of the master since a contractual relation is absent; the master
simply imposes labor upon the slaves and decides arbitrarily how they shall live. By
contrasting such pre-capitalist forms with capitalism, Marx is able to pinpoint a
contradiction immanent to wage labor that is easy to overlook. In slavery and serfdom
there is no separation between the active being of persons and the “inorganic or objective
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conditions” of their existence. In capitalism there is such a separation, since “living
labor appears as alien vis-à-vis labor capacity whose labor it is, whose life it expresses,
for it is surrendered to capital in return for objectified labor, for the product of labor
itself.”79 Despite appearances, in capitalism there is no equal exchange of objectified
labor (in the form of capital) for living labor. There is instead an exchange of objectified
labor for labor capacity. The contractual relation between worker and capitalist rests on
that basis. In being paid not for their actual labor but only for their capacity to labor, the
active being of the workers is separated or alienated from the objective conditions of
existence. “Labor itself, like its product, is negated in its form as the labor of the
particular, individualized worker.”80 Wage labor is therefore far from being either natural
or an expression of actual freedom. It is rather a peculiar social relation in which the
formal equality between capitalist and worker rests upon the alienation of labor. It
follows that wage labor will come to an end with the abolition of alienated labor.
Second, Marx shows that while relations of exchange and commodity production
long preceded capitalism and are found in diverse forms of precapitalist societies, only in
capitalism do they define and determine social reproduction. Relations of exchange, as is
the case with exchange value, exist on the margins of precapitalist society, or in their
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“interstices.” The subordination of the producers to relations of exchange that exist
outside of their control is historically specific and is not at all “natural.” The same is true
of the concept of value itself. He writes,
The economic concept of value does not occur among the ancients. Value as
distinct from pretium [price] was a purely legal category, invoked against fraud,
etc. The concept of value wholly belongs to the latest political economy, because
that concept is the most abstract expression of capital itself and of the production
based on it. In the concept of value, the secret of capital is betrayed.82
It follows that just as value production and exchange value do not dominate society prior
to capitalism, they do not do so after capitalism.
Third, Marx shows that the isolated individuality and atomization that
characterize modern capitalism are by no means natural or eternal by focusing on
communal forms of association, production and distribution that precede capitalism. The
Grundrisse contains one of the most extensive treatments of the Germanic, Slavic, and
“Asiatic” communal forms found in any of his writings. He denies that the “Asiatic” form
is a historic aberration, noting that the later Germanic forms are derived from it. The
historical aberration is instead the concept of free individuality abstracted from
communal conditions that prevail in modern capitalist societies. The very concept of the
atomized and independent individual, he argues, arises and can only arise on the basis of
developed social and economic relations, including communal ones. As he puts it, “Man
81
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becomes individualized only through the process of history.” Moreover, he argues
that precapitalist communal forms, despite the social backwardness and political
despotism that were often associated with them, “seems very exalted, when set against
the modern world, in which production is the end of man, and wealth the end of
production.”84 It follows that just as non-communal forms of labor and production did not
prevail prior to capitalism, they will not prevail after capitalism. Marx fleshes out this
conception by directly addressing the contours of a postcapitalist society, as follows:
In fact, however, if the narrow bourgeois form is peeled off, what is wealth is not
the universality of the individual’s needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive
forces, etc., produced in universal exchange; what is it if not the full development
of human control over the forces of nature—over the forces of so-called Nature,
as well as those of his own nature? What is wealth is not the absolute unfolding of
man’s creative abilities, without any precondition other than the preceding
historical development, which makes the totality of this development—i.e. the
development of human powers as such, not measured by any previously given
yardstick—an end-in-itself, through which he does not reproduce himself in any
specific character, but produces his totality, and does not seek to remain
something he has already become, but is in the absolute movement of
becoming?85
Although there is much that can be said of this striking passage, what stands out
most of all is the distinction Marx makes between material wealth and value production.
In capitalism, material wealth takes the form of value; however, there is no reason for
wealth to forever exist in a value-form. It ceases to do so in a postcapitalist society. In a
new society wealth becomes reconfigured from a merely quantitative to a qualitative
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determinant; instead of expressing the reduction of human sensuousness to the
abstraction of value, wealth becomes “the absolute unfolding of man’s creative
abilities.”86 In such a society material wealth is not, as in capitalism, a mere means to the
augmentation of value. Instead, wealth—understood as the unfolding of the richness of
the human personality—now becomes an end in itself.
Marx is here returning to and deepening the conception he earlier elaborated in
1844, when he wrote:
It will be seen how in place of the wealth and poverty of political economy come
the rich human being and the rich human need. The rich human being is
simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human manifestations of
life—the man in whom his own realization exists as an inner necessity, as need.87
For Marx the new society is the realm in which the development of the totality of human
powers is its own end. In capitalism, in contrast, human powers exist to service capital,
self-expanding value.88 The latter serves as the “yardstick” of social development. In
contrast, no “previously given” yardstick that is independent of the individuals’
subjective self-activity governs social development in a postcapitalist society.
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Capitalism, as Marx was fully aware, constantly creates new needs as the
forces of production expand. Such needs, however, are generated in order to service
capital’s thirst for self-expansion. A new society, on the other hand, is one in which the
creation and development of human needs is a self-sufficient end.89 New needs are
generated through a “universal exchange” of humanity’s creative capacities and serve no
purpose other than to augment those capacities. The generation of such needs, of course,
is potentially endless; needs are limited only by the capacity to envision them.90
However, this is not commensurate with the “bad infinite” of value production, in which
new needs are generated for the sake of endlessly augmenting an abstraction, value.
Value, as Marx notes several times in the Grundrisse, appears as the absolute subject in
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capitalism. In contrast, once wealth is freed from its value integument, a
“multiplicity of needs”92 is generated for the sake of augmenting a concrete, sensuous
force—that of the individuals themselves. The actual individual now finally emerges as
the absolute subject. Perhaps for this reason, Marx writes that an “absolute movement of
becoming”93 characterizes a postcapitalist society. Such an “absolute movement,” which
is thwarted by capitalist value production, is the basis of the new society.
Throughout the Grundrisse, Marx points to a possible transcendence of value
production by emphasizing the dissolution of social formations. There is hardly any word
that appears more often in his work than dissolution. He writes,
Wage labor appears as the dissolution, the destruction of relations in which labor
was fixed in all respects of income, content, locality, scope, etc. Hence as
negation of the fixity of labor and its remunerations.94
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He adds, “The dissolution of all products and activities into exchange values presupposes
both the dissolution of all established personal (historical) relations of dependence in
production, and the all-round dependence of producers upon one another.”95 And he
writes of how capital promotes the “dissolution of the relation to the earth—to land or
soil—as a natural condition of production . . . ”96 Marx’s emphasis on dissolution is no
less emphatic when it comes to analyzing precapitalist economic formations, as the
following passage—in which dissolution is mentioned no less than six times—suggests:
Such historical processes of dissolution can take the form of the dissolution of the
dependent relationship which binds the worker to the soil and to the lord but
which actually presupposes his ownership of the means of subsistence. . . . They
can also take the form of the dissolution of these relations of landed property
which constitute him as yeoman, as a free working petty landowner or tenant
(colonus), i.e. as a free peasant. The dissolution of the even more ancient forms of
communal property and of real community needs no special mention. Or they can
take the form of the dissolution of guild relations. . . . Lastly, they can take the
form of the dissolution of various client relationships . . . 97
The reason for Marx’s repeated emphasis on dissolution is not immediately selfevident. The Grundrisse explores a number of social formations that existed for many
centuries or even millennia, including the so-called “Asiatic” mode of production. Surely
not all of these formations were forever on the verge of collapsing or dissolving. So why
does Marx place so much emphasis on the tendency towards dissolution, even when he is
analyzing relatively stable social formations?
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The reason appears to be that Marx was not interested in writing a history of
social or economic development as much as detailing the process by which a new, free
society is compelled to come into being. If Marx were engaged in historical analysis for
the purpose of developing an empirical sociology, he would need to give as much weight
to tendencies towards stability and equilibrium as to dissolution and decay. Yet Marx
does not do so; his historical analyses are decidedly one-sided, in so far as they
emphasize the constraints faced by social formations in the face of changing historical
circumstances. He does so because his real object of analysis is not so much the past as
the future. In tracing out how various formations undergo dissolution, Marx is
elucidating the factors immanent in the present that point to a future state of affairs.
Contrary to the claim that Marx focused mainly on the present and secondarily on the
past, his emphasis on tendencies toward dissolution in his analyses of both the present
and the past indicate that he was most of all concerned about the future. The future,
however, cannot simply be spelled out on the basis of the individual’s imagination; it
must be traced out through an analysis of existing social formations. Marx spells this out
in the following passage:
Within bourgeois society, based as it is upon exchange value, relationships of
exchange and production are generated which are just so many mines to blow it to
pieces. (A multitude of antagonistic forms of the social entity, whose antagonism,
however, can never be exploded by a quiet metamorphosis). On the other hand, if
we did not find latent in society as it is, the material conditions of production and
the corresponding relationships of exchange for a classless society, all attempts to
explode it would be quixotic.98
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Marx locates the specific process by which capitalist social relations create the
conditions for a supersession of value production in his discussion of the relation between
necessary and surplus labor time. This represents one of the most important sections of
the Grundrisse. Along with its accompanying discussion of the machinery and “the
automaton,” it has given rise to a large number of debates in the history of Marxism and
Marx scholarship.
Necessary labor is the amount of labor time needed to ensure the subsistence of
the laborer—the time requisite for enabling the worker to re-enter the labor process on a
renewed basis. It depends on an assortment of factors, such as the level of a society’s
material development, what is specifically required in a given time or place for workers
to replenish their labor power, etc. Surplus labor refers to the excess of time needed to
ensure the workers’ subsistence. This distinction is of great importance, as it serves as the
basis of Marx’s concept of surplus value.99 He argues,
The great historical aspect of capital is the creation of this surplus labor,
superfluous from the point of view of mere use value. Or mere subsistence, and its
historical mission is fulfilled when, on the one hand, needs are developed to the
point where surplus labor beyond what is necessary has itself become a general
need and arises from the individual needs themselves; and on the other, when, by
strict discipline of capital to which successive generations have been subjected,
general industriousness has been developed as the universal asset of the new
generation.100
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Capital spurs the formation of new needs beyond what is required for
subsistence, as part of spurring the augmentation of value. The less (relative) amount of
value that goes to sustain the worker, the greater the (relative) amount of value that
accrues to capital. The greater the ratio of surplus relative to necessary labor, the more
expansive human needs become—even as they are subjected to capital’s dominance.
Capital’s “progressive” or “civilizing” mission is to expand the boundaries of human
needs. Although this unfolds in an alienating process at the expense of the workers, it
creates the possibility for richer and more expansive conditions of life: “As the ceaseless
striving for the general form of wealth, however, capital forces labor beyond the limits of
natural need and thus creates the material elements for the development of the rich
individuality.”101
There are, however, internal barriers to capital’s effort to surmount all obstacles to
its drive to increase the proportion of surplus labor relative to necessary labor, since “The
smaller the fractional part already which represents necessary labor, the greater the
surplus labor, the less can any increase in productivity perceptively diminish necessary
labor.”102 Surplus labor expands so dramatically vis-a-vis necessary labor that capital
cannot further reduce necessary labor without undermining the only source of value,
living labor itself:
It is the law of capital, as we have seen, to produce surplus, disposable time. It can
do this only by setting in motion necessary labor, i.e., by entering into exchange
with the worker. It is therefore the tendency of capital to produce as much labor as
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possible, just as it is its tendency to reduce necessary labor to a minimum. . . .
It is just as much the tendency of capital to render human labor (relatively)
superfluous, as to drive it on without limit.103
In rendering human labor relatively superfluous, even as the magnitude of capital
increases, the rate of profit begins to decline. The decline in the rate of profit, Marx
argues, is merely a manifestation of the increased productivity of labor—that is, capital’s
effectiveness at increasing surplus labor relative to necessary labor. Capital can of course
try to get around this problem. One way is by increasing the length of the working day, to
increase absolute surplus value. Yet there are limits to this since a day only contains 24
hours. Another way is through a “spatial addition of more simultaneous working
days”104—such as by increasing the size of the laboring populace by evicting farmers
from the land. At the same time, however, capital’s tendency is to “reduce to a minimum
the many simultaneous working days.”105 As much as capital tries to increase the amount
of working time in order to accrue more value, it is driven, at one and the same time, to
reduce the amount of necessary working time. Surplus labor increases at a faster rate than
necessary labor time, replicating the original problem. There is too much capital relative
to living labor.
Capitalist value production therefore finds itself caught in an insuperable
contradiction: “Capital, in positing surplus labor, equally and simultaneously posits and
does not posit necessary labor; it exists only as necessary labor both exists and does not
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This very contradiction creates the conditions for a higher form of social

organization, since “an individual can satisfy his own needs only by simultaneously
satisfying the needs of, and producing a surplus over and above that for, another
individual.” Thus, “it is this very development of wealth which makes it possible to
transcend these contradictions.”107
Marx concludes, “Capital posits the production of wealth itself and thus the
universal development of the productive forces, posits the continual overthrow of its
existing presuppositions, as the presuppositions of its reproduction.” Capital is based on
conditions that point beyond itself, not despite but because “the elaboration of the
productive forces, of general wealth, etc., knowledge, etc., takes place in such a way that
the working individual alienates himself.” This serves as
The basis [of] the possibility of the universal development of the individuals, and
their actual development from this basis as constant transcendence of their
barrier, which is recognized as such, and is not interpreted as a sacred limit. The
universality of the individual not as an imaginary concept, but the universality of
his real and notional relations.108
The development of the material productive forces posits the possibility of this
transcendence; however, it does not by itself constitute it. What constitutes the
transcendence of capitalist value production is a state of existence in which the
universality of needs is actualized. The very process that limits and impoverishes the
workers by reducing their laboring activity to a mere means of increasing the productive
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forces turns into its opposite, in that this process helps lead to a new sensitivity and
understanding of universal needs, connections, enjoyments, and experiences that can
realize the wealth of the human personality.
It appears, therefore, that even when tackling such basic economic categories as
the relation between necessary and surplus labor time, Marx focuses much of his
theoretical attention on forms of social existence that could follow capitalism.
This becomes further attenuated in Marx’s discussion of machinery and “the
automaton” in the concluding part of the “Chapter on Capital.” He argues that the logical
trajectory of capitalism is to replace living labor at the point of production with dead
labor—machinery and labor saving technology. The greater the productivity of labor, the
greater the output of value. The value of each particular commodity decreases with
increases in productivity, since each commodity embodies less hours of labor time. Yet
by producing greater amounts of commodities in a given unit of time, the total amount of
value increases considerably. As a result, “immediate labor and its quantity disappear as
the determining principle of production, of the creation of use-values. “Although labor
remains “indispensable” to capitalist production, it “becomes a subaltern moment in
comparison to scientific work, the technological application of the natural sciences.”109
It may appear that Marx is simply discussing the well-known tendency of
capitalism to promote technological innovation. While that is surely his focus, he is not
only detailing a major component of how capitalism grows and develops. His attention is
focused just as much on how this phenomenon points to a form of social existence that
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can follow capitalism. He writes, “Thus capital works to dissolve itself as the form
which dominates production.”110 Since living labor as the source and determinant of
value begins to disappear under the impact of technological innovation, the existence of
value production itself is placed in jeopardy—even though the mass of capital grows
under its impetus. As the importance of living labor as the source value begins to recede,
the possibility arises of another way of producing use-values—one that is not tied to labor
as the universal medium of social reproduction. The very principle that governs the
development of capitalism—the increased productivity of labor through the use of labor
saving devices—points towards a possible supersession of capitalism. Just when capital
takes over and dominates living labor to an unprecedented degree, the conditions that
ensure the existence of capital begin to dissolve. Marx states that capitalism “quite
unintentionally reduces human labor, the expenditure of human energy, to a minimum.
This will be to the advantage of emancipated labor and is the condition for its
emancipation.”111
Marx argues that the logical trajectory of this substitution of dead labor for living
labor is the following:
Labor no longer appears so much as included in the production process, but rather
man relates himself to that process as its overseer and regulator . . . [the laborer]
stands besides the production process, rather than being its main agent. Once this
transformation has taken place, it is neither the immediate labor performed by
man himself, nor the time for which he works, but the appropriation of his own
general productive power, his comprehension of Nature and domination of it by
virtue of his being a social entity—in a word, the development of the social
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individual—that appears as the cornerstone of production and wealth. . . . As
soon as labor time in its immediate form ceased to be the great source of wealth,
labor time ceases and must cease to be its measure, and therefore exchange value
[must cease to be the measure] of use value. The surplus labor of the masses has
ceased to be the condition for the development of general wealth, just as the nonlabor of a few has ceased to be the condition for the development of the general
powers of the human mind. As a result, production based upon exchange value
collapses, and the immediate material production process itself is stripped of its
form of indigence and antagonism.112
Marx is envisioning a situation in which labor ceases to be the measure or
medium of social relations. Marx denies that labor is the “cornerstone of production and
wealth” in all forms of society. Least of all does he think that labor will serve as the
cornerstone of a postcapitalist society. Instead, “the development of the social individual”
in its variety of manifestations—including those not limited to labor or material
production—will serve as the cornerstone of wealth. Capitalism prepares the way for this
through its proclivity to reduce the relative importance of living labor. This will free up
individuals in the new society to pursue talents and capacities that are not restricted to the
labor process. Marx envisions the following:
Free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary
labor time in order to posit surplus labor, but in general the reduction of necessary
labor of society to a minimum, to which then corresponds the artistic, scientific,
etc., development of individuals, made possible by the time thus set free and the
means produced for all of them.113
These passages clearly highlight Marx’s emphasis on how the specific features of
a postcapitalist society emerge from within the womb of capitalism itself. At the same
time, his analysis raises many unresolved questions. If living labor “disappears” or is
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severely reduced as capitalism fully develops, how is a new society going to actually
come into being? Will it arise quasi-automatically, through the development of the capital
relation? Or will it arise consciously, through a revolution by social agents resisting the
capital relation? How is it possible to uproot the capital relation from within if the role of
living labor “disappears” from the process of producing and reproducing it? Marx does
not explicitly address these questions in this section of the Grundrisse, and it is not easy
to discern how he would address them were he given the chance.114 It appears that there
is somewhat of a discord between objective and subjective factors in his analysis, in that
he does not directly indicate how subjective forms of resistance can overcome the
objective tendency of capitalist accumulation that he outlines in his analysis.115
On these grounds, many objectivist Marxists have argued that the Grundrisse
indicates that Marx did not place as much emphasis on class struggle and subjective
forms of resistance as have been widely assumed. Moishe Postone sees the Grundrisse as
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the most graphic confirmation that for Marx not living labor but dead labor is the
emancipatory alternative. Postone is very much following the lead of Herbert Marcuse in
this regard, who argued many decades earlier that this section of the Grundrisse
anticipates contemporary capitalism, in so far as the existence of a politicized working
class has become largely non-existent.116
In contrast to Marcuse, Postone, and other objectivist Marxists, Antonio Negri has
argued that the Grundrisse is more deeply rooted in proletarian subjectivity than any of
his other major works. He does so by focusing on the sections of the Grundrisse in which
Marx explicitly connects subjective and objective factors, as when he writes, “But capital
too, cannot confront capital, if it is not confronted by labor, for capital is capital only as
non-labor, in this antithetical relation.”117 Negri also makes much of the section on
machinery and “the automaton” by arguing that its discussion anticipates the emergence
of a post-industrial information economy. As a result of decades of intense proletariat
revolt, he contends, capitalism has been forced to replace living labor with labor saving
devices, thereby making the former so superfluous that value production has ceased to
govern contemporary capitalism. What Marx posits as occurring after capitalism—the
transcendence of value production through the elimination of living labor from the
production process—Negri sees as defining the contemporary information economy.
Value production, he argues, no longer characterizes capitalism, which makes it all the
easier, in his view, to move toward replacing it with an alternative form of social
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organization. The emancipatory project, for Negri, is fundamentally political in
character, since capitalism has already sublated its economic reliance on value.
While a full analysis and evaluation of these positions cannot be included here, it
is important to exercise caution when it comes to drawing conclusions from the passages
in the Grundrisse concerning the relation of necessary and surplus labor time and
machinery. While Marx sometimes writes of the “disappearance” of living labor in the
production process, it appears that he is addressing a tendency more than an
accomplished fact. This is reinforced by the fact that the “Chapter on Capital” also
emphasizes the ways in which the incorporation of labor saving devices into the
production process can also increase the employment of living labor. Marx writes,
This is striking proof that, under the dominion of capital, the employment of
machinery does not reduce work, but rather lengthens it. What it reduces is
necessary labor, not the labor necessary for the capitalist. Since fixed capital is
devalued as long as it is not employed in production, its growth is linked with the
tendency to make work perpetual.118
While capitalism strives to reduce the relative amount of labor time at the point of
production, it also strives to augment value. Capitalism is defined by a complex dynamic
rather than by a unilinear replacement of all workers by machines. The incorporation of
new machinery in the production process necessitates that the value of the constant
capital be reproduced with each new cycle of capitalist production, thereby creating an
impetus to increase the absolute (if not relative) employment of labor. Marx refers to this
process as follows: “By striving to reduce labor time to a minimum, while, on the other
hand, positing labor time as the sole measure and source of wealth, capital itself is a
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Two contradictory tendencies occur side-by-side. On

the one hand, capitalism is driven to reduce necessary labor time to a minimum; on the
other hand, capitalism creates disposable time by increasing surplus labor. Marx notes
that this contradiction becomes increasingly evident with the development of the
productive forces.120 The reduction of necessary labor time does not necessarily lead to
an absolute reduction of surplus labor time, which still creates value. Marx writes,
“Hence, the most developed machinery now compels the laborer to work for a much
longer time than the savage does, or than the laborer himself did when he was using the
simplest, crudest instruments.”121
Marx refers to this contradiction being superseded in a new society, in which
necessary labor “will be measured by the needs of the social individual” while “the
disposable time of all will increase.”122 While many issues remain unresolved about
Marx’s discussion of machinery and “the automaton” in the “Chapter on Capital,” it
seems over-hasty to conclude that he is suggesting that the actual elimination of living
labor from the production process will occur in capitalism. Marx is delineating a
tendency, not a finished result. Objectivist and subjectivist Marxists appear to have seized
on these passages by jumping to conclusions not warranted by the full text. Marx neither
infers that value production will be annulled in capitalism, nor does he suggest that living
119

Ibid., 91.

120

Ibid., 94.

121

Ibid. Emphasis is in Marx’s original.

122

Ibid., 94.

123

labor ceases to be a socially determinative force in capitalism.
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The transcendence

of both value production and labor as the medium governing the social metabolism occur
in a new, postcapitalist society, even if the conditions for this future state of existence are
readied and prepared in the womb of the old one.
Marx takes a step further into a new society at the end of the Grundrisse in
addressing whether play can replace labor after capitalism. He cites Fourier, stating that
it was his “great merit” to have emphasized the need to transform conditions of
production instead of relations of exchange. However, he takes issue with Fourier’s view
that play can replace labor on the grounds that freely-associated human relations require
great discipline and development. Marx conceives of free activity as not only leisure but
also as exercise,124 writing of the importance of “material creative and self-objectifying
science, with respect to the developed man, whose mind is the repository of the
accumulated knowledge of society.”125 Truly free activity, for Marx, consists of
conscious, purposeful activity—which is an arduous exercise.
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Far from denigrating the role of ideas or seeing them as merely
epiphenomenal, Marx considers it imperative for a new society to appropriate the
“accumulated knowledge” of previous historical eras. The fully developed person, who
seeks to express a totality of manifestations of life, cannot be without the vast storehouse
of accumulated knowledge that human history provides us with. A new society is not
defined only by its level of material development, but also by its intellectual and spiritual
level.
The “Third Draft” of Capital, 1861-63
After finishing the Grundrisse, Marx published a relatively brief work entitled A
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. Although it marked his effort to
publicly present some of his theoretic discoveries of the late 1850s, it is far less
comprehensive and sweeping than either the Grundrisse or volume one of Capital. Marx
was not yet prepared in 1859 to publish the comprehensive study that he had in mind for
some time; therefore, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy has a more
modest scope, containing only two brief chapters—“The Commodity” and “Money or
Simple Reproduction.” Marx later considerably re-worked these chapters in volume one
of Capital, published in 1867. Since many of the points contained in A Contribution to
the Critique of Political Economy are found in either the Grundrisse or Capital, it will
not be analyzed here.
More germane to this study is the work that comes between A Contribution to the
Critique of Political Economy and volume one of Capital—the 1861-63 draft of Capital.

This “third” draft of Capital
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is extremely detailed and comprehensive, consisting of

over 2,000 printed pages.127 A section of the draft, consisting of a lengthy criticism of the
works of other economic theorists, was published several decades after Marx’s death as a
separate work, entitled by its editors Theories of Surplus Value.128 The entire draft has
only recently become available and is just beginning to receive the scholarly attention
that it deserves.129
The 1861-63 draft contains a number of innovative formulations and concepts that
are not explicitly found in Marx’s earlier work, the Grundrisse included. These include a
detailed analysis of the origin and nature of surplus value, discussions of the
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contradiction between “living labor” and objectified or ”dead labor,” and a
preliminary discussion of the forms of value as well as the fetishism of commodities. The
draft of 1861-63 also represents Marx’s first effort to develop a theory of “average
prices,” the difference between “market value” and “individual value,” over-production,
and capitalist crisis, all of which later become critically important in volumes two and
three of Capital.
The 1861-63 draft also touches on the nature of a postcapitalist society in a
number of important ways. However, Marx’s discussion of this is not as explicit or
detailed as in the Grundrisse, One reason for this may be that Marx decided not to
directly enter into a critical discussion of the shortcomings of other socialist and
communist writers in the work on the grounds that it was more important for him to focus
on a critique of the major bourgeois economists. He writes,
In accordance with the plan of my work socialist and communist writers are
entirely excluded from the historical reviews. . . . I therefore exclude such
eighteenth century writers as Brissot, Godwin and the like, and likewise the
nineteenth socialists and communists.130
At the same time, since most of the socialist and communist writers critiqued by
Marx in other contexts take Ricardo’s formulation of the determination of value by labor
time as their conceptual point of departure, Marx’s extended criticism of Ricardo in the
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draft of 1861-63 has important implications for understanding his view of the
alternative to capitalism.
Marx’s criticism of Ricardo and his followers (such as James Mill, John Stuart
Mill, Thomas Hodgskin and others) are quite lengthy, totaling over 600 pages. His main
objection is that Ricardo and the post-Ricardians focus exclusively on the quantitative
side of value, on the amount of labor time embodied in a product, rather than on the
qualitative side, on the kind of labor that creates value. He writes, “Ricardo starts out
from the determination of the relative values (or exchangeable values) of commodities by
‘the quantity of labor.’” However, “The character of this ‘labor’ is not further
explained.”131 If the value of all commodities is determined by the quantity of labor time
embodied in them, all commodities must contain a common substance. Commodities
have differing exchange values in so far as they contain different amounts of this
substance. Yet why does living labor, a subjective activity, take the form of this
substance? Ricardo and his followers never ask the question because they assume that
value is simply a natural property of labor. Marx, on the contrary, argues that living labor
serves as the substance of value only when labor assumes a specific social form—the
dual form of concrete versus abstract labor. Labor can serve as the substance of value
only if it is alienated labor. “But Ricardo does not examine the form—the peculiar
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characteristic of labor that creates exchange value or manifests itself in exchange
values—the nature of this labor.”132
Why does Ricardo never investigate the nature of value creating labor? Why does
he conflate “labor” with value creating labor? What prevented him from grasping the
historical specificity of value-creating labor? The answer is that his theoretic categories
did not proceed from the standpoint of the subjectivity of the laborer. Ricardo is more
interested in the products of labor than in the laborer. He wants to understand how
products come into being (such as commodities, capital and money) and how their value
is determined. The product is the subject of his analysis, not the human being who creates
and shapes it. He never conceptually looks into the factory to see what occurs in the
“storm and stress” of the actual production process. As a result, he fails to distinguish
between living labor as a generic activity and the peculiar kind of (alienated) labor that
actually creates value.
The manuscript of 1861-63, when read as a whole, shows that Marx took a very
different approach. The section on Ricardo and other economists is preceded by a part on
“”The Production Process of Capital.”133 Marx here focuses on the central contradiction
that is internal to the capitalist process of production—the antithesis between objectified
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labor and living labor. He writes, “an increase in value means nothing more than an
increase in objectified labor; but it is only through living labor that objectified labor can
be preserved or increased.”134 He refers to living labor as the “subject” of this process—
since no value can be created without it—while showing that living labor becomes
subsumed by objectified labor:
A further antithesis is this: in contrast to money (or value in general) as objectified
labor, labor capacity appears as a capacity of the living subject; the former is past
labor, labor already performed, the latter is future labor, whose existence can only
be the living activity, the currently present activity of the living subject itself.135
Marx has entered into the heart of the process of production by showing what occurs
within the factory. Not only are products being produced by workers, the workers
themselves are being transformed from living, creative, subjective agents into mere
appendages of the machine. A split occurs between the subjectivity of the laborer and the
labor that they perform. Marx describes this split in terms that recall, but also further
extend, his earlier formulations of 1844:
The labor goes over from the form of activity to the form of being, the form of the
object. As alteration of the object it alters its own shape. The form-giving activity
consumes the object and itself; it forms the object and materializes itself; it
consumes itself in its subjective form as activity and consumes the objective
character of the object, i.e., it abolishes the object’s indifference towards the
purpose of the labor.136
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By directly exploring the contradictions internal to the capitalist labor process,
what becomes visible is the specific kind of labor that creates value. This becomes of
critical importance in his criticism of Ricardo. Whereas prior to 1861 Marx often credited
Ricardo for pinpointing the determination of value by labor time, he now emphasizes his
radical departure from him. Marx indicates that positing labor as the source of value fails
to get to the critical issue—the kind of labor that creates value. When the latter is passed
over it becomes hard to see why living labor serves the substance of value. Marx is
suggesting that it is not enough to ameliorate the quantitative inequities associated with
the determination of value by labor time; instead, what is most needed is to qualitatively
eliminate the kind of labor that creates and constitutes value in the first place.
This has important ramifications for a Marxian understanding of a postcapitalist
society. This can be best discerned when Marx’s critique of Ricardo and post-Ricardians
is considered in light of his preceding discussion in “The Production Process of
Capital.”137 Marx argues that Ricardo’s failure to grasp the nature of the labor that creates
value leads to an erroneous theory of money. Ricardo argues that money, like other
market phenomena, only appears to contradict the determination of value by labor time
in so far as its value is determined by supply and demand instead of by the amount of
labor time that it takes to produce it. Ricardo seeks to dispel what he considers this false
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appearance by arguing that money, like the market price of a commodity, is
ultimately reducible to the determination of value by labor time. He “directly seeks to
prove the congruity of the economic categories with one another.”138 By reducing market
phenomena to the determination of value in an unmediated fashion, Ricardo posits an
identity of essence and appearance. Marx argued that this is even truer of John Stuart
Mill, who “transforms the unity of opposites into the direct identity of opposites.”139
Marx does not deny that the determination of value by labor time is an essential
economic category of capitalism, which is hidden and distorted by transactions on the
phenomenal level of the market. He denies, however, that there is a direct, unmediated
connection between the law of value and market phenomena. Prices must diverge from
value, Marx contends, because of the specific kind of labor that creates value—abstract
or indirectly social labor. Since “the definite, particular labor of the private individual
must manifest itself as its opposite, as equal, necessary, general labor,”140 the exchange
value of the commodity obtains an independent existence in money. Exchange values
calculated in money, or price, can therefore never be directly reduced to the commodity’s
“real” value. While the sum of all prices is equal to the sum of all values, the price of any
given commodity generally diverges from its value because of the peculiar form of labor
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that governs capitalist production. Value becomes price through a transformation into
opposite; the two are not identical, even though they exist in a state of dialectical unity.
The reason why Ricardo and the neo-Ricardians force the opposites of price and
value141 into an unmediated unity is that they fail to comprehend the historical peculiarity
of value-creating labor. They do not grasp that the concrete labor of individuals in
capitalist society must be represented in terms of its “immediate opposite, abstract,
general labor.” Essence and appearance cannot be made to coincide so long as abstract or
alienated labor persists, since “Only by its alienation does individual labor manifest itself
as its opposite.”142
By failing to grasp this, Ricardo and his school present “the whole bourgeois
system of economy as subject to one fundamental law, and extract the quintessence out of
the divergency and diversity of the various phenomena.”143 While this has the advantage
of concentrating attention on the determination of value by labor time, it is outweighed
by its disadvantages:
As the work proceeds, there is no further development. Where it does not consist
of a monotonous formal application of the same principles to various extraneous
matters, or of polemical vindication of these principles, there is only repetition or
amplification.144
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Marx will also contend that this is true of their understanding of the relation of
surplus value and profit as well.
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Ibid., 394-5. Marx’s comments bring to mind Hegel’s criticism of formal
abstraction in the Phenomenology of Spirit: “The Idea, which is of course true enough on
its own account, remains in effect always in its primitive condition, if its development
involves nothing more than this sort of repetition of the same formula. . . . Rather it is a
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Although Marx states that he intends to focus on the classical political economists
like Smith, Ricardo and Mill and not on the radical or socialist thinkers who were
influenced by them, he does venture into a critical discussion of the latter. He does not
dispute the contention of an important American advocate of free trade and critic of
Ricardo, Henry Charles Carey, that Ricardo’s economic theories made him “a father of
communism” in many respects.145 The manuscript of 1861-63 also contains an extended
section on “Proletarian Opposition on the Basis of Ricardo,” in which he discusses such
thinkers as Thomas Hodgskin, George Ramsey, and Richard Jones.146 Marx’s analysis
indicates that it should come as no surprise that the socialist followers of Ricardo adopted
the notion that money could be replaced by another means of measuring the quantity of
labor time, such as time chits or labor tokens. They found no fault with Ricardo’s purely
quantitative analysis of value production since they also did not ask the question of what
kind of labor creates value. Like Ricardo, the post-Ricardian socialists simply assumed
that it was a natural property of labor to serve as the substance of value. For this reason,
they thought it is possible to replace money by a direct determination of value by labor
time instead of relying on the indirect medium of price formation on the market. Marx
contends that they shared with Ricardo a failure to understand that money—or any
alternative medium that is adopted as a universal equivalent—is not just the expression of
monochromatic formalism which only arrives at the differentiation of its material since
this has been already provided and is by now familiar.” See G.W.F. Hegel,
Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), 9.
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a quantity of labor time, but of a specific quality of labor. This is why they held that
the ills of capitalism could be remedied by eliminating the “anarchy” of the market, such
as by replacing money with labor tokens.
Marx does not share their conception of the alternative to capitalism because he
does not hold that price formation on the market is “arbitrary” and contingent whereas
value production is predictable and transparent. The arbitrary and contingent nature of
market phenomena is itself a reflection of the irrational and indirect nature of value
production. Instead of contrasting the transparency of value production to the opaqueness
of market transactions, Marx sees both as constituting irrational and contradictory forms
within capitalist society. As long as the production relations of capitalism are
presupposed as natural and eternal, it is impossible to overcome the irrational and crisis
ridden nature of capital:
[I]t is quite clear, that between the starting-point, the prerequisite capital, and the
time of its return at the end of one of these periods, great catastrophes must occur
and elements of crisis must have gathered and developed, and these cannot in any
way be dismissed by the pitiful proposition that products exchange for product.147
As Marx also puts it, “Crisis is nothing but the forcible assertion of the unity of phases of
the production process which have become independent of each other.”148
Ricardo himself, Marx notes, denies the possibility of crises that are endemic to
value production149 because he posits an identity between production and consumption as
well as between purchase and sale. This implies that society,
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as if according to a plan, distributes its means of production and productive
forces in the degree and measure which is required for the fulfillment of the
various social needs, so that each sphere of production receives the quota of social
capital required to satisfy the corresponding need. This fiction arises entirely from
the inability to grasp the specific form of bourgeois production and this inability
in turn arises from the obsession that bourgeois production is production as such,
just like a man who believes in a particular religion and sees it as the religion, and
everything outside of it only as false religions.150
Marx’s statement that Ricardo assumes that the disproportionalities of value
production can be smoothed out “as if according to a plan” is striking in light of the
experience of the state-controlled “planned” economies in the USSR and elsewhere in the
twentieth century. By 1943 Soviet economists admitted that the law of value continued to
operate in their putatively “socialist” society. They contended, however, that because of
state planning the disproportionalities inherent in value production had been overcome.151
That they succeeded in actually overcoming such disproportionalities can be doubted,
given the history of the Soviet economy. Much like the socialist neo-Ricardians of the
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Ricardo held that economic crises are merely an exogenous hangover of feudal
appendages, such as legislation preventing free trade and competition.
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See “Teaching of Economics in the Soviet Union,” trans. Raya Dunayevskaya,
American Economic Review, vol. 34, no. 3 (September 1944):501-30. The article
originally appeared in the Russian journal Pod Znamenem Marxizma, no. 7-8 (1943).
Whereas previously Soviet textbooks had argued that the law of value did not operate
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economy. For the debate touched off by this declaration, see Raya Dunayevskaya, “A
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“Marxian Economics in the Soviet Union” and Leo Rogin, “Marx and Engels on
Distribution in a Socialist Society,” American Economic Review, vol. 35, no. 1 (March
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nineteenth century critiqued by Marx, they thought it was possible to eliminate
indirect and “anarchic” market relations while maintaining a system of value production
based on indirectly social labor.
Marx’s discussion lends credence to Moishe Postone’s argument that Marx’s
critique of capital applies to what he calls “traditional” or “Ricardian Marxism.”152 The
manuscript of 1861-63 indicates that Marx’s criticism of Ricardo and the neo-Ricardians
sheds illumination on the shortcomings of various “alternatives” to capitalism proposed
or implemented during the twentieth century.153
The 1861-63 draft of Capital also introduces a new concept that is not explicitly
developed in the Grundrisse—commodity fetishism.154 Marx argues that in capitalism
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I am referring only to Postone’s contention that many twentieth century
Marxists were “Ricardian” in so far as they focused on the magnitude of value rather than
on the dual character of labor. As indicated above, I do not share his view that those who
consider workers as revolutionary subjects to be “Ricardian Marxists.”
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Marx anticipates the shortcomings of twentieth century “socialism” in
numerous places in the manuscript. He goes so far as to view various socialist tendencies
as expressing the logic of capital. This is especially evident when he takes issue with
those who confuse the abolition of interest-bearing or monetary capital with the
elimination of the capitalist mode of production. He writes, “It is thus clear why
superficial criticism—in exactly the same way as it wants [to maintain] commodities and
combats money—now turns its wisdom and reforming zeal against interest-bearing
capital without touching upon real capitalist production, but merely attacking one of its
consequences. This polemic against interest-bearing capital, without touching upon real
capitalist production, but merely attacking one of its consequences. This polemic against
interest-bearing capital, undertaken from the standpoint of capitalist production, a
polemic which today parades as ‘socialism,’ occurs, incidentally, as a phase in the
development of capital itself . . . ” See Economic Manuscript of 1861-63, in MECW
32:453.
154

Although the concept is not spelled out in the Grundrisse, Marx does refer to
the phenomena of social relations appearing in “perverted” form several times in it as
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“the social character of labor ‘manifests itself’ in a perverted form—as the ‘property’
of things: that a social relation appears as a relation between things (between products,
value in use, commodities).”155 This is not simply an illusory appearance. Social labor
necessarily appears as a property of things because the labor that creates value, abstract
or alienated labor, is homogeneous and thing-like.
Marx notes, “As a commodity, a commodity can only express its value in other
commodities, since general labor time does not exist for it as a commodity.”156 Labor
time serves as the determination of value only when it exists in an objectified form, in the
shape of a thing or a commodity. It therefore appears that what establishes the
exchangeability of a given set of commodities is their thing-like nature—their natural
properties. Value appears as a property of the object. Value, however, is not a property of
objects but “only a representation in objects, an objective expression, of a relation
between men, a social relation, the relationship of men to their reciprocal productive
activity.”157 It appears that value is an attribute of the things-in-themselves instead of a
representation of specific social relations. Value production becomes naturalized in
appearing to be a property of things-in-themselves. And it must appear this way so long
as the peculiar social form of labor that characterizes capitalism remains intact. Here we

well as in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy. See MECW 29:275-6 and
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see why so many critics as well as defenders of capitalism assume that value
production is “natural.”158
Marx is engaging in a kind of phenomenological reduction in showing that what
appears to exist independent of us is actually a representation of our human relations. As
he puts it, “Thus commodities, things in general, have value only because they represent
human labor, not in so far as they are things in themselves, but in so far as they are
incarnations of social labor.”159 The fetishism of viewing the commodity as a thing-initself, which he considers “perverse,”160 is inevitable so long as value production persists.
Marx is not arguing that fetishism is simply a mental defect that can be stripped
away by enlightened critique. Although fetishizing the products of our own creation is
surely perverse, it cannot be avoided so long as the perverse system of value production
is maintained. Marx takes issue with fellow socialists on this:
The capitalist, as capitalist, is simply the personification of capital, that creation
of labor endowed with its own will and personality which stands in opposition to
labor. Hodgskin regards this as a pure subjective illusion which conceals the
deceit and interests of the exploiting classes. He does not see that the way of
looking at things arises from out of the actual relationship itself; the latter is not
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Marx expresses this as follows: “Thus the participants in capitalist production
live in a bewitched world and their own relationships appear to them as properties of
things, as properties of the material elements of production.” See Economic Manuscript
of 1861-63, in MECW 33:514.
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“inverted” or “turned upside down.” It can also be rendered as “mad.” For Marx, a world
in which the relation of subject and predicate is inverted through a process in which we
become subordinated to the products of our own creation is indeed a mad world.
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the expression of the former, but vice versa. In the same way, English
socialists say: “We need capital, but not the capitalist.”161
Marx does not oppose the capitalists on the grounds that they treat human beings
as objects—as if they had any choice in the matter. Capitalists treat human beings as
objects in so far as capital remains the defining principle of social organization. In
arguing that human relations appear as relations between things because that is what they
truly are in capitalism, Marx is fully breaking from the illusions of both Ricardo and the
neo-Ricardian socialists. Marx therefore does not propose replacing the capitalists with
some other agency that can more rationally allocate resources according to the
determination of labor time. Instead, he writes: “Where labor is communal, the relations
of men in their social production do not manifest themselves as ‘values’ of ‘things.’”162
Marx’s critique of other theorists in the manuscript of 1861-63 thus speaks directly to his
view of a postcapitalist society.
There are several other ways in which the 1861-63 draft speaks to the nature of a
postcapitalist society. Marx returns to and further develops his argument in the
Grundrisse that capitalism stimulates the development of new needs and capacities that
provide a material foundation for a higher form of social existence. He writes,
But it is a law of the development of human nature that once the satisfaction of a
certain sphere of needs has been assured new needs are set free, created.
Therefore when capital pushes labor time beyond the level set for the satisfaction
of the worker’s natural needs, it impels a greater division of social labor—the
labor of society as a whole—a greater diversity of production, an extension of the
sphere of social needs and the means for their satisfaction, and therefore also
161
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impels the development of human productive capacity and thereby the
activation of human dispositions in fresh directions. But just as surplus labor time
is a condition for free time, this extension of the sphere of needs and the means
for their satisfaction is conditioned by the worker’s being chained to the necessary
requirements of his life.163
Marx is emphasizing the contradictory character of capitalism’s development of new
needs and capacities—something that is not as explicitly spelled out in the Grundrisse,
which tended to emphasize capital’s positive contributions. While capital “activates” new
“dispositions in fresh directions,” the contrary development also occurs: “Once the
commodity becomes the general form of the product, or production takes place on the
basis of exchange value and therefore of the exchange of commodities, the production of
each individual, first of all, becomes one-sided, whereas his needs are many-sided.”164
Marx is acknowledging that with the development of capitalism the worker (as well as
others) “lose room for intellectual development, for that is time.”165 People are deprived
of a host of “pleasures of life,” leading to “the vacuity of their lives.166 However, he
contends,
[A]lthough at first the development of the capacities of the human species takes
place at the cost of the majority of human individuals and whole human classes,
in the end it breaks through this contradiction and coincides with the development
of the individual; the higher development of individuality is thus only achieved by
a historical process during which individuals are sacrificed . . . 167
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Hence, as Marx develops his discussion of the contradictions inherent in capital’s
generation of new needs and capacities, he looks ahead to what would characterize a
postcapitalist society once such contradictions are transcended:
Time of labor, even if exchange value is eliminated, always remains the creative
substance of wealth and the measure of the cost of its production. But free time,
disposable time, is wealth itself, partly for the enjoyment of the product, partly for
free activity which—unlike labor—is not determined by a compelling extraneous
purpose which must be fulfilled, and the fulfillment of which is regarded as a
natural necessity or a social duty, according to one’s inclination.168
In a new, postcapitalist society, in which exchange value is “eliminated,” the
amount of time that individuals spend on the production and reproduction of basic
necessities will remain an important factor. However, such labor time—and indeed labor
time in general—will cease to be the determining principle governing such a society.
Labor that is engaged in material production and reproduction, even when creating
wealth instead of value, is still determined by “extraneous” purposes in so far as it is
subject to some degree of natural necessity. Human activity can therefore not be its own
end where labor remains the determining principle of social reproduction. A truly free
society, according to Marx, is not governed by labor time but by free time—the time
taken to express the totality of one’s sensuous and intellectual capacities. Marx spells out
the nature of such a new society thusly:
It is self-evident that if time of labor is reduced to a normal length and,
furthermore, labor is no longer performed for someone else, but for myself, and,
at the same time, the social contradictions between master and men, etc., being
abolished, it acquires a quite different, a free character, it becomes real social
labor, and finally the basis of disposable time—the time of labor of a man who
168
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also has disposable time must be of a much higher quality than that of the
beast of burden.169
The length of labor time dramatically declines in a new society at the same time as its
character is qualitatively transformed with the abolition of class divisions and social
domination. What provides the material condition for this reduction of labor time to a
minimum is the development of capital itself, which relentlessly increases labor’s
productivity as it seeks to augment value. At the same time, however, capital’s thirst for
self-expansion is inseparable from a drive to appropriate ever-more unpaid hours of
living labor. To put an end to this contradictory process, a new kind or form of labor and
human activity is needed. Marx writes, “The capitalist mode of production disappears
with the form of alienation which the various aspects of social labor bear to one another
and which is represented in capital.”170 Therefore, he concludes, “Just as one should not
think of sudden changes and sharply delineated periods in considering the succession of
the different geological formations, so also in the case of the creation of the different
economic formations of society.”171
Nevertheless, while the new society emerges from within the womb of the old
one, the former represents a qualitative break and leap from the latter. Marx never ceases
to stress the radically different way in which time becomes treated in the new society:
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“But time is in fact the active existence of the human being. It is not only the measure
of human life. It is the space for its development.”172
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE VISION OF THE NEW SOCIETY IN MARX’S CAPITAL
Volume One of Capital
Volume one of Capital is Marx’s most important work and represents the
culmination of over a quarter-century of intense research and philosophic development.
As indicated by its subtitle, “A Critique of Political Economy,” it consists of an analysis
of capitalist production and only capitalist production. Since its purpose is to discern the
“law of motion” of existing society, it might seem to have little to say about a future
society. Marx’s own words tend to reinforce this perception. His “Postface to the Second
Edition” notes that a reviewer of the first edition “reproaches me for, on the one hand,
treating economics metaphysically, and, on the other hand—imagine this!—confining
myself merely to the critical analysis of the actual facts, instead of writing recipes
(Comtist ones?) for the cook-shops of the future.”1 At the same time, Marx does not deny
that his critique of capitalism is intended to point to or intimate its future transcendence.
He positively cites the review by the Russian economist I.I. Kaufman, who wrote, “For
[Marx] it is quite enough, if he proves, at the same time, both the necessity of the present
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Marx, Capital, 1:99. The “Postface to the Second Edition” is dated January 1873.
At the time Marx was also preparing the French edition of Capital, which appeared in
serialized form between 1872-75. The French edition introduced several important
changes and additions to the original German edition of 1867, some of which will be
discussed below.
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order of things and the necessity of another order into which they first must inevitably
pass over, and it is a matter of indifference whether men believe or do not believe,
whether they are conscious of it or not.”2 While the scope of Capital is restricted to an
analysis of capitalism, an examination of its most important concepts shows that they
contain a number of suggestions regarding his view of a postcapitalist society.
One of the most important concepts in Capital, and a novel theoretic development
as compared with his earlier work, is that for the first time Marx explicitly distinguishes
between exchange value and value. Marx’s previous work treated exchange value and
value as more or less interchangeable.3 He now writes, however, that “Exchange value
cannot be anything other than the mode of expression, the ‘form of appearance’
[Erscheinungsform] of a content distinguishable from it.”4 He adds,
The progress of the investigation will lead us back to exchange-value as the
necessary mode of expression, or form of appearance, of value. For the present,
however, we must consider the nature of value independently of its form of
appearance.5
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As late as the first (1867) edition of the first volume, Marx still treats value and
exchange value as interchangeable terms. He writes, “When we employ the word value
with no additional determination, we refer always to exchange value” (Wenn wir künftig
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chapter one of Capital in the French edition, and the English translations (based on the
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Why does Marx make this distinction between exchange value and value, and
what is its significance? The answer lies in the peculiar nature of value production itself.
Value, Marx writes, “does not have its description branded on its forehead.”6 Value does
not exist on its own account, independent of the products in which it is embodied. It first
appears as a quantitative relationship—one commodity can be exchanged for another
because both contain equal quantities or amounts of (socially average) labor time. Value
is therefore never immediately visible; it necessarily first appears as exchange value, as a
quantitative relation between things. However, the exchange of things is not only a
quantitative relation, since there must be a quality common to the things that can enable
them to be exchanged for one another. Without a commensurate quality or substance, the
exchange of discrete products is not possible.7 Two commodities can enter into a
quantitative relation only if they share a common quality. This quality, Marx shows, is
abstract or homogenous labor: “Equality in the full sense between different kinds of labor
can be arrived at only if we abstract from their real inequality, if we reduce them to the
characteristic they have in common, that of being the expenditure of human labor power,
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Marx quotes Aristotle on this: “There can be no exchange without equality, and
no equality without commensurability.” See Capital 1:151. See also Aristotle,
Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Joe Sachs, 90 [1133b16-19]: “So the currency, like a unit of
measure, equalizes things by making them commensurable, for there would be no
community if there were not exchange, and no exchange if there was not equality, and no
equality if there were not commensurability.”
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of human labor in the abstract.” Abstract labor—labor expended without regard for
the usefulness or use value of the product—is the substance of value. But since abstract
labor is objectified in products, value first appears (and must appear) as a quantitative
relationship between products—as exchange value.
Marx contends that neither the greatest philosophers, such as Aristotle, nor the
greatest classical political economists, such as Ricardo, were able to go beyond the
appearance of value in exchange to the examination of value itself.9 This limitation has
objective roots. It flows from the fact that value “can only appear in the social relation
between commodity and commodity.”10 The essence, value, appears, and must appear, as
exchange value. Since “reflection begins post-festum, and therefore with the results of the
process of development ready at hand,”11 it is virtually inescapable, at least initially, to
conflate value with exchange value. So objective is this conceptual barrier that even Marx
does not arrive at the explicit distinction between exchange-value and value until quite
late—until 1872. As Marx writes in the first chapter of Capital,
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When at the beginning of this chapter, we said in the customary manner that a
commodity is both a use value and an exchange value, this was, strictly speaking,
wrong. A commodity is a use value or object of utility, and a “value.” It appears
as the twofold thing it really is as soon as its value possesses its own particular
form of manifestation, which is distinct from its natural form. The form of
manifestation is exchange value, and the commodity never has this form when
looked at in isolation, but only when it is in a value-relation or an exchange
relation with a second commodity of a different kind.12
How does Marx finally get to explicitly specify the difference between exchange
value and value, and how does it impact his understanding of the alternative to
capitalism? Marx proceeds phenomenologically, by beginning with the appearance of
value in the relation between discrete commodities. After delineating the quantitative
determination of value (two different commodities can be exchanged for each other in so
far as they contain equal amounts of socially necessary labor time), he probes into the
conditions that make this exchange possible. He discovers that the condition for the
possibility of magnitudes of labor time to be exchanged for one another is a common
quality or element. That common element is abstract or undifferentiated labor. Marx’s
delineation of the dual character of labor—which he calls his unique contribution to the
critique of political economy13—brings to light the substance of value, abstract labor.
That in turn makes it possible to conceptualize value independent of its form of
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appearance. He writes, “In fact, we started from exchange value, or the exchange
relation of commodities, in order to track down the value that lay hidden within it.”14
The movement from exchange value (appearance) to value (essence) is not only
the course by which Marx structures his argument; it also corresponds to the historical
development of economics. Economic theory develops from classical political
economy’s emphasis on the quantitative determination of value, in which commodities
exchange against one another based on embodying given magnitudes of labor time, to
Marx’s emphasis on the kind of labor that enables this exchange to occur—abstract,
homogenous labor. The development from classical political economy to Marxism is a
movement from quantity to quality, from the appearance of exchangeability to the
identification of the conditions that make such exchangeability possible. Marx does not
arrive at this result by jumping to the absolute like a shot out of a pistol. He instead
traverses the pathway initially laid out by classical political economy itself by beginning
with the appearance of value as exchange value and then proceeding to discover what
makes this quantitative relation possible. By explicitly distinguishing value from
exchange value, Marx succeeds in overcoming the historical limits reached by classical
political economy.
It bears repeating that the value cannot be conceptualized immediately, without
going through a philosophic detour that proceeds from appearance, because value shows
itself in the exchange relation of commodity to commodity. We must begin with the form
of appearance of exchange value and “track down” the value relation that is immanent in
14
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it. It is not possible to proceed the other way around, by proceeding from value to
exchange value, because the essence (value) is not immediately accessible. However, the
fact that the “identical social substance” that enables one commodity to exchange for
another can be grasped only by proceeding from the exchange relation to that which
makes exchange possible carries with it a grave risk: namely, that consciousness will get
stuck in the detour by stopping at the phenomenal manifestation of value without
inquiring into the conditions of its possibility. Since value can only show itself as a social
relation between one commodity and another, it all too readily appears that relations of
exchange are responsible for value production. So powerful is that appearance that even
Marx does not explicitly pose the difference between exchange value and value until
quite late in his development of Capital.
That Marx ultimately makes this distinction is of critical importance, since it
suggests that attempting to ameliorate the deleterious aspect of value production by
altering the exchange relation is fundamentally flawed. Since exchange value is a
manifestation of value, whose substance is abstract labor, the essential problem of
capitalist production can be addressed only by altering the nature of the labor process.
Marx points to this when he writes, “Our analysis has shown that the form of
value, that is, the expression of the value of a commodity, arises from the nature of
commodity-value, as opposed to value and its magnitude arising from their mode of
expression as exchange-value.”15 This helps to illuminate why many fail to correctly
identify the central problem of capitalism. Since value must show itself as exchange
15
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value, it appears that uprooting value production depends upon altering relations of
exchange. However, altering relations of exchange in lieu of changing conditions of labor
cannot eliminate value production, even though value production is inseparable from
relations of exchange. While altering the exchange relation can influence the quantitative
determination of value, it cannot change its qualitative determination, the substance of
value itself. Yet the peculiar nature of capitalism’s social relations, in which the
substance of value appears in quantitative proportions in the exchange of products, makes
it appear as if altering the exchange relation is of cardinal importance.
As Marx will indicate throughout much of Capital, the fundamental problem of
capitalism is not its exchange relations as much as the specific form assumed by labor—
abstract or alienated labor. For this reason he is not satisfied with the classical political
economists’ discovery that labor is the source of all value. Far more important, Marx
argues, is the kind of labor that creates value and serves as its substance. Only when this
is recognized is it possible to focus on the defining social relation of capitalism that needs
to be uprooted. He insists, “It is not sufficient to reduce the commodity to ‘labor’; labor
must be broken down into its twofold form—on the one hand, into concrete labor in the
use value of the commodity, and on the other hand, into socially necessary labor as
calculated in exchange value.”16 It is all too easy to hold stubbornly to a vantage point
that never gets to the critical issue, precisely because of the specific nature of value
production itself. As Marx puts it, “But it does not occur to the economists that a purely
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quantitative distinction between the kinds of labor presupposes their qualitative unity
or equality, and therefore their reduction to abstract human labor.”17
Another major conceptual innovation in Capital is its discussion of commodity
fetishism. While Marx refers to the fetishism of commodities a number of times in his
earlier work, it is only in Capital that he devotes a full section (in the first chapter) to
delineating it.18 Georg Lukács was one of the first post-Marx Marxists to call attention to
its central importance:
It has often been claimed—and not without a certain justification—that the
famous chapter in Hegel’s Logic treating of Being, Non-Being, and Becoming
contains the whole of his philosophy. It might be claimed with perhaps equal
justification that the chapter dealing with the fetish character of the commodity,
contains within itself the whole of historical materialism and the whole selfknowledge of the proletariat seen as the knowledge of capitalist society.19
The basis of commodity fetishism is that value appears to be an attribute of the
physical or thing-like character of products of labor. Marx writes, “The fetishism peculiar
to the capitalist mode of production . . . consists in regarding economic categories, such
as being a commodity or productive labor, as qualities inherent in the material

17

Ibid., 173.

18

The section on commodity fetishism as presently found in the English edition of
Capital actually first appeared the French edition of Capital in 1872. Although the first
German edition of 1867 discussed commodity fetishism, it did not contain the section
entitled “The Fetishism of the Commodity and its Secret.” For an English translation of
the original 1867 version of chapter one of Capital, see Value Studies by Marx, trans. and
ed. Albert Dragstedt (London: New Park Publications, 1976), 1-78.
19

Georg Lukács, History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics,
trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Merlin Press, 1968), 170.

20

223

incarnations of these formal determinations of categories.” Marx asks why does this
“folly of identifying a specific social relationship of production with the thing-like
qualities of certain articles”21 arise. “Whence, then, arises the enigmatic character of the
product of labor, as soon as it assumes the form of a commodity?”22 Marx provides the
following answer:
Clearly, it arises from this form itself. The equality of the kinds of human labor
takes on a physical form in the equal objectivity of the products of labor as
values; the measure of the expenditure of human labor-power by its duration takes
on the form of the magnitude of the value of the products of labor; and finally the
relationships between the producers, within which the social characteristics of
their labors are manifested, take on the form of a social relation between the
products of labor.23
Marx is here returning to and deepening a concept that was integral to his work
from as early as 1843-44—the inversion of subject and predicate. Value is a product of a
definite form of human labor; it is the predicate of human activity. So why does value
take on a life of its own in so far as it is appears to be the property of the thing-like
character of objects? Why does the predicate come to dominate the subject, the active
agents who create value in the first place? Why is it that “Their own movement within
society has for them the form of a movement made by things, and these things far from
being under their control, in fact control them”?24
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Marx’s answer is that the mysterious character of the product of labor,
wherein the product is the subject instead of the predicate, arises from the form of the
commodity itself—from the fact that value appears in the form of a relation between
products of labor that are exchanged for one another. The product appears as the active
agent because its value can only show itself as an exchange relation between the
products. Hence, the real subject, the labor that assumes a peculiar social form and is
responsible for the ability of the products to exchange against one another, is rendered
invisible by the necessity for value to appear as a relation between things, as exchange
value—even though value itself has nothing to do with the physical properties of these
things.
In sum, the subject appears to be the predicate and the predicate appears to be the
subject because that is how things really are in capitalist society. Marx writes,
To the producers, therefore, the social relations between their private labors
appear as what they are, i.e. they do not appear as direct social relations between
persons in their work, but rather as material relations between persons and social
relations between things.25
The fetishism of commodities is no mere illusion that can be stripped away by
enlightened critique. It is a valid and adequate form of consciousness that corresponds to
the actual conditions of capitalist production. Abstract labor, the equality of all labors,
takes on a physical form in being materialized or objectified in a commodity. The value
of the commodity is measured by the magnitude of time that it takes to create it. Its value
cannot be discerned independent of this quantitative measurement. Hence, the relation of
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producers that creates value appears as a property of the thing-like character of the
commodities and not of their own labor. Fetishism arises from the necessity of value to
assume a form of appearance that is contrary to its essence. This mystified form of
appearance is adequate to its concept, for it corresponds to the nature of the actual labor
process in capitalism in which living labor, an activity, is transformed into a thing in the
process of production: “It is nothing but the definite social relation between men
themselves which assumes here, for them, the fantastic form of a relation between
things.”26 Marx sums it up as follows: “This fetishism of the world of commodities arises
from the peculiar social character of the labor that produces them.”27
This fetishism of commodities is so overpowering that even Smith and Ricardo
fell victim to it. Despite their important discovery that labor is the source of value, they
viewed this source, living labor, as a thing or a commodity that can be bought and sold.
In doing so they fell prey to the fetishism that treats value as a property of things instead
of as the expression of social relations that take on the form of things. Marx avoids this
defect by distinguishing between labor and labor power. Living labor is not a thing; nor is
it a commodity. It is an activity. The commodity is instead labor power, the capacity to
labor. By distinguishing between labor and labor power, Marx avoids falling victim to the
fetishism that ascribes value to the physical character of things. As Dunayevskaya argues,
[Marx] rejected the concept of labor as a commodity. Labor is an activity, not a
commodity. It was no accident that Ricardo used one and the same word for the
activity and for the commodity. He was a prisoner of his concept of the human
26
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laborer as a thing. Marx, on the other hand, showed that what the laborer sold
was not his labor, but only his capacity to labor, his labor power.28
The question that still needs to be answered, however, is what enabled Marx to
make this conceptual distinction that went beyond the framework of classical political
economy? If commodity fetishism is an adequate expression of existing social relations,
how does Marx manage to penetrate through the mystified veil of commodity fetishism in
such a way as to show the inadequacy and transitory nature of existing social relations?
After all, as Marx writes in chapter one of Capital, “The categories of bourgeois
economics . . . are forms of thought which are socially valid, and therefore objective, for
the relations of production belonging to this historically determined mode of social
production, i.e. commodity production.”29 If this is so, how does it become possible to
avoid falling prey to the fetishism of commodities?
Marx himself provides the answer: “The whole mystery of commodities, all the
magic and necromancy that surrounds the products of labor on the basis of commodity
production, vanishes therefore as soon as we come to other forms of production.”30 The
only way to overcome the fetishism that attaches itself to products of labor is to step
outside of capitalism’s confines and examine it from the standpoint of non-capitalist
social relations. Marx therefore proceeds to examine value production from the vantage
point of precapitalist societies and postcapitalist social relations. In doing so he returns to
28
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and further concretizes his conception in the Grundrisse that “the correct grasp of the
present” hinges on “the understanding of the past” which “leads to points which indicate
the transcendence of the present form of production relations, the movement coming into
being, thus foreshadowing the future . . . for a new state of society.”31
After discussing the precapitalist relations of feudal Europe in which “the social
relations between individuals in the performance of their labor appear all events as their
own personal relations, and are not disguised as social relations between things,”32 he
writes: “Let us finally imagine, for a change, an association of free men, working with the
means of production held in common, and expending their many different forms of labor
power in full self-awareness as one single social labor.”33 In one of the most explicit and
direct discussions of the transcendence of capitalist value production found in any of his
writings, Marx outlines the following about such a future state of affairs:
First, he nowhere refers to value or exchange value in discussing this future noncapitalist society. All products are “directly objects of utility”34 and do not assume a
value-form. Second, what characterizes this postcapitalist society is “an association of
free men”—not a mere association as such. He notes that precapitalist feudal societies
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were characterized by “directly associated labor.” Yet such societies were not free
since they were based on “patriarchal” and oppressive social relations. The new society,
in contrast, is one in which social relations are freely constituted. Third, the individuals in
this freely associated society directly take part in distributing and consuming the total
social product. There is no objectified expression of social labor that exists as a person
apart from the individuals themselves.
Marx spells this out as follows: “The total product of our imagined association is
a social product.”36 One part of the aggregate social product serves to renew or reproduce
the means of production. It “remains social” since it is not individually consumed. The
other part of the aggregate social product “is consumed by members of the association as
means of subsistence.”37 How is this division of the aggregate product to occur? No
mechanism independent of the free association of the producers decides this for them. It
is decided by the conscious deliberation of the free association itself. Marx does not go
into any details of how this will be arranged, since it “will vary with the particular kind of
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social organization of production and the corresponding level of social development
attained by the producers.”38
Marx seems reticent about going into too many details about this new society.
This is because of his emphasis on the freely associated character of such a society. The
specific manner in which the total social product is divided between individual
consumption and means of production depends on a number of variables that cannot be
anticipated in advance. Marx is wary about suggesting any mechanism or formula that
operates irrespective of what the freely associated individuals decide to do based upon
their specific level of social development.
Marx then writes, “We shall assume, but only for the sake of a parallel with the
production of commodities, that the share of each individual producer in the means of
subsistence is determined by his labor time.”39 He suggests that labor time plays a double
role in this new society. First, it functions as part of “a definite social plan [that]
maintains the correct proportion between the different functions of labor and the various
needs of the associations.”40 Labor time is divided up or proportioned in accordance with
the need to replenish the means of production as well as meet the consumption needs of
individuals. He continues, “On the other hand, labor time also serves as the measure of
the part taken by each individual in the common labor, and of his share in the part of the
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total product destined for social consumption.” The specific share of each individual
in social consumption is determined by the actual amount of labor time that they perform
in the community.
Since this passage has been subject to a wide variety of interpretations, it is
important to pay close attention to Marx’s specific wording. Although he speaks of a
“parallel” with commodity production in so far as “the share of each individual producer
in the means of subsistence is determined by his labor time,” Marx is not suggesting that
the new society is governed by socially necessary labor time. As noted earlier, there is a
vast difference between actual labor time and socially necessary labor time. In capitalism
actual labor time does not create value; instead, the social average of necessary labor
time creates value. That he does not envision the latter as operating in a postcapitalist
society is indicated by the sentence that concludes his discussion: “The social relations of
the individual producers, both towards their labor and the products of their labor, are here
transparent in their simplicity, in production as well as in distribution.”42 Social relations
based on necessary labor time are anything but transparent since they are established
behind the backs of the producers by a social average that operates outside of their
control. If social relations in the new society are “transparent in their simplicity,” this can
only mean that the social product is distributed not on the basis of socially necessary
labor time but rather on the actual amount of time that the individual engages in material
production. Such a principle is completely alien to capitalist value production.
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The distinction between actual labor time and socially necessary labor time is
of cardinal importance, since conflating the two leads to the erroneous conclusion that
Marx posits value production as continuing to operate in a postcapitalist society. This is
how Georg Lukács read these passages in his Ontology of Social Being and The Process
of Democratization. He writes,
For Marx, labor exploitation can exist under socialism if labor time is
expropriated from the laborer, since “the share of every producer to the means of
production is determined by his labor time”. . . . For Marx, the law of value is not
dependent upon commodity production . . . according to Marx these classical
categories are applicable to any mode of production.43
Lukács misreads Marx’s phrase “for the sake of a parallel with the production of
commodities” as suggesting not just a parallel but an identity between commodity
production and forms that prevail in a postcapitalist society. Marx mentions this parallel
only to emphasize the role that labor time would play in the future. But what does he
mean by labor time? The actual labor time that operates after capitalism is far from
identical with the socially average necessary labor time that operates in capitalism. In
Lukács’ reading the two become conflated, even though the latter implies value
production whereas the former implies its transcendence. Marx never mentions value or
exchange value in discussing the new society in chapter one, and for good reason: he
holds that its social relations are “transparent in their simplicity.” Lukács fails to mention
Marx’s discussion of the “transparent” nature of social relations in the future, even
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though Marx repeats it on several occasions. If Lukács paid greater attention to this
issue he would have recognized that Marx is not referring to socially necessary labor time
in discussing the operative principles of a postcapitalist society.
Nevertheless, why does Marx suggest in chapter one of Capital that in a new
society “the means of subsistence is determined by labor time” when he has spent many
years attacking Proudhon and the socialist neo-Ricardians for their proposals to
“organize” exchange along the lines of labor vouchers and time chits? Why does he do so
when he continues to criticize these utopian experiments in Capital itself?45 The answer
again lies in the distinction between actual labor time and socially necessary labor time.
The socialist neo-Ricardians presumed that actual labor time is the source of value. Like
Ricardo himself, they focused on the quantitative determination of value by labor time
without ever inquiring into what kind of labor creates value in the first place. They
conflated actual labor time and socially necessary labor time and therefore imagined that
a “fair exchange” of labor time for means of subsistence is possible on the basis of value
production. Marx castigated their position as completely utopian because it is impossible,
he shows, to establish social equality on the basis of inequitable social relations in which
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the very activity of the laborer is treated as a thing. As Marx reiterates in chapter
three of Capital, “private labor cannot be treated as its opposite, directly social labor”46
because social relations based on value production are inherently indirect.
The situation becomes very different, however, with the abolition of value
production. With the creation of a free association of individuals in which social relations
are “transparent,” individuals are no longer governed by an abstract average that operates
behind their backs. The production and distribution of the social product is instead
determined by their free and conscious activity. Labor is directly social. It now becomes
possible to distribute the social product on the basis of the actual amount of time that
individuals contribute to society, since production relations have been transformed in
such a way as to make such a distribution possible. Marx addresses this by contrasting the
utopian schemes of Proudhon and the socialist neo-Ricardians to what he considers the
more practical approach of Robert Owen:
Owen presupposes directly socialized labor, a form of production diametrically
opposed to the production of commodities. The certificate of labor is merely
evidence of a part taken by the individual in the common labor, and of his claim
to a certain portion of the common product which has been set aside for
consumption. But Owen never made the mistake of presupposing the production
of commodities, while, at the same time, by juggling with money, trying to
circumvent the necessary conditions of that form of production.47
Marx’s comments on the new society in chapter one of Capital are brief and
somewhat cryptic. However, they represent an important development in exhibiting a
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willingness on his part to directly discuss the nature of a postcapitalist society. What
is most striking about Marx’s discussion is the suggestion that it is impossible to
penetrate through the mystified veil of commodity fetishism unless capitalist value
production is critiqued from the standpoint of its transcendence. The fact that the chapter
on commodity fetishism was written only after the experience of the 1871 Paris
Commune—the first time in history that a mass revolt attempted an exit from
capitalism—suggests the importance of analyzing the present from the vantage point of
the future.49 This may be what Rosa Luxemburg had in mind when she wrote,
The secret of Marx’s theory of value, his analysis of money, this theory of capital,
his theory of the rate of profit, and consequently of the whole existing economic
system is—the transitory nature of the capitalist economy, its collapse: thus—and
this is only another aspect of the same phenomena—the final goal, socialism. And
precisely because, a priori, Marx looked at capitalism from the socialist’s
viewpoint, that is, from the historical viewpoint, he was enabled to decipher the
hieroglyphics of capitalist economy.50
As Marx himself puts it at the end of chapter one, “The veil is not removed from
the countenance of the social life-process, i.e. the process of material production, until it
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becomes production by freely associated men, and stands under their conscious and
planned control.”51
Although no section of volume one of Capital discusses the new society as
directly as the concluding pages of chapter one, Marx’s discussion of a number of critical
theoretic categories in the rest of it sheds illumination on his understanding of the
alternative to capitalism. I will focus on four such categories: (1) The transformation of
money into capital; (2) The nature of wage labor; (3) The “despotic form” of capital at
the point of production; and (4) The distinction between two kinds of private property in
the means of production, with which Capital ends.
Much of the first volume of Capital is concerned with how money becomes
transformed into capital. The transformation is by no means self-evident. Since “the value
of a commodity is expressed in its price before it enters into circulation,” Marx holds that
it is “therefore a pre-condition of circulation, not its result.”52 At the same time, money
cannot become transformed into capital without being valorized in the process of
circulation. Although the creation of value precedes circulation, the transformation of
money into capital requires circulation. Hence, “Capital cannot therefore arise from
circulation, and it is equally impossible for it to arise apart from circulation. It must have
its origin both in circulation and not in circulation.”53
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Marx wrestles with this somewhat puzzling contradiction throughout the rest
of the book. In order to transform money into capital, the capitalist must find on the
market a commodity that produces a value greater than itself. There is only one
commodity that meets this requirement—labor power. The transformation of money into
capital requires the purchase and sale of labor power. Put differently, money cannot be
transformed into capital in the absence of a labor market. By purchasing labor power the
capitalist can compel the laborers to create a value greater than the value of their labor
power or means of subsistence. The increased value is what Marx calls “surplus value.”
Money is transformed into capital through the production of surplus value.
However, what allows for the existence of a market in labor power? The mere act
of buying and selling labor power is not enough. The laborers have to be compelled to
sell their labor power by being separated from the objective conditions of production—
from the land and control over their labor. A market in labor power can arise only if the
workers become dispossessed of owning anything except their labor power, which they
sell for a wage in order to survive. Marx contends,
In themselves, money and commodities are no more capital than the means of
production and subsistence are. They need to be transformed into capital. But this
transformation can itself only take place under particular circumstances.54
The most important of these circumstances is the creation of a class of “free” wage
laborers—“Free workers, in the double sense that they neither form part of the means of

54

Ibid, 874.

237
production themselves, as would be the case with slaves, serfs, etc. nor do they own
the means of production, as would be the case with free peasant proprietors.”55
Hence, although a market for labor time is an essential condition for the
transformation of money into capital, the separation of the worker from the objective
conditions of production is an essential condition for the existence of a labor market. In
the absence of a generalized labor market it is impossible for surplus value and capital to
arise. The mere existence of a commodity market does not therefore imply capitalist
relations of production. Capitalist relations of production arise on the basis of a
generalized labor market that enables money to be converted into capital. But the
emergence of that labor market depends in turn upon a transformation of specific
production relations—most of all the separation of the laborer from the objective
conditions of production. Marx therefore argues,
The production of commodities leads inexorably to capitalist production, once the
worker has ceased to be a part of the conditions of production (as in slavery,
serfdom), or once primitive common ownership has ceased to be the basis of
society (India).56
The transformation of money into capital therefore occurs in two “wholly distinct,
autonomous spheres, two entirely separate processes.”57 One is the realm of circulation—
the buying and selling of labor power in the marketplace. The other is “the consumption
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Both are necessary, but the latter makes the former possible. What makes it possible for a
market in labor power to arise, and for money to be converted into capital, is the
existence of alienated labor. It is crucial that,
[T]hese means of production and these means of subsistence confront laborpower, stripped of all material wealth, as autonomous powers, personified in their
owners. The objective conditions essential to the realization of labor are alienated
from the worker and become manifest as fetishes endowed with a will and a soul
of their own. Commodities, in short, appear as the purchasers of persons.59
Marx’s discussion indicates that the market is not the primary object of his
critique of capital. Even when discussing the market in labor power, without which the
transformation of money into capital cannot occur, he emphasizes the formation of
specific (alienated) relations of production that make such a market possible. The
implication is that ending the separation of the laborers from the objective conditions of
production would render superfluous the necessity of a labor market.
This carries over into Marx’ detailed analyses of wage labor. The existence of
wage labor is the key to capital formation. He writes, “The capitalist form presupposes
from the outset the free wage laborer who sells his labor power to capital.”60 He adds,
“The whole system of capitalist production is based on the worker’s sale of his labor
power as a commodity.”61 And he notes that the means of production and subsistence
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“become capital only because of the phenomenon of wage labor.” However, it takes
a lot more than the existence of money or a commodity market to generate wage labor.
Wage labor can only arise if workers have become separated from the objective and
subjective conditions of production. They must be torn from the land, from their
instruments of production, and most of all, from control over their own laboring activity.
Only then do the laborers become compelled to sell themselves for a wage. Marx writes
that this means, “In reality, the worker belongs to capital before he has sold himself to the
capitalist.”63
It appears from the purchase and sale of labor power that the market transaction
between buyer and seller is the defining feature of capitalist social relations. But Marx is
telling us that the workers “belongs to capital” even before they are offered up for sale on
the market. The sale of labor power is merely the consequence of a much more irksome
experience that occurs within the work process itself. Marx writes: “The starting point of
the development that gave rise to the wage laborer and to the capitalist was the
enslavement of the worker.”64 The critical determinate to both wage labor and capital,
each of which cannot exist without the other, is this:
The capital-relation presupposes a complete separation between the workers and
the ownership of the conditions for the realization of their labor. As soon as
capitalist production stands on its own feet, it not only maintains this separation,
but reproduces it on a constantly extending scale. The process, therefore, which

62

Ibid., 1005.

63

Ibid., 723. My emphasis.

64

Ibid., 875.

240
creates the capital-relation can be nothing other than the process which
divorces the worker from the ownership of the conditions of his own labor.65
This has a number of implications when it comes to conceiving of an alternative
to capitalism. Marx is suggesting that a postcapitalist society will eliminate wage labor.
That in turn suggests that a labor market will not exist in it. However, the abolition of the
labor market does not depend upon the abolition of money and the commodity market as
much as upon the transformation of the process of production. More specifically, the split
between the worker and the objective conditions of production would have to be healed.
It is surely possible to conceive of a world without money and commodity markets but
which still leaves this separation unhealed. Such a society is far from Marx’s concept of
socialism.
What has often stood in the way of this realization is the assumption that Marx
counterpoised the “anarchy of the market” to the social “organization” found in the
capitalist process of production. Numerous thinkers have argued in favor of correcting
the inefficiencies and “anarchy” of markets by extending the presumably more “rational”
and ordered mechanisms of the production process into the sphere of distribution.66
Marx’s discussion of the despotic form of capitalist production tends to undermine claims
that he favored this approach. He writes,
If capitalist direction is thus twofold in content, owing to the twofold nature of the
process of production which has to be directed—on the one hand a social labor
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process for the creation of a product, and on the other hand capital’s process
of valorization—in form it is purely despotic.67
This despotism is contained in the fact that “it is not the worker who employs the
conditions of his work, but rather the reverse, the conditions of work employ the
worker.”68 It is true that Marx refers to “the anarchic system of competition” which he
calls “the most outrageous squandering of social means of production.”69 However, he
notes, ”the immanent laws of capitalist production manifest themselves in the external
movement”70 of individual units of competing capitals. He contends that the “scientific
analysis of competition is possible only if we can grasp the inner nature of capital.”
“Anarchic” competition is not the cause but the consequences of despotic relations of
production.
According to Marx, what makes such relations of production despotic is the
subordination of living labor by “dead labor.” He argues in “The Results of the
Immediate Process of Production,” “In fact, the rule of the capitalist over the worker is
nothing but the rule of the independent conditions of labor over the worker, conditions
that have made themselves independent of them.”71
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Viewed from this perspective, neither the “anarchy of the market” nor even
the actions of the capitalists vis-à-vis the workers serve as the essential objects of the
Marxian critique of capital. The capitalist too is merely the expression of the separation
of the worker from the objective conditions of production. For once these conditions
become independent from the worker, the necessity arises for an alien class of capitalists
to chain the workers to the alienated work process.72 This suggests that even the
elimination of the personifications of capital does not suffice to free the worker so long as
the breach between the worker and the objective conditions of production remains
unhealed. On these grounds Marx often criticizes his fellow socialists for wanting capital
without the capitalists. He argues,
The functions fulfilled by the capitalist are no more than the functions of capital—
viz. the valorization of value by absorbing living labor—executed consciously and
willingly. The capitalist functions only as personified capital, capital as a person,
just as the worker is no more than labor personified. . . . Hence the rule of the
capitalist over the worker is the rule of things over man, of dead labor over the
living, of the product over the producer.73
The fullest indication that Marx neither posits the market as the major object of
his critique nor conceives of its abolition as the key to creating an alternative to
capitalism is contained in a paragraph added to “The General Law of Capitalist
Accumulation” in the French edition of Capital, in 1872-75. In discussing the
concentration and centralization of capital to its ultimate limit, he writes:
In any branch of industry centralization would reach its extreme limit if all the
individual capitals invested there were fused into a single capital. In a given
72
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society this limit would be reached only when the entire social capital was
united in the hands of either a single capitalist or a single capitalist corporation.74
This indicates that capitalism’s law of motion would not be radically altered even if “the
entire social capital” became united “in the hands of either a single capitalist or a single
capitalist corporation.” Such a situation would, of course, imply the effective abolition of
a competitive free market. But it need not imply the end of capitalism itself. Capitalism
can survive, Marx appears to be suggesting, with a variety of forms of circulation and
distribution. It is at least theoretically possible that capitalist social relations could persist
even in the absence of an anarchic “free” market.75
This possibility is further bolstered by Marx’s discussion of two kinds of “private
property” at the very end of the first volume of Capital. In discussing the “So-Called
Primitive Accumulation of Capital,” he points to the destruction of two kinds of private
property in the means of production. One is “the dissolution of the private property based
on the labor of its owner.” This refers to “The private property of the worker in his means
of production.”76 This property is based on small land holding and small-scale industry.
This kind of private property is ruthlessly and violently destroyed by the process that
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brings capitalist private property into being. Modern capitalism arises most of all
from the eviction of the peasant proprietors from the land, from the destruction of their
private property.
Although Marx sharply criticizes the way in which capitalist private property
supplants the private property of the direct producer, he does not advocate returning to
the landowning patterns that characterized precapitalist societies in the West.77 Such
small, isolated, and relatively fragmented landowning patterns do not befit the higher
form of social organization that will follow capitalism. But they do indicate that forms of
private ownership and possession have existed that are qualitatively different from
capitalist private property, which is based on the compete separation of the laboring
populace from the objective conditions of production.
Marx here directly brings in the Hegelian concept of “the negation of the
negation” to elucidate this process. The first negation is capitalist private property that
supplants the property of workers and peasants. As capitalism undergoes a further
concentration and centralization of capital in fewer and fewer hands, the point is reached
wherein this negation is itself negated: “But capitalist production begets, with the
inexorability of it a natural process, its own negation.”78 This second negation does not
reestablish the fragmented and isolated parcels of precapitalist private property, but it
77
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does end the breach between the laborers and the objective conditions of production.
What emerges is “cooperation and the possession in common of the land and the means
of production produced by labor itself.”79 The new society, for Marx, represents a
reversal of the basic principle of capitalism: “the annihilation of that private property
which rests on the labor of the individual himself.”80 A free association of producers
overcomes the separation between individuals and the conditions of material wealth. This
entails something far more emancipatory than the transference of private property into
state property; indeed, Marx never mentions the state once in his discussion. His analysis
of the two kinds of private property at the end of the first volume of Capital indicates that
he is not limiting his horizon to the contrast of private versus collective property. Instead,
he is focusing on the contrast between property relations that fragment individuals from
their natural and subjective capacities and forms that overcome this separation. The latter,
for Marx, constitutes the substance of a new society.
Volumes Two and Three of Capital
Volumes two and three of Capital are integral to Marx’s overall theoretic project.
Marx planned for volume one to deal with the process of production, volume two with
the process of circulation, and volume three with the process of capitalist production as a
whole.81 He only lived to complete the first volume, even though most of the manuscripts
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of what became volumes two and three were written prior to the publication of the
first volume in 1867. Volumes two and three have to be read with a degree of caution,
since they were edited and published after Marx’s death by Engels (volume two appeared
in 1885; volume three appeared a decade later). It cannot therefore be assumed that either
volume would have appeared in its present form and content had Marx succeeded in
completing it.82 Volume two clearly lacks the polish as well as literary quality of the first
volume, and its more rarified subject matter makes it one of the least amenable to
immediate application on behalf of political causes than perhaps any of his writings.
Volume three has given rise to far more discussion and debate in the critical literature on
Marx, largely because it deals with topics that touch directly on matters of concern to
traditional economists, such as credit, interest, rent, the rate of profit, speculative capital
and the causes of crises. Given the great span of topics covered in these two volumes
(most of which is not touched upon in volume one at all), we must limit ourselves to
those passages that directly speak to the subject matter of this study.
Although volume two of Capital deals with circulation, it would be a mistake to
assume that it deals with the circulation of commodities, since that is analyzed in the first
part of volume one. The second volume instead deals with the circulation of capital. The
circulation of capital comprises three component parts—money capital, productive
capital, and commodity capital. These are not three independent classes of capital but
82

MEGA2 has published Marx’s original manuscripts for volumes two and three,
which for the first time has allowed scholars to critically evaluate Engels’ role in editing
the manuscripts for publication. This has led to a lively controversy, especially among
Marx scholars in Germany. This debate falls outside the scope of this study and is not
discussed here.

247
rather three forms of industrial capital, separate moments of the same aspect of the
economy. Capital of necessity takes on these three modes of existence; they are “different
forms with which capital clothes itself in its different stages.”83 Their interrelation is
Marx’s primary object of investigation in the second volume.
Marx’s aim is to describe how these circuits operate in a chemically pure
capitalist economy. He writes, “In order to grasp these forms in their pure state, we must
first of all abstract from all aspects that have nothing to do with the change and
constitution of the forms as such.”84 He abstracts from contingent or secondary factors
that get in the way of grasping the object of his analysis by assuming: (1) Commodities
are sold at their value. (2) No revolutions in value occur in the circulation process.85 (3)
There is no foreign trade: “We therefore completely abstract from it here, and treat gold
as a direct element of the annual [domestic] production.”86 (4) There are no crises of
realization. Marx is not leaving aside these factors in order to create a purely abstract
model of capitalist accumulation that has little or no bearing on reality. Instead, his
approach is to strip away secondary or tertiary phenomena that get in the way of
delineating capitalism’s actual law of motion. According to Marx, capital can “only be
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grasped as a movement, not as a static thing.” He employs this method of
abstraction in order to present the circuits of capital in the clearest possible terms.
Given its relatively rarified subject matter, it is surprising that volume two
contains any discussion of a postcapitalist society at all. However, several passages
address the issue. What grounds much of Marx’s discussion of the issue is a concept that
is introduced in its opening pages of volume two—the “distribution of the elements of
production.” This does not refer to distribution of relations of circulation as opposed to
those of production. It instead refers to how one class—the workers—become torn from
the objective conditions of production and become “distributed” as “free” wage laborers,
while another class—the capitalists—effectively own them. As Marx puts it:
Thus the situation that underlines the act of M-C (L/MP) is one of distribution;
not distribution in the customary sense of distribution of the means of
consumption, but rather the distribution of the elements of production themselves,
with the objective factors concentrated on one side, and labor-power isolated from
them on the other. The means of production, the objective productive capital,
must thus already face the worker as such, as capital, before the act M-L can
become general throughout society.88
The importance of this concept becomes clearer later in the third part of volume
two, “The Reproduction and Circulation of the Total Social Capital.” This part has a
largely polemical thrust, in that Marx aims to show what he considers the erroneous
nature of two prevailing tendencies in political economy. One is that of Adam Smith,
who “spirited away” constant capital by arguing that it is ultimately consumed as
revenue. The other is underconsumptionism, represented by such figures as Sismondi,
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Malthus, and Rodbertus (and more recently by Paul Sweezy and Ernest Mandel),
which argues that the critical determinant in capital accumulation is a level of effective
demand sufficient to buy up the surplus product.
Marx counters Smith’s view by arguing that the value of constant capital does not
dissolve into wages and profits, since a considerable portion of it is consumed
productively. There are two reasons for Marx’s criticism of Adam Smith on this issue.
The first, and most obvious, is that if Smith were right that the value of constant capital
ultimately dissolves into revenue there would be no reason for workers to fight against
the appropriation of their unpaid hours of labor by the capitalists. Although that is
doubtless an important consideration, there is also a deeper issue involved in Marx’s
critique of Smith than the alienation of the product from the producer. The most
egregious aspect of Smith’s error is that it conceals how constant capital is the
instrumentality through which the capitalist gains the mastery over the worker. If the
value of constant capital dissolves into revenue, the domination of dead over living labor
dissolves as well. Smith’s position completely obscures what Marx considers the crux
and distinctiveness of the class relation of capitalist society.
Some of the same considerations explain Marx’s objection to
underconsumptionism—the notion that the central contradiction of capitalism is the
inability of workers to buy back the surplus product. Marx of course fully knows that the
purchasing power of the workers does not enable them to buy back the surplus product.
But the reason for this, he contends, is not the lack of effective demand; instead, the lack
of effective demand is a result of a deeper problem. Although crises often manifest
themselves in an inability to sell the surplus product, they “first become evident not in the

250
direct reduction of consumer demand, the demand for individual consumption, but
rather a decline in the number of exchanges of capital for capital, in the reproduction
process of capital.”89 Marx counters the underconsumptionist argument as follows:
It is precisely a tautology to say that crises are caused by the scarcity of solvent
consumers, or of a paying consumption. The capitalist system does not know any
other modes of consumption than a paying one. . . . But if one were to attempt to
clothe this tautology with a semblance of profounder justification by saying that
the working class receives too small a portion of their own product, and the evil
would be remedied by giving them a larger share of it, or raising their wages, we
should reply that crises are always preceded by a period in which wages rise
generally and the working class actually gets a larger share of the annual product
intended for consumption.90
Marx objected to underconsumptionism because it tends to locate the central
contradiction of capitalism in the market instead of in production. To Marx, this not only
gets the facts of capitalism wrong; it also misconstrues how to correct them. If
capitalism’s main problem is the lack of effective demand, it follows that resolving it
centers on paying workers better wages and benefits. The need to uproot the domination
of dead over living becomes just as readily obscured as by Smith’s error.
Marx’s view, which is spelled out in the formulas of expanded reproduction, did
not at all satisfy critics such as Rosa Luxemburg. As she saw it, Marx’s assuming away
of realization crises projects a tendency of unimpeded equilibrium or balanced growth.
She wrote in her Accumulation of Capital,
The complicated problem of accumulation is thus converted into a diagrammatic
progression of surprising simplicity. We may continue the above chain of
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equations ad infinitum so long as . . . a certain increase in the constant capital
in Department I91 always necessitates a certain increase in the variable capital.92
She found the implications of this profoundly disturbing, for some of the same reasons
that a number of economists have found it appealing—that it seems to suggest the
possibility of infinite capitalist expansion.93
Luxemburg’s sharp criticism of Marx’s presentation of the formulas of expanded
reproduction did not stop her, however, from suggesting that it offered a possible model
of a postcapitalist society that overcomes the “anarchic” character of capitalism. She
wrote in The Accumulation of Capital: “Marx’s diagrams of enlarged reproduction has
objective validity—mutatis mutandis—for a planned society.”94 While she held that
Marx’s formulas failed to present the actual dynamic of capitalism by ignoring effective
demand and realization crises, they are valid for a “planned” economy in which “market
anarchy” is overcome. Three years earlier, and writing from the very different perspective
91
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of disproportionality theory, Rudolf Hilferding argued that Marx’s formulas suggest
the kind of normative balance between production and consumption that could be
achieved through state intervention in the economy. Whereas Luxemburg criticized
Marx’s formulas on the grounds that they suggest balanced growth, Hilferding embraced
them for presumably offering a model of balanced growth. As one recent study puts it,
By assuming balance in the reproduction schema, co-ordination is established
between capital and consumer-good producing sectors. For some Marxists,
writing at the start of the twentieth century, this provided a seductive insight into
how governments might impose order on the economic system.95
A more recent articulation of this view was expressed by Ernest Mandel, author of
the Introduction to the current English translation of Capital. He writes, “It follows
logically from this idea that if the capitalists were capable of investing ‘rationally,’ i.e., so
as to maintain proportions of equilibrium between the two main sectors of production,
crises could be avoided.”96 Mandel denies that capitalists can or will rationally plan; he
instead calls for rational planning based on the elimination of private property and private
capitalists by bringing capital accumulation under the management of a state plan. His
position owes much to the efforts of such thinkers as Wassiley Leontief, who earlier
sought to apply Marx’s theory of expanded reproduction to the state centralized
economies of the USSR.
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The problem with these approaches is that the formulas of expanded
reproduction, as is true of Marx’s analysis of capitalist production as a whole, are not
applicable to any society other than capitalism because the value production upon which
they are based is applicable only to capitalism. There is very little textual evidence to
suggest that Marx’s aim in presenting the schemas of expanded reproduction was to
imply anything about a postcapitalist society, one way or the other. Although he
emphasizes the material form of constant capital, he deals with constant capital—as all of
the factors of production and circulation—in value terms. And for Marx value production
is the differentia specifica of capitalism.
However, while Marx does not address the nature of a postcapitalist society in his
formulas of expanded reproduction, he does discuss it in a number of other places in
volume two of Capital. In discussing the exchange between the two departments of social
capital in the chapter on “Simple Reproduction,” Marx suddenly breaks into a discussion
of a new society:
If production were social instead of capitalist, it is evident that these products of
department I would be no less constantly redistributed among the branches of
production in this department as means of production, according to the needs of
reproduction; one part directly remaining in the sphere of production from which
it entered as a product, another part being shifted to other points of production.97
Marx is suggesting that the form of the distribution of the elements of production
is of decisive significance for any social order. In capitalism this distribution occurs
behind the backs of the producers, according to the dictates of value production. In
socialism the distribution is based on the “needs of reproduction” itself. This distribution
97
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is of a radically different kind in socialism, since the producers allocate a given
amount of material wealth to replenish means of production and another amount to
supply their consumption needs. Value production does not enter the picture.98
Earlier, in chapter sixteen on “The Turnover of Variable Capital,” Marx goes into
much greater detail by discussing what prevails “If we were to consider a communist
society in place of a capitalist one.” His writes:
Money capital would immediately be done away with, and so too the disguises
that transactions acquire through it. The matter would be simply reduced to the
fact that the society must reckon in advance how much labor, means of production
and means of subsistence is can spend, without dislocation.99
Since value production ceases in a postcapitalist society, there is no reason for its
transactions to occur through the medium of monetary capital; society itself, through the
free association of producers, would “reckon in advance” how the elements of social
wealth are to be produced and distributed. Marx elaborates upon this in even more detail
in chapter eighteen:
With collective production, money capital is completely dispensed with. The
society distributes labor power and means of production between the various
branches of industry. There is no reason why the producers should not receive
paper tokens permitting them to withdraw an amount corresponding to their labor
time from the social consumption fund. But these tokens are not money; they do
not circulate.100
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This passage builds upon and extends his discussion of the new society at the
end of chapter one of volume one of Capital, since Marx explicitly refers to receiving
tokens or vouchers based on the amount of labor time contributed by the individual to the
community. It is just as necessary for a socialist society to distribute the elements of
production as any other. In contrast to capitalist society, however, this distribution does
not occur through an autonomous force that is independent of the producers. The
distribution of the elements of production is not computed on the basis of an abstract
social average of labor time, but on the actual amount of labor time contributed by the
individual. Labor time in socialism, as Marx has earlier indicated in volume one of
Capital, simply refers to the amount of physical hours employed in a given enterprise.
One receives in the form of tokens a share of the common goods of society that is
materially equivalent to the actual amount of time engaged in producing them for the
community.
Curiously, none of Marx’s discussions of a postcapitalist society in volume two of
Capital mentions the state. He instead refers to the control of the elements of production
and distribution by society. He also does not mention the state in his brief discussion of a
postcapitalist society in chapter one of volume of Capital.
While Marx’s comments in volume two on postcapitalism are hardly systematic
or detailed, they are conceptually consistent with his earlier comments on the subject in
volume one of Capital. From his earliest writings of the 1840s to his late ones, Marx
insisted that the aim of capitalist society is not to enrich human needs and capabilities but
rather to augment value. Capitalism is an abstract form of domination that has one overriding goal: to accumulate value for its own sake. A new society would need to radically
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reverse this. On these grounds, Marx writes in chapter four of volume two, “For
capitalism is already essentially abolished once we assume that it is enjoyment that is the
driving principle and not enrichment itself.”101
Volume three of Capital may seem to be even less likely than the second volume
to venture into a discussion of a new society, since it is largely devoted to a detailed
analysis of such economic phenomena as profit rates, credit, interest, rent, and
speculative capital. Yet even in the course of discussing these issues some important
comments are made about what is to follow a capitalist society.
This is especially seen from Marx’s analysis of credit. He shows that credit works
to accelerate and amplify the concentration and centralization of capital, as it enables
larger units of capital to buy up and absorb its competitors. This leads to the formation of
joint-stock companies and mega-firms. Joint-stock companies allow for an enormous
development of economies of scale and output that small, individual units of capital find
impossible to match. Private capital is increasingly forced out by what Marx calls, “social
capital.” He writes,
Capital . . . now receives the form of social capital (capital of directly associated
producers) in contrast to private capital, and its enterprises appear as social
enterprises as opposed to private ones. This is the abolition of capital as private
property within the confines of the capitalist mode of production itself.”102
Marx is indicating that the capitalist mode of production does not necessarily depend
upon capital taking the form of private property. In the joint-stock company the
individual entrepreneur tends to lose private ownership of the enterprise. As the firm
101

Ibid., 199.

102

Capital 3:567.

257
becomes larger and more complex, individual private property becomes socialized. It
is not socialized, of course, either by or in the interest of the workers. But it still
represents “the abolition of capital as private property.” He adds,
In joint-stock companies, the function is separated from capital ownership, so
labor is completely separated from ownership of the means of production and of
surplus labor. This result of capitalist production in its highest development is a
necessary point of transition towards the transformation of capital back into the
property of the producers, though no longer as the private property of individual
producers but rather as their property as associated producers, as directly social
property. It is furthermore a point of transition towards the transformation of all
functions formerly bound up with capital ownership in the reproduction process
into simple functions of the associated producers, into social functions.103
Joint-stock companies further extend the alienation and dispossession of the
laborer. The workers—as well as the capitalists—cease to have even an indirect
ownership stake in the enterprise. The firm becomes completely autonomous from the
social forces that comprise it. The joint-stock company can in no way therefore be
considered an expression of “socialism.” At the same time, the joint-stock company
represents a possible transitional form towards a new social order, in that it undermines
the principle of private ownership of the means of production. In doing so it helps prepare
the ground for a form of socialization that can overcome the separation of the laborers
from the conditions of production.
Marx is not suggesting that the formation of the credit-system and joint stock
companies on their own impel the formation of a socialist society. He directly criticizes
those “socialists” who have “illusions” about the ability of mega-firms to directly lead to
a new society:
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Finally, there can be no doubt that the credit system will serve as a powerful
lever in the course of transition from the capitalist mode of production to the
mode of production of associated labor; however, only as one element in
connection with other large-scale organic revolutions in the mode of production
itself. On the other hand, illusions about the miraculous power of the credit and
banking system, in the socialist sense, arise from complete ignorance about the
capitalist mode of production and about the credit system, as one of its forms.104
Marx’s description of the joint-stock company as a possible transitional form to a
new society, even though it is firmly within the confines of the capitalist mode of
production, suggests that he does not conceive of it as part of a distinct phase between
capitalism and socialism. The joint-stock company is firmly embedded within the
capitalist mode of production—indeed, it can be considered its “highest” expression. And
yet this highest expression of capitalism represents a possible transitional form to a future
society. This suggests that for Marx, the transitional formation that leads to socialism is
nothing other than capitalism. He contends,
This is the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within the capitalist
mode of production itself, and hence a self-abolishing contradiction, which
presents itself prima facie as a mere point of transition to a new form of
production. It presents itself as such a contradiction even in appearance. It gives
rise to monopoly in certain spheres and hence provokes state intervention. It
reproduces a new financial aristocracy, a new kind of parasite in the guise of
company promoters, speculators, and merely nominal directors; an entire system
of swindling and cheating with respect to the promotion of companies, issues of
shares and share dealings. It is private production unchecked by private
ownership.105
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Marx’s discussion of the “swindling” and “cheating” that characterize the
mega-firm indicates that he is by no means embracing it as a liberatory form. Nor is he
endorsing the tendency of these mega-firms to “provoke state intervention” in the
economy, since he says that that produces a parasitic financial aristocracy. Nor does he
contend that the joint-stock company represents a form of socialized production. He
explicitly refers to it as “private production unchecked by private ownership.” Precisely
because no single individual or unit of capital has complete ownership of the mega-firm,
the latter extends rather than mitigates the central problem of capitalism—the separation
of the producers from the conditions of production.
As Marx shows at the end of volume one of Capital, the distinguishing mark of
capitalist private property is not that private individuals own property. Non-capitalist
producers also own property, but they are destroyed by capitalist private property. The
distinguishing mark of capitalist private property is that it rests upon the dispossession of
the laborer. This is why Marx says that private ownership can be eliminated without
eliminating private production. He makes this explicit by writing that the joint-stock
system “is an abolition of capitalist private industry on the basis of the capitalist system
itself.”106 Nevertheless, the separation of the enterprise from the control of private
capitalists creates a material condition for the laborers to eventually create genuinely
socialized relations—once, that is, they manage to strip the cooperative content of labor
from its despotic form by achieving an “organic revolution in the mode of production.”
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This leads Marx into a direct discussion of what can produce such a transition
from the old society to the new one—worker-owned and managed cooperatives. Marx
was always very interested in worker cooperatives and did not downplay their
importance, including when undertaken by such utopian socialists as Fourier and Owen.
One the other hand, he was very critical of socialists who disparaged such efforts, like
Saint-Simon.107 Marx writes of worker cooperatives,
The cooperative factories run by workers themselves are, within the old form, the
first examples of the emergence of a new form, even though they naturally
reproduce in all cases, in their present organization, all the defects of the existing
system, and must reproduce them. But the opposition between capital and labor is
abolished here, even if at first only in the form that the workers in association
become their own capitalist, i.e. they use the means of production to valorize their
own labor. These factories show how, at a certain stage of development of the
material forces of production, and of the social forms of production corresponding
to them, a new mode of production develops and is formed naturally out of the
old. Without the factory system that arises from the capitalist mode of production,
cooperative factories could not develop.108
There is much to be said of this passage. First, Marx explicitly avers that worker
cooperatives represent a new form of production. He does not say that of the joint-stock
company, which he sees as the highest expression of capitalist production. The fact that
the latter does away with private ownership does not change that one iota. This is an
important consideration, since it was already misunderstood by many socialists of the
time (and afterward) who held that the credit system would enable capitalism to naturally
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Second, Marx states that worker cooperatives

represent a new form of production in so far as they overcome the opposition between
capital and labor, at least initially and provisionally. This is because “In the case of the
cooperative factory, the antithetical character of the supervisory work disappears, since
the manager is paid by the workers instead of representing capital in opposition to
them.”110 Third, despite the importance of these cooperatives in foreshadowing the future,
they are limited by the fact that the “workers in association become their own capitalist”
in so far as the collectively owned and managed enterprise is still subject to value
production. They still “valorize their own labor.” Marx does not go on to explain exactly
how they valorize their own labor, but he appears to be suggesting that since these
cooperatives exist as islands in a capitalist ocean they cannot avoid operating in
accordance with the law of value. In this sense, they still remain within capitalism, even
as they contain social relations that point to its possible transcendence.
It may seem that workers who take over a productive enterprise and run it as their
own cooperative have freed themselves from the capital relation, and in one sense they
have. They have certainly eliminated the need for the capitalist. As Marx puts it, “the
capitalist vanishes from the production process as someone superfluous.”111 At the same
time, Marx repeatedly criticizes the socialists of his time for “wanting capital without the
109
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While the workers who take over the productive enterprise may free

themselves from the need to subject themselves to a capitalist, that does not necessarily
mean that they have freed themselves from the social power of capital. Worker
cooperatives that exist in a context in which exchange value continues to govern the
production and circulation of commodities tend to eventually discover that they have less
freedom and control than may at first appear. For while there is no longer a particular
capitalist within the enterprise to tell them what to do, the system of value production
informs or even governs their decisions as to what to produce, how much to produce,
how fast to produce, and in what form to produce. The more social cooperatives continue
to operate as islands within a sea of value production, the less real social power the
workers actually have as they find themselves subject to an autonomous force of value
production.
This does not prevent, however, worker-owned cooperatives from constituting a
transitional form to socialism—any more than the fact that the joint-stock company is
firmly rooted in capitalism prevents it from constituting a possible transitional form to a
new society. That is because capitalism, for Marx, is the transitional form for a socialist
reorganization of social relations. Marx writes,
Capitalist joint-stock companies as much as cooperative factories should be
viewed as transition forms from the capitalist mode of production to the
associated one, simply that in the one case the opposition is abolished in a
negative way, and in the other, in a positive way.113

112

Grundrisse, in MECW 28:229.

113

Capital 3:572.

263
Marx concludes his discussion of a new society in volume three of Capital by
speaking of the kind of social relations that will directly characterize it. In one of his most
explicit discussions of a socialist society, he writes:
The realm of freedom really begins only when labor determined by necessity and
external expediency ends; it lies by its very nature beyond the sphere of material
production proper. Just as the savage must wrestle with nature to satisfy his needs,
to maintain and reproduce his life, so must civilized man, and he must do so in all
forms of society and under all possible modes of production. This realm of natural
necessity expands with his development, because his needs do too; but the
productive forces to satisfy these expand at the same time. Freedom in this sphere,
can consist only in this, that socialized man, the associated producers, govern the
human metabolism with nature in a rational way, bringing it under their collective
control instead of being dominated by it as a blind power; accomplishing it with
the least expenditure of energy and in conditions most worthy and appropriate of
their human nature. But this always remains realm of necessity. The true realm of
freedom, the development of human powers as an end in itself, begins beyond it,
though it can only flourish with this realm of necessity as its basis.114
The realm of freedom, for Marx, begins when humanity no longer has to define
itself by its laboring activity. He is not suggesting that labor as such literally comes to an
end. After all, he explicitly states that labor exists “in all forms of society and under all
possible modes of production.” In a truly free society, however, human life activity is no
longer defined by labor. It is not defined by external or natural necessity. Marx’s
statement renders completely implausible the claim made by N.R. Berki:
In Capital Marx more or less completely acquiesces in the continuing—and
indeed, permanent—superiority of nature over the human species. And
correspondingly his earlier vision of ‘labor’ as integrated species-activity, as full
and free individual self-realization, is all but completely overshadowed by a
decidedly pessimistic view of labor as eternal toil and drudgery.115
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The amount of time engaged in material production will be drastically reduced
in the new society, thanks to technological innovation and the development of the forces
of production, at the same time as labor, like all forms of human activity, will become
freely associated and not subject to an autonomous power that operates behind the backs
of individuals.
Here is the most important determinate in Marx’s concept of the new society:
social relations must cease to operate independent of the self-activity of the associated
individuals. Marx will oppose any force—be it the state, a social plan, or the market
itself—that takes on a life of its own and utilizes human powers as a mere means to its
fruition and development. Marx’s opposition to the inversion of subject and predicate
constitutes the reason for his opposition to all forms of value production. It is also what
grounds his conception of socialism. Human power, he insists, must become its own
end—it must cease to serve as a means to some other end. He will project this concept
even more explicitly in his last writings, in which he issues his most detailed discussion
of the content of a postcapitalist society.

CHAPTER FIVE:
MARX’S LATE WRITINGS ON POSTCAPITALIST SOCIETY
The Impact of the Paris Commune on Marx
There is no question that the Paris Commune had an enormous impact on Marx.
Although it was restricted to the city of Paris and lasted only six weeks, the Commune
marked the first time in Marx’s life that the working class seized hold of a major urban
area and attempted to reorganize social relations in a revolutionary direction. Although he
was living in London at the time, Marx was in close contact with events on the ground
(thanks to his network of correspondents and his role in the International Workingmen’s
Association)1 and he made an important study of it in his booklet The Civil War in
France.
Marx was deeply impressed with the liberatory content of the Commune. In the
matter of a few weeks the populace of Paris put an end to the Second Empire of Louis
Napoleon by eliminating the standing army; stripped the police force of its political
powers; established the separation of church and state; organized the production and
distribution of foodstuffs through deliberative bodies of producers; and arranged for
municipal officials to be democratically elected and subject to immediate recall. It placed
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“the whole initiative hitherto exercised by the State . . . into the hands of the
Commune.” It compelled the “old centralized government” to “give way to the selfgovernment of the producers.”2 All of this was achieved without a single party or
political tendency monopolizing power.3 For these reasons, Marx considered the
Commune to be “a thoroughly expansive political form, while all previous forms of
government had been thoroughly repressive.” He viewed it as “the political form at last
discovered under which to work out the economical emancipation of labor.”4
In the Communist Manifesto of 1847, Marx had written,
The proletariat will use its political supremacy to wrest, by degrees, all capital
from the bourgeoisie, to centralize all instruments of production in the hands of
the State, i.e., of the proletariat organized as the ruling class; and to increase the
total productive forces as rapidly as possible.5
In contrast, in The Civil War in France he writes, “But the working class cannot simply
lay hold of the ready-made State machinery and wield it for its own purposes.”6 His first
draft of the address notes that earlier revolutions were “forced to develop, what absolute
monarchy had commenced, the centralization and organization of state power, and to
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expand the circumference and the attributes of the state power.” He adds, “All
revolutions thus only perfected the state machinery instead of throwing off this deadening
incubus.”8 The Paris Commune, in contrast, sought to dismantle the machinery of the
state through decentralized, democratic control of society by the freely associated
populace.
This was, therefore, a Revolution not against this or that, legitimate,
constitutional, republican, or Imperialist form of State Power. It was a Revolution
against the State itself, this supernaturalist abortion of society, a resumption by
the people for the people, of its own social life. It was not a revolution to transfer
it from one fraction of the ruling classes to the other, but a Revolution to break
down this horrid machinery of class domination itself.9
This marks a distinct departure from the view of the state expressed in the
Manifesto. The Paris Commune taught Marx that the state is not a neutral instrument that
can be used to “wrest” power from the oppressors. Its very form is despotic. In
recognizing this, the communards did not aspire to centralize power into the hands of a
state of their own.10 They instead aimed for “the destruction of the State power which
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claimed to be the embodiment of that unity independent of, and superior to, the nation
itself, from which it was but a parasitic excresence.”11
Far from being a neutral instrument, the state is a disfiguring outgrowth of
society. Society gives birth to this monstrosity, which takes on a life of its own and
operates behind its back. “The centralized state machinery . . . entoils (inmeshes) the
living civil society like a boa constrictor.”12 A social revolution aims to reverse this
reversal: “The Communal Constitution would have restored to the social body all the
forces hitherto absorbed by the State parasite feeding upon, and clogging the free
movement of, society.”13 The Paris Commune is therefore not a new form of the state.
Instead, “this new Commune . . . breaks the modern State power.”14 It aspires for “the
reabsorption of the State power by society.”15
The Paris Commune was unlike anything that had emerged in previous
revolutions. Marx generalizes its experience by contending that it discloses the proper
political form that can enable revolutions to break free from the despotism of capital:
“The Commune was therefore to serve as a level for uprooting the economical
foundations upon which rests the existence of classes, and therefore of class rule.”16
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Since the new society consists of freely associated producers planning and allocating
social wealth, it must be created by means of such a free association. The vision is
fundamentally democratic. “Such is the Commune—the political form of the social
emancipation, of the liberation of labor from the usurpation of the (slaveholding)
monopolies of the means of labor.”17
This is quite a distance from the view of the state as the principal instrument of
revolutionary transformation that has tended to dominate efforts at social transformation
in the twentieth century. The Commune was a cooperative form of administration that
was not weighted down by being dominated by one political party or tendency,
centralized or otherwise. Yet it managed to institute a series of wide-ranging
transformations in social relations that has attracted the imagination of people around the
world ever since.18 Marx now conceives of an association of freely associated
cooperatives as the most effective form for making a transition to a new society.19
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The Commune was the political lever or form for the transformation of the
despotic relations of capital, but it did not constitute the transcendence of capital—nor
could it in the mere six weeks of its existence. Marx never claimed that Paris was a
socialist society under the Commune. It rather marked the self-government of the
producers on a municipal scale. It only could have constituted a transitional form to
socialism had it been allowed to survive and spread. As Marx notes in his comments on
cooperatives in volume three of Capital, a liberatory form that exists within a capitalist
context can still represent the transition to a new society, so long as a number of
historical conditions are present.
Marx himself notes, “The working class did not expect miracles from the
Commune. They have no ready-made utopias to introduce par décret du peuple.”20
They know that in order to work out their own emancipation, and along with it
that higher form to which present society is irresistibly tending by its economical
agencies, they will have to pass through long struggles, through a series of
historic processes, transforming circumstances and men. They have no ideas to
realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which the old
collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.21
Marx repeatedly emphasizes not only the achievements but also the limitations of the
Commune—which, he contends, the communards were fully conscious of:
They know that the superseding of the economical conditions of the slavery of
labor by the conditions of free and associated labor can only be the progressive
work of time, (that economical transformation) that they require not only for a
change of distribution but a new organization of production, or rather the delivery
(setting free) of the social forms of production in present organized labor
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(engendered by present industry) of the trammels of slavery, of their present
class character, and their harmonious national and international coordination.22
Marx does not hesitate to emphasize how laborious is the process of creating a
new society, since it depends not only upon national but international cooperation as well
as transforming not only of relations of distribution but also of production. Marx was
clearly disappointed at the bloody suppression of the Commune by the forces of reaction,
but not long afterwards he became even more disappointed at the realization that his own
followers had failed to learn its lessons. Nowhere is the depth of Marx’s dissatisfaction
expressed more sharply than in his work composed in the aftermath of the Commune’s
defeat, the Critique of the Gotha Program.
The Critique of the Gotha Program
Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Program of 1875 contains his most sustained,
detailed, and explicit discussion of a postcapitalist society. It was not written, however, as
part of an effort to provide a blueprint as to the kind of society that would follow
capitalism. Its composition was instead driven by organizational considerations. The
German socialist movement comprised two tendencies in the 1860s and 1870s. One was
the General Union of German Workers, whose founder was Ferdinand Lassalle. It was
the first nationwide socialist organization of the German proletariat, and its energetic and
charismatic leader helped make it the largest and best-known leftwing organization in
Europe. After a period of collaboration, Lassalle and Marx had a bitter breakup, largely
occasioned by what Marx considered Lassalle’s unprincipled interest in forging alliances
with sections of German officialdom in order to secure organizational legitimacy for his
22
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party and social reforms. The other tendency of the German workers’ movement was
the much-smaller Eisenachers (named for the city in which they were founded), which
considered themselves Marx’s followers. In 1875 the two groups entered into unity
negotiations in the city of Gotha, and against Marx’s wishes formed a united organization
based on a brief program named after the site of the conference. This marked the birth of
what later was known as the German Social-Democratic Party, which became the largest
socialist organization in European history after Marx’s death.
Marx was furious when he read the Gotha Program, which he considered to be a
complete capitulation to Lassallean principles.23 He threatened to break off his relations
with his German followers unless they disavowed the decisions made at the unity
congress. They refused to do so, but Marx decided not to go through with his threat and
in the end chose not to make his denunciation public, in part because Bismarck had jailed
several leading Eisenachers.
There were a number of formulations in the Gotha Program that infuriated
Marx,24 but none more so than its brief discussion of the alternative to capitalism. Point
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three of the Program stated, “The emancipation of labor demands the raising of the
means of labor to the common property of society and the collective regulation of the
total labor with a fair distribution of the proceeds of labor.”25 The Gotha Program was not
referring to distribution of the elements of production. It was instead referring to the
distribution of the social product, which Marx saw as a wholly secondary and subsidiary
matter. In fact, the Gotha Program failed to refer to production relations or their
transformation at all. It instead focused on the “fair” distribution of the products of labor
in a new society.
Marx sharply attacks the claim that in a future “communist society every worker
must receive his ‘undiminished’ Lassallean ‘proceeds of labor.”26 He denies that workers
would receive an “undiminished” share of the total social product, since a number of
deductions would be needed to pay for depreciation of the means of production, the
expansion of production, and for an insurance fund against accidents. None of these
factors can be calculated in advance, since they depend on an assortment of contingent
conditions. Moreover, additional deductions from the now “diminished” proceeds of
labor would be needed to pay for the costs of social administration, schools and health
services, and compensation for those too old or too ill to work. These would increase
“considerably in comparison with present-day society and it grows in proportion as the
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new society develops.” Marx thoroughly rejects the claim that workers in a new
society obtain the full value of their labor.
Marx is clearly irritated at having to write his criticism of the Gotha Program. As
he puts it in a letter to Wilhelm Bracke, “it was by no means a pleasure to write such a
lengthy screed.”28 He is not issuing his critique in order to delineate the nature of
distribution in the new society; the matter is clearly of secondary interest to him. But he
is deeply concerned at the implications of the Gotha Program’s focus on distribution to
the exclusion of emphasizing the need to transform relations of production. For this
reason he directly addresses the form of collective ownership of the means of production
in a society that does manage to radically transform production relations—a matter that
was not discussed in the Gotha Program itself. He writes,
Within the collective society based on common ownership of the means of
production, the producers do not exchange their products; just as little does the
labor employed on the product appear here as the value of these products, as a
material quality possessed by them, since now, in contrast to capitalist society,
individual labor no longer exists in an indirect fashion but directly as a component
part of the total labor.29
Marx leaves no doubt that his description of such a state of affairs represents a
socialist or communist society:
What we are dealing with here is a communist society, not as it has developed on
its own foundations, but on the contrary, just as it emerges from capitalist society,
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which is thus in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still
stamped with the birth-marks of the old society from whose womb it emerges.30
This represents the first time in any of his writings that Marx explicitly refers to
two “phases” of the new society. These are not two distinct stages that are respectively
termed “socialism” and “communism.” For Marx, “socialism” and “communism”—along
with “free association,” “society of free individuality,” or simply “the new society”—are
completely interchangeable terms. The notion that “socialism” and “communism”
represent distinct stages of social development was alien to Marx’s thought and only
entered the lexicon of “Marxism” after his death.
To see why Marx contends that neither value nor the exchange of products
characterizes the initial phase of socialism or communism, it is necessary to closely
examine his statement that individual labor exists as a direct component part of the sum
of social labor only in a new society. The total sum of labor can be treated as an
aggregate, just like the amount of labor performed by an individual can be treated as a
discrete unit. In the capitalist mode of production individual labor exists indirectly as a
part of the sum of total labor, since the only labor that counts is that which corresponds to
the average amount of time socially necessary to create a product. Individual labor that
fails to conform to that average is socially useless and expendable. It does not directly
figure into the aggregate. This situation prevails so long as actual labor time is subsumed
by socially necessary labor time. Individual labor can exist or count only indirectly “as a
component part of the total labor” so long as capitalist relations of production are
maintained.
30
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With socialism or communism, on the other hand, the disregard of actual labor
time in favor of socially necessary labor time is annulled. The exertion of concrete acts of
labor, performed by freely associated individuals, becomes the one and only expression
of living labor. No longer does a force operate behind the backs of the producers—
socially necessary labor time—that renders their individual activity useless or
unproductive if it fails to meet an abstract standard. The formation of freely associated
production relations therefore heals the split between abstract and concrete labor. With
the elimination of the dual character of labor, the substance of value—abstract labor—
drops out of existence. As a result, value production itself ceases to exist. The “labor
employed on the products” therefore no longer appears in the form of “the value of these
products.”
With the abolition of the conditions of value production, value’s form of
appearance—exchange value—likewise ceases to exist. Value must take on a form of
appearance distinct from itself, as exchange value; but exchange value can only be the
appearance of something if there is something to appear. Exchange value is readily
visible, but it is far more difficult, as Capital shows, to “track down” the value immanent
in it. So difficult is it to discern value independent of its manifestation that it appears to
be a property of the physicality of things instead of the peculiar social form of labor in
capitalism. Yet with the abolition of this peculiar social form, the conditions for the
possibility of both value and exchange value cease to exist.
However, if value and exchange value cease to exist, how is the mutual and
universal exchangeability of products of labor possible? As we have seen, products of
labor, as well as labor power, can be rendered mutually exchangeable only if there is an
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abstract denominator or principle of equality that makes such exchangeability
possible. The universal exchange of discrete products requires a commensurate quality or
substance: “There can be no exchange without equality, and no equality without
commensurability.”31 This equal quality is value, and abstract labor is its substance. But
the new production relations in a socialist or communist society eliminate abstract labor,
and with it, value production itself. How is it possible, then, for products of labor to be
mutually exchangeable? The answer is that they can’t be universally exchangeable. This
is why Marx writes that even in the initial phase of a socialist or communist society “the
producers do not exchange their products.”
This suggests that a socialist or communist society, as Marx envisions it,
eliminates the possibility of a market in which products of labor are mutually and
universally exchanged. A generalized commodity market cannot exist if there is no
substance that renders different magnitudes qualitatively equal. Does this mean that a
market in any possible sense of the word cannot exist in a new society? Marx does not
directly address the question. However, given the logic of his argument, it does not
necessarily follow that the answer is in the affirmative. First, as Marx often notes,
markets existed long before capitalism. The mere existence of a market is not therefore
ipso facto evidence of capitalist relations of production. Second, the object of Marx’s
critique of capitalism is not the market; it is instead the relations of production and the
distribution of the conditions of production. Third, in the Critique of the Gotha Program,
Marx is responding to what he considers the erroneous theoretical statements in a
31
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program of a political party. He does not intend for his critique be read as a detailed
blueprint that accounts for any and all possible conditions and institutions of a
postcapitalist society.
This much is clear: a generalized commodity market, one in which products of
labor are mutually interchangeable, cannot exist if the substance of value, abstract labor,
ceases to exist. A society cannot be defined or dominated by market transactions or a
market if the conditions for its possibility are not present. It is one thing, however, for a
generalized commodity market to exist, and quite another for a much more limited
market to persist (whether temporarily or not) in a subordinate and subsidiary role in
comparison to a society’s governing social relations.
A few years before the Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx wrote in The Civil
War in France:
If cooperative production is not to remain a sham and a snare; if it is to supersede
the capitalist system; if united cooperative societies are to regulate national
production upon a common plan, thus taking it under their own control, and
putting an end to the constant anarchy and periodical convulsions which are the
fatality of capitalist production—what else, gentlemen, would it be but
Communism, “possible” Communism?32
For cooperative production not to be “a sham and a snare,” it has to be under the control
of the workers themselves. But what does he mean by control? Surely, Marx is referring
to effective as well as formal control. And the workers will not have effective control of
their cooperative production if an independent pricing mechanism acts in disregard of
their collective deliberations by dictating the manner, form, and nature of their laboring
activity. Marx’s conception of socialism is fundamentally democratic, and democracy
32
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must exist on the economic as well as the political level. Throughout his writings,
Marx never wavers from his emphasis on the need for the producers to have power and
control over the process of forming the social product. He is conceiving of a new society
in which the products of human activity can no longer take on an autonomous power
independent of the producers. He opposes the existence of a market in so far as its
existence implies the existence of such an autonomous force. But he does not explicitly
rule out a market if it exists in a subsidiary position and does not assume such a role.
As Marx repeatedly stresses, the process of creating such a society is a long and
laborious one. The effort extends far beyond the moment of revolution itself. It is
impractical to presume that a new society can emerge sui generis, without bearing the
birthmarks of the society from which it emerges. At the same time, Marx wishes to
emphasize that a socialist or communist society represents a qualitative break from the
conditions and social forms that define capitalism. This two-fold concern governs his
discussion through the rest of the Critique of the Gotha Program.
As noted earlier, Marx explicitly states that his discussion thus far is of “a
communist society, not as if has developed on its own foundations, but on the contrary,
just as it emerges from capitalist society,” and is “still stamped with the birth-marks of
the old society from whom womb it emerges.” So how would the laborers be
remunerated in this lower phase of a new society? Since, for Marx, a radical break occurs
between capitalism and even the most initial phase of socialism or communism, it is
crucial that the defining characteristics of capitalism be eliminated from the outset. And
the most defining characteristic of capitalism, for Marx, is wage labor. He makes it clear
that there is no place for it in the initial phase of a new society by spelling out an
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alternative form of remuneration. This form is as follows: each individual gives to
society “his individual quantum of labor” which is measured in “the sum of hours of
work.” The “individual labor time of the individual” represents the individual’s share in
society, and the individual receives back from society a corresponding amount of means
of subsistence. “The individual producers receive back from society—after the
deductions have been made—exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his
individual quantum of labor.”33 The individual receives from society a voucher or token
that he has “furnished such and such an amount of labor (after deducing his labor for the
common funds)” and from it obtains from “the social stock of means of consumption as
much as the amount of labor costs.”34 Remuneration is based on an “equal standard”—
labor time.
Marx is not suggesting that the worker’s labor is computed on the basis of a social
average of labor time. Labor time here simply refers to the amount of actual hours of
work performed by the individual. Remuneration is based on “the individual labor time of
the individual producer.” This is completely different than in capitalism, where
remuneration is based on socially necessary labor time. As Marx puts it, “The same
amount of labor which he has given to society in one form he receives back in another.”35
Marx states, “Here obviously the same principle prevails as that which regulates
the exchange of commodities, as far as this is the exchange of equal values.” He is
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referring to values in the generic sense of an exchange of equal quantities, of equal
sums of actual (concrete) labor time. Yet the “content and form” of this exchange are
radically distinct compared with what occurs in capitalism, since “nothing can pass to the
ownership of individuals except individual means of consumption.”36
Why does he compare remuneration by labor time to the “principle” of
commodity exchange? Simply because there is an exchange of two items of equal worth:
one hour of actual labor is exchanged for an equal amount of goods or services produced
in the same amount of time, just two commodities are exchanged on the basis of an
equality between them. However, the exchange of labor time for goods and services in
the initial phase of a new society is radically different in form and content from capitalist
commodity relations, since the former is based on the equality of concrete magnitudes
posited by the producers—not on an abstract average that operates independently of the
producers.
It is important to emphasize that Marx is not suggesting that remuneration in this
lower phase of socialism or communism is based on the level of productive output by the
laborer. It is instead based on “the natural measure of labor”37—time, the actual number
of hours performed by the individual. The difference between labor and labor time is a
critical analytical distinction, and conflating the two readily leads to misconstruing
36
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Marx’s position. He is not suggesting that the operative principle of the lower phase
of socialism or communism is “from each according to their ability, to each according to
their work.” No such formulation appears either in the Critique or in any of Marx’s work.
Yet it became the widespread interpretation of Marx in the statist “communist” regimes
of the twentieth century. As János Kornai writes,
Under classical socialism the principle of socialist distribution stated in every
textbook is, “To each according to his work.” But the question remains of how
performance can be measured and what the income proportionate with the
performance should be. To an extent the principle “distribution according to
work” applies under capitalism as well, at least in the case of earned income.
There performance is measured and rewards are set mainly (but not exclusively)
by an anonymous, decentralized process: the labor market, on which the relative
wages emerge. Whereas in a classical socialist economy the question of what
income is due for what quantity and type of work is decided arbitrarily by persons
appointed to do so.38
Kornai is correct that “distribution according to work” became the justification by
which the centralized command economies in the USSR, East Europe and China imposed
draconian social control upon the workforce. Far from representing a form of the “new”
society, it became an administrative formula for getting the workers to produce under
degrading conditions for the sake of “catching up with the West.” He is also correct that
“distribution according to work” is not at odds with the principle by which capitalism
operates. He fails to notice, however, that Marx was fully aware of this, which is why no
such formulation or conception enters his own discussion of a postcapitalist society.39
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Marx is not concerned with the form by which the worker is compelled to provide
greater and greater amounts of work for social agents. He is not concerned with whether
the mechanism that compels the workers to produce more than they consume is
accomplished through the arbitrary vehicle of the market or through the equally arbitrary
whims of government officials. Both forms “reward” laborers based on their productive
output; they are made to produce more and more within a unit of time in accordance with
the average amount of time that it takes to produce the product on the world market. In
this sense, both forms rest upon the existence of wage labor, which is inseparable from
the despotic plan of capital.
In direct contrast, Marx’s concept of socialism or communism is premised upon
the abolition of wage labor and capital, as seen from his discussion of remuneration by
labor time in the Critique of the Gotha Program. The worker receives an amount of
means of subsistence based on the unit of time worked, not on the amount of productive
output within that unit. Labor time is a purely internal standard, based on a given hour of
actual labor performed by the individual. The workers are not “paid” according to
whether or not their labor conforms to some other standard. The latter, distribution
according to labor, is entirely consistent with value production, whereas the former,
distribution according to actual labor time, represents a break from value production
altogether.

ideological premise—namely, the claim that they operated according to principles laid
down by Marx.
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Marx’s discussion in the Critique of the Gotha Program is his most detailed
discussion of a postcapitalist society, but it is entirely consistent with his previous
writings on the issue in the drafts of Capital as well as in its published version.
His critique of Proudhonian proposals for utilizing time chits or labor vouchers in
The Poverty of Philosophy and Grundrisse is based on the conflation of actual labor time
with socially necessary labor time. He rejects such proposals because they are premised
upon the existing system of commodity production. Exchange relations cannot be
rendered transparent or rational by being grafted onto a system of commodity production
that is itself irrational and mystified. Marx’s sharp critique of his followers in 1875 for
accepting the Lassallean notion that workers can obtain the full value of their product
carries forward the critique he had earlier made of the Proudhonists for presuming that an
“equitable” distribution of the products of labor is consistent with value production.
Marx’s Critique of the Gotha Program is also remarkably consistent with his
earlier comments about the new society in Capital. This is especially seen from his
statement in the Critique, “Here obviously the same principle prevails as that which
regulates the exchange of commodities . . . .” Marx is restating his formulation at the end
of chapter one of volume one of Capital, which stated, “We shall assume, but only for the
sake of a parallel with the production of commodities, that the share of each individual
producer in the means of subsistence is determined by his labor time.”40 In neither case is
Marx suggesting that value production prevails under “socialism.” A fundamentally
different content and form are operative in the new society, but they can be compared to
40
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the exchange of commodities in so far as an exchange of equal determinants occurs in
both cases. What makes the two radically distinct is that in the new society the exchange
of labor time for social products is transparent whereas in the old society it is not. And it
is not transparent in the old society because labor is indirectly social. This is of cardinal
importance, for it signifies that production relations in the new society have become
radically transformed.41
Marx’s discussion in the Critique of the Gotha Program is also consistent with
his earlier discussions in volumes one through three of Capital. These three works
emphasize the difference between actual labor time and socially necessary labor time.
These three works state that remuneration in the society will at least initially be based on
the labor time of the individual, not on labor output that is governed by an abstraction.
Neither indicates that exchange value or value exists in the new society. Moreover,
volume two of Capital explicitly endorses remuneration based on labor tickets or
vouchers along basically the same lines as the 1875 Critique. Volume two also states that
money ceases to be the medium of social interaction in the new society and that the
vouchers do not circulate, that is, they do not augment value.
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There is, however, an important difference between the Critique of the Gotha
Program and these earlier writings, in that the Critique for the first time specifies that the
postcapitalist relations under discussion thus far pertain to the initial phase of new
society, which still is defective from the vantage point of what eventually follows it.42
The initial phase of socialism or communism is defective for a number of reasons.
Some degree of social inequality will exist, since some individuals will work more hours
than others and will therefore obtain a larger amount of means of consumption. Likewise,
an individual who produces more in a given hour than another will not receive greater
remuneration than one who labors for the same amount of time. Since “one man is
superior to another physically or mentally and so supplies more labor in the same time, or
can work for a longer period of time”43 the levels of remuneration will be unequal. Most
important of all, remuneration takes into consideration “a certain side only” of
individuals—their contribution in terms of labor time—“everything else being ignored.”44
Since labor time—albeit in the radically altered form of actual and not average labor
time—governs the distribution of the elements of production, social existence is still
based on natural necessity. Marx writes, “Hence, equal right here is still in principle—
bourgeois right, although principle and practice are no longer at loggerheads, while the
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exchange of equivalents in commodity exchange only exists on the average and not
in the individual case.”45 He introduces an important note of caution here:
But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is
when it has just emerged from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than
the economic structure and its cultural development which this determines.46
As Marx states in volume three of Capital, “The realm of freedom really begins
only when labor determined by necessity and external expediency ends; it lies by its very
nature beyond the sphere of material production proper.”47 True freedom represents a
higher phase in which society is no longer measured by labor time or defined by material
production. This higher phase is “the development of human powers as an end in itself.”48
At that point no longer will only “a certain side” of the individual determine the
distribution of the elements of production. Social production and distribution will instead
be based on the totality of the individual’s needs and capacities.
Marx discusses the radically different distributive principle that governs a higher
phase of socialism49 as follows: “From each according to his abilities, to each according
to his needs!” This represents a significant development as compared with the lower
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phase, since society no longer operates on the basis of an exchange of equivalents.
The lower phase represents a radical departure from commodity production, since there is
an exchange of concrete, sensuous equivalents—so many hours of labor in exchange for
so many goods and services produced in that amount of actual time. But no such
exchange occurs in a higher phase of socialism or communism. “From each according to
his abilities, to each according to his needs” is not a quid pro quo. It is not as if one’s
needs are met only to the extent that they correspond to the expression of a given set of
abilities. If such a principle prevailed, human relations would still be governed by natural
necessity and external expediency. Society would remain governed by material
production. But the true realm of freedom lies beyond all of this. This does not mean that
labor as such vanishes in a higher phase of socialism or communism. Marx explicitly
states that in such a higher phase, labor will no longer be “only a means of life but life’s
prime want.”50 Labor is now radically transformed as compared with capitalism, since it
serves not as a means to an end but as an end in itself. In a higher phase of socialism or
communism, labor is fully inseparable from the individual’s self-activity and selfdevelopment.
It is not hard to see that Marx’s vision of a higher phase of socialism or
communism requires a momentous material and intellectual transformation. It certainly
does not emerge overnight! Marx explicitly states that it cannot come into existence
without a whole series of preconditions. These include the end to the separation between
50
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mental and manual labor, the transformation of labor from a means to an end to an
end in itself, a dramatic increase of the productive forces such as to alleviate the
possibility of poverty and want, and “the all-round development of the individual.” He
does not specify any time frame for these transformations. Marx is always cautious about
getting ahead of what individuals could or could not achieve in the course of their
practical history, precisely because he is wary of imposing any conceptions upon
individuals that are independent of their own self-activity.
This also explains the nature of his discussion of the distributive principles of a
lower and higher phase of a new society in the Critique of the Gotha Program. He is not
trying to formulate a normative model of how distribution ought to function in a new
society. He is instead addressing what would occur of necessity if and only if a radical
transformation occurred in production and human relations. Marx does not feel the need
to advocate specific forms of distribution in a postcapitalist society, because they will
arise, he contends, from the nature of the new forms of production. He insists,
If the elements of production are so distributed, then the present-day distribution
of the means of consumption results automatically. If the material conditions of
production are the collective property of the workers themselves, then there
likewise results a distribution of the means of consumption different from the
present one.51
This does not mean that Marx’s discussion of the lower phase of socialism or
communism is of incidental or passing importance. For Marx’s discussion points to the
specific conditions that are needed to eventually make the principle “From each
according to his abilities, to each according to his needs” a reality. The most important
51
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condition, which defines the emergence of socialism or communism, is that indirectly
social labor is replaced by directly social labor. Without this fundamental transformation
it is impossible to abolish the dual character of labor and with it value production.
The nuances of Marx’s discussion of the new society in the Critique of the Gotha
Program can be brought into focus by noting an important comment made by Herbert
Marcuse on Marx’s view of the new society. According to Marcuse, the problem of
capitalism,
is to be solved by a revolution which brings the productive process under the
collective control of the “immediate producers.” But this is not freedom. Freedom
is living without toil, without anxiety: the play of human faculties. The realization
of freedom is a problem of time: reduction of the working day to the minimum
which turns quantity into quality. A socialist society is a society in which free
time, not labor time is the social measure of wealth and the dimension of the
individual existence.52
Marcuse is correct that for Marx the realization of freedom involves the problem
of time. Marx repeatedly emphasizes throughout his work that in a new society time will
become the space for human development. However, Marcuse is not correct that the
problem of time revolves solely around the reduction of the working day to an absolute
minimum. Labor time is not only a quantitative but also a qualitative determination. As
can be seen from a careful reading of the Critique of the Gotha Program, Marx’s view is
that labor time does not cease to be the measure of social wealth in the lower or initial
phase of socialism. This does not mean that Marx conceives of this initial phase as one in
which freedom remains unrealized, since the replacement of indirect social labor by
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direct social labor signals the abolition of alienated labor, and with it, of value
production itself. Freedom defines every phase of the new society for Marx, even when
that phase still operates in accordance with natural necessity, since it consists of “free
men” “expending their many different forms of labor power in full self-awareness as one
single social labor force.”53 A society is unfree not because labor time is its measure but
because social necessary labor time is its measure. By failing to conceptually distinguish
between actual labor time and socially necessary labor time, Marcuse is led to conclude
that a new society, for Marx, entails the abolition of labor per se.54 Marx does speak, as
noted in chapter two, of the abolition of labor in his early writings, but he means by that
the abolition of alienated labor. And the Critique in the Gotha Program explicitly states
that labor exists not only in the initial phase of socialism but also in a higher phase in so
far as labor becomes “life’s prime want.”55 In a higher phase of socialism, but only in a
higher phrase, labor ceases to be the measure of social relations. Freedom in the initial
phase of socialism or communism remains defective in so far as it remains tied to the
53
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necessity of remunerating individuals based on actual labor time. But that is a far cry
from suggesting that that has anything to do with value production.
“Socialism,” for Marx, was never meant to serve as a transitional stage to some
distant “communist” formation. He is not pushing off the realm of freedom to some
distant horizon. The realm of freedom emerges simultaneously with the elimination of
capitalism. Marx is realistic enough to understand, however, that a free society itself
undergoes self-development. There would be no necessity for it to undergo further
development if it did not contain some kind of defect that impels the forward
movement.56
This is not to suggest that Marx did not conceive of a possible transitional stage
between capitalism and the initial phase of socialism. He addresses this in the Critique of
the Gotha Program thusly:
Between capitalist and communist society lies the period of the revolutionary
transformation of the one into the other. Corresponding to this is also a political
transition period in which the state can be nothing but the revolutionary
dictatorship of the proletariat.57
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Based on the above discussion of the impact of the Paris Commune, it appears
that Marx conceived of this transitional period along the lines of the non-statist and freely
associated form of self-governance that emerged in the Commune. Marx saw in the
Commune an exemplar of the political form best suited for exiting capitalism. It is a
mediatory or transitional political stage in which capitalist social relations have not yet
been fully overcome. But this is not what Marx means by the lower phase of socialism.
With the lower phase, capitalism has been left behind altogether. He did not view
socialism as a preliminary stage that is compatible with the existence of value production.
The latter notion, which largely defined the discourse of established “Marxist”
thought in the twentieth century, is alien to Marx’s thought. Such misreadings of his work
had already begun to emerge in his own lifetime, and he lived long enough to directly
answer them. One of his most poignant critiques is found in his “Notes on Wagner’s
Lehrbuch des politischen Ökonomie,” which was one of the first works by a professional
economist to directly engage Marx’s theoretic contribution:
Value. According to Mr. Wagner, Marx’s theory of value is the “cornerstone of his
socialist system.” As I have never established a “socialist system,” this is a fantasy
of Wagner, Schäffle e tutti quanti. . . . [I]n my investigation of value I have dealt
with bourgeois relations, not with the application of this theory of value to a
“social state” not even constructed by me but by Mr. Schäffle for me.58
Marx’s entire body of work shows that socialism or communism, which he treats
as mutually interchangeable terms, is conditional upon a radical transformation of labor
and social relations. The measure of whether such a transformation is adequate to the
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concept of a new society is the abolition of the law of value and value production by
freely associated individuals.
This goal is not achieved, however, merely by some act of revolutionary will. It is
achieved by discerning and building upon the elements of the new society that are
concealed in the shell of the old one. This includes elucidating the forces of liberation
that arise against capitalist alienation—which Marx referred to as “new forces and
passions” for the reconstruction of society.”59 It is the development of both capitalism “as
such” and the forms of resistance that arise against it that create the possibility for a new
society. It is on these grounds that Marx argues, “The capitalist mode of production is in
fact a transitional form which by its own organism must lead to a higher, to a cooperative
mode of production, to socialism.”60
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CONCLUSION
EVALUATING MARX’S CONCEPT OF A POSTCAPITALIST SOCIETY
This study has shown that a coherent and consistent concept of a new society is
contained in Marx’s work, which is present from his early work of the 1840s to his last
writings in the 1880s. From the inception of his philosophic project, Marx expressed
strong opposition to any formation or situation in which individuals become dominated
by social relations and products of their own making. His criticism of the inversion of
subject and predicate, which is evident from his early writings on the state and civil
society, carries over into his critique of the economic formations of capitalism, in which
the self-development of individuals becomes thwarted by the products of their productive
activity. This perspective is hardly restricted to his early writings. His two-decade long
process of developing Capital, as well as the content of Capital itself, shows that Marx’s
primary object of criticism was the domination of things over individuals, of dead labor
over living labor, of the object over the subject. It is on these grounds that he not only
opposed capitalist commodity production but also the system of value production upon
which it is based. Marx’s critique of capital is part of a complex argumentative approach
that is directed against all social phenomena that take on a life of their own and dictate
the behavior and actions of the social agents that are responsible for creating them.
Marx’s philosophic approach, both to the critique of capitalism and to the
delineation of its alternative, is rooted in a particular conception of freedom. Free
295
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development, for Marx, is not possible if the products of human activity take on the
form of an autonomous power and proscribe the parameters in which individuals can
express their natural and acquired talents and abilities. As this study has sought to show,
Marx’s commitment to this concept of freedom owes much to his effort to re-think the
status of human relations in the aftermath of the philosophic discoveries of German
idealism, on the one hand, and the emergence of industrial capitalism and the formation
of a radicalized working class opposing it, on the other. His conclusion that the modern
world is a fundamentally inverted (and indeed a mad) phenomenon does not derive from
an exaggerated commitment to “rationalism” or speculative metaphysics; instead, it
derives from his understanding of freedom as the subject’s ability to feel at one with and
at home in its objective manifestations instead of being controlled and dominated by
them.
This conception of freedom serves as the basis of Marx’s objections to the myriad
forms of social phenomena associated with modern capitalism—value, exchange value,
money, commodity production and circulation, and not least, capital itself. It also grounds
his criticism of the state and civil society. For this very reason, Marx does not object to
capitalism because of the existence of the market and private property. He objects to the
market and private property in so far as they are expressions of capital—a formation that
crystallizes the transformation of human relations into relations between things.
Marx’s conception of a postcapitalist society is therefore radically different from
what has characterized most approaches to “socialism” and “communism” in the century
since his death. His critique of existing society goes much deeper than the contrast
between the “anarchic” market and the “organized” factory, just as it extends beyond the
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boundaries of defining socialism as the mere abolition of private property and the
market. Marx above all focuses on the need to eliminate the basis of both modern
capitalism and its statist “socialist” alternatives—value production. Since he objects to
value production in so far as it crystallizes the subjection of individuals to social relations
of their own making, he can hardly conceive of its alternative as another structure in
which human relations takes on the form of things. Marx’s conception that only freely
associated labor can strip the mystical veil from commodity production is not a mere
humanitarian adjunct to an otherwise objectivistic economic theory. His concept of the
alternative to capitalism flows from the same normative concerns as governs his critique
of capital itself. Just as he opposes any social formation that acts behind the backs of
individuals, so he opposes any social solution that imposes itself irrespective of the selfactivity of the subject.
Marx’s conception of a postcapitalist society is therefore both expansive and
visionary, in that it excludes any social formation that takes on an autonomous power at
the expense of its creators. This is why even when he endorsed worker cooperatives as a
possible transitional form to socialism, he warned that they too can become a “sham and
a snare”1 if they are not under the workers’ actual and not just formal control. This is why
even when he noted that the concentration and centralization of capital points toward
socialized relations of the future, he argued that they could serve as the basis for a future
society only if there were accompanied by “other large-scale organic revolutions in the
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mode of production.” Marx never endorses a given social form as the solution unless
it avoids the tendency of human subjective activity to become constrained by forces of its
own making.
At the same time, there is an underlying realism and sobriety in Marx’s work that
runs counter to the claim that his concept of a free society requires the existence of
perfect and error-free individuals. Most of his discussions of a post-capitalism actually
deal with a socialist or communist society that is “still stamped with the birth-marks of
the old society from whom womb it emerges.”3 This is especially the case with his
discussions of the new society in volumes one and two of Capital, and in much of the
Critique of the Gotha Program.
Marx understands that it is not possible to achieve complete social equality in the
immediate aftermath of the demise of capitalism. Nor is it possible to leave behind such
cardinal principles of the old society as basing remuneration on an exchange of labor time
for means of consumption—even though labor time functions in a radically different
form and content in the new society as compared with the old one. It is indeed
fundamentally different, since social relations become “transparent in their simplicity”
once socially necessary labor time is abolished and indirect social labor is replaced by
direct social labor. Marx is not suggesting that all facets of life become transparent in the
lower phase of socialism or communism; indeed, he never suggests this about conditions
in a higher phase either. He is addressing something much more specific: namely, the
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transparent nature of the exchange between labor time and products of labor. This
relation can never be transparent so long as there is value production; it becomes
transparent only once value production is annulled by freely associated labor.
The fact remains, however, that conditions in the lower phase of socialism or
communism are defective and limited as compared to those that follow in a higher phase.
Indeed, Marx contends that they are “still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society”
in “every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually.”4 This is a far cry from
someone who thinks that a socialist society entails the perfected man.
Marx does not, of course, limit his horizon to the initial phase of socialism or
communism. He discusses it as part of understanding what is needed in order to bring to
realization the more expansive social relations of a higher phase. Marx conceives of this
phase as the passing beyond of natural necessity—not in the sense that labor as such
would come to an end, but rather that society would no longer be governed by the
necessity for material production and reproduction. This higher phase, however, can only
come into being as a result of a whole series of complex and involved historical
developments, which include the abolition of the “the enslaving subordination of the
individual to the division of labor, and thereby also the antithesis between mental and
physical labor.”5 It is impossible to achieve this, he reminds us, in the absence of highly
developed productive forces. Marx never conceived it as possible for a society to pass to
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“socialism” or “communism” while remaining imprisoned in conditions of social and
technological backwardness.6
Marx’s realism is most of all expressed in his insistence that the new society is
contained in the womb of the old one. For Marx there was never a question of calling
socialism or communism into being through the projection of a subjective wish. The new
society will immanently emerge from the existing conditions prepared by capitalist
production and reproduction. If those conditions are not present, he held, it would not
emerge at all, regardless of how much such a state of being is desired by particular
individuals. This is the reason that Marx devoted so much of his life to a detailed study
and analysis of existing capitalist relations and why he spends so little time elaborating
any kind of blueprint for the future.
That he said relatively little about the future, however, has been wrongly
interpreted to mean that he said nothing about the future. Moreover, it has been wrongly
interpreted to mean that one ought not to say anything about the future—presumably
because normative considerations and “oughts” are out of place for “socialists” and
“historical materialists.” The self-refuting nature of the proposition is self-evident but is
all too rarely reflected upon by its expositors. Normative considerations are as
6

Even when Marx, at the end of his life, entertained the possibility that a country
like Russia could experience a socialist revolution ahead of the West, he held that it
would not succeed unless the revolution was joined and supported by a proletarian
revolution in the industrially developed countries. He never held that Russia (or any other
country for that matter) could create a socialist society in the absence of such an
international transformation of social and production relations. See Karl Marx, “Draft
Letters to Vera Zasulich,” in Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and ‘The
Peripheries of Capitalism,” ed. Teodor Shanin (New York: Monthly Review Books,
1983), 97-126.
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inescapable as language itself, precisely because what ought to be is inscribed within
what is.7 Reflection about the future is impossible to avoid, nor is it desirable to avoid it–
at least so long as it has some grounding in reality. The inescapable nature of normative
statements about the future is evident from the content of Marx’s own work. Much as he
may have wanted to avoid speaking about the future, he often found it necessary to do so
precisely because elements of the future are contained within the very structure of the
present that he subjected to such careful and painstaking examination.
Marx definitely understood his role as delineating the “law of motion” of
capitalism towards its collapse, but the very fact that he analyzed it with this aim in mind
suggests that he approached his subject matter with a conception of the necessity for its
transcendence. If he did not have a specific kind of future in mind, why would he have
adopted the specific argumentative approach found in his greatest theoretical work,
Capital, which centers upon tracing out the processes toward dissolution of a given social
phenomena? Marx’s entire vantage point hinges on not just having, but also being
committed to, a specific vision of the future. Without it the very nature of his philosophic
project could not have developed as it did.
Does this mean that Marx finds himself in something of a bind—wanting to avoid
“utopian” speculation about the future, on the one hand, while not being able to avoid
7

“Many attempts have been made to deduce ‘ought’ from ‘is’ or to base it on
some kind of ‘ought-free’ being of facticity. These attempts are not based on the
presupposition that ‘is’ and ‘ought’ are opposed, but instead on the hypothesis that the
meaning of ‘is’ or ‘being’ is more universal or more fundamental than that of ‘ought,’
and that the latter can somehow emerge out of the former. . . . In this hypothesis, ‘ought’
and ‘is’ are simultaneously given—they belong together—but our awareness of this
belonging would require an awakening.” See Adriaan T. Peperzak, Elements of Ethics
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 46.
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analyzing the present on the basis of some (however general) conception of the
future, on the other? Can he successfully carry out the “scientific” and “materialist”
nature of his project while remaining wedded to a conception of how the future should or
ought to evolve? There is clearly a tension between these two dimensions of Marx’s
work, and it would take an additional study to unravel all of its implications. However, it
is possible that a famous analogy from an earlier philosopher may help illuminate how
Marx sought to navigate through this issue. I am referring to the Plato’s conception of
maieutics—of the philosopher as the midwife of knowledge.8
References and illusions to the new emerging from within the “womb” of the of
old constantly appear in Marx’s work. If there is one persisting and recurrent theme in
Marx’s analysis of capital, it is this:
The development of the productive forces of social labor is capital’s historic
mission and justification. For that very reason, it unwittingly creates the material
conditions for a higher form of production.9
The new society, for Marx, always emerges from within the womb of the old one. But
what does this say about Marx’s own standpoint vis-à-vis the object of his investigation?
He does not want to project a vision or concept of the new society from out of his head,
irrespective of the social conditions and relations of reality itself. To do so, after all,
would violate the very concept of freedom since it would entail imposing a conception

8

The concept is central to Plato’s Theaetetus. The image of midwifery (maieutics)
is mentioned 26 times in Plato’s dialogues, 24 times of them in the Theaetetus and once
in the Cratylus and Statesman. See Leonard Brandwood, A Word Index of Plato (Leeds:
W.S. Maney and Son, 1976), 544.
9
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upon the subject from outside. And yet neither can he avoid speaking about the future
in some way, since his conception of the future (in however general a form) has helped
inform his very approach the object of his investigation. He therefore adopts the approach
of elucidating the elements of the future that he finds contained within the present.
Marx therefore serves as a kind of midwife of the new society. He does not give
birth to the idea of socialism or communism; he elicits it from the movement of
capitalism itself. In other words, it is not only that Marx holds that the new society will
emerge from within the womb of the old one. It is that for this very reason he sees his
role as being no more than the midwife that assists its delivery. By elucidating
capitalism’s tendency toward dissolution and collapse, he is able to explicate the main
elements of that new society without falling prey to utopianism.
Given the tragic outcome of what has passed for “Marxism” in the past century,
how valid is such a methodological approach and perspective? In one sense it remains
extremely valuable, precisely because Marx’s maieutic approach avoids the voluntarism
and elitism that have marred far too many “experiments” at social transformation. The
tragedy of “Marxism” is that a philosophy that originated (at least in Marx’s hands) with
the aim of abolishing any social powers that operate behind the backs of the producers
ended up creating dictatorial regimes that imposed their will on individuals without even
a minimal degree of democratic control or public accountability. Nor was this only a
political problem: the economic plans of the state-controlled economies operated no less
outside the control of the producers, who were reduced to wage slavery (where they were

10
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not subjected to slavery of a more nefarious kind). The notion that a “new” society
can be imposed behind the backs of the producers and irrespective of specific social
conditions faced by that society has done enormous damage. It is not idle speculation to
presume that Marx would be the first to criticize this, since, as we have seen, he did
criticize it repeatedly in his disputes with a number of socialist tendencies of his era.
At the same time, precisely because we live in the shadow of the crimes
committed in Marx’s name, can the Marxian project be fully renewed if the conception of
a new society found in his writings remains only implicit? Is it not necessary to project a
much more explicit notion of what constitutes a viable notion of the alternative to
capitalism, given the enormous impact that the misrepresentation of the meaning of
socialism or communism has had—and continues to have—in our time? For while the
future may well be contained in the womb of the old, the extent to which it comes into
being or flowers depends on how well it is understood and nurtured. Although our age
may well be defined as a “birth-time of history,”11 we have also experienced all too many
stillbirths—in large part because so many have misconstrued the nature of what
constitutes a genuinely free, non-capitalist society. The history of the past 100 years
makes it painfully evident that while the material conditions for the existence of
socialism are a necessary condition for freedom, they are by no means sufficient. They

10

It has been widely estimated that between 12 and 15 million Russians labored
in the slave labor camps at any given during and after the forced industrialization
campaign in the USSR under Stalin.
11

“Besides, it is not difficult to see that ours is a birth-time and a period of
transition to a new era.” Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 6.
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can even lead to a new form of tyranny based on the despotic plan of capital, if the
effort to elicit the emancipatory forms contained within the womb of the old is
mishandled.
This study has aimed to show that a much deeper, richer, and more emancipatory
conception of a postcapitalist society is found in Marx’s work than has heretofore been
appreciated. This is not to say that Marx provides anything in the way of a detailed
answer as to what is a viable alternative to capitalism. His work does, however, contain
crucial conceptual markers and suggestions that can help a new generation chart its way
towards the future. Rather than wait upon “a sunburst, which, in one flash, illuminates the
features of the new world,”12 the realities of our time, in terms of its triumphs as well as
its tragedies, calls on us to develop a much more explicit and articulated alternative to
capitalism than appeared necessary in Marx’s time, and even to Marx himself. It is to this
end that this study is devoted.

12

Ibid., 7.

APPENDIX A
TRANSLATION OF MARX’S NOTES OF 1844 ON G.W.F. HEGEL’S
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT
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Note: Marx’s notes on the chapter “Absolute Knowledge” from Hegel’s
Phenomenology of Spirit have never before appeared in English translation. They were
composed at the time Marx wrote the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,
most likely as part of his work on the concluding part of the Third Manuscript, now
known as “Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole.” The original
can be found in Karl Marx-Friedrich Engels Gesamtausgabe [MEGA2] IV/2 (Berlin:
Dietz Verlag), 483-500. Pages numbers in the text (in brackets) are to the edition of the
Phenomenology used by Marx (G.W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, hrsg.
Johann Schulze [Berlin, 1841]), as supplied by the editors of MEGA2.
Marx’s notes consist mostly of copying out passages and paraphrasing parts of
this final chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology. Places where Marx inserts his own
comments are indicated by boldface. All emphases and elipses are by Marx. The
manuscript breaks off about two-thirds into the chapter on “Absolute Knowledge.” In
translating these notes, I have consulted the translation of Hegel’s Phenomenology by
A.V. Miller and J.B. Baillie without, however, necessarily committing myself to their
respective rendering of Hegel’s text.

In the Phenomenology, Absolute Knowledge thus becomes described as:
1) In revealed religion the actual self-consciousness of Spirit is not yet the
object of its consciousness; it and its moments fall within picture thinking and in the
form of objectivity. The content of this picture thinking is absolute spirit; it is still a
matter of transcending this mere form. [p. 574.]
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2) This surmounting of the object of consciousness . . . is not to be taken in a
one-sided manner, that the object showed itself returning into the self; rather, it is to be
taken specifically .. to not only mean that the object showed itself as returning into the
self, but above all that the object presents itself not only as a vanishing factor but as the
externalization of self-consciousness that posits thinghood. This externalization has not
merely a negative but a positive meaning, not merely for us or in itself but for selfconsciousness itself. The negative of the object, or its self-transcendence, has a positive
meaning, for on the one side it knows this nothingness of the object that it itself
externalizes; —for in this externalization it posits itself as the object or the object as the
inseparable unity of being-for-self. On the other hand, there is also this other moment,
that self-consciousness has equally transcended this externalization and objectification
as it has returned to itself, so that it is with itself in its otherness as such.
3) This is the movement of consciousness and herein is found the totality of its
moments. — It must have taken up a relation to the object in the totality of its
determinations and from the point of view of each of them. This totality of its
determinations means the object is in itself a spiritual being and it is so because in truth
consciousness apprehends each individual one of them as its own self, through the
spiritual relationship just mentioned. [p. 574-575.]
4) The object is thus the partly immediate being or the thing in general —
corresponding to its immediate consciousness. It is partly a becoming other of itself, its
relationship or essential being is for another and for itself; its determinateness —
corresponds to perception, partly to essential being in the form of a universal
corresponding to the understanding. (Being, Essence, Concept; Universality.
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Particularity. Individuality. Position. Negation. Negation of the Negation;
simple, differentiated, transcended opposition. Immediacy. Mediation. Selftranscending mediation. Being in itself. Externalization. Return to itself from
externalization. In-itself. For-itself. In-and-for-itself. Unity. Differentiation. Selfdifferentiation. Identity. Negation. Negativity. Logic. Nature. Spirit. Pure
Consciousness. Consciousness. Self-Consciousness. Concept. Judgment.
Syllogism.) It is then a whole, a syllogism, or the movement of universality through
particularization to individuality, as also the reverse movement, from the individual
through its transcendence or determination to the universal. — These are the three
determinations by which consciousness must know the object as itself. This knowing of
which we here speak is not that of the pure comprehension of the object; instead, this
knowing is to be taken only as aspects or moments of its coming to be in the manner
appropriate to consciousness as such, as moments of pure knowledge, the Concept
itself, in the form of shapes of consciousness. For this reason the object does not yet
appear in consciousness as the spiritual essence that we have spoken of; the relationship
of consciousness to it is not the view of this totality as such nor in its pure form as the
Concept. Instead, it is from one side a shape of consciousness in general, and from the
other side a number of moments that we bring together, in which the totality of the
moments of the object and the relations of consciousness to the object can be indicated
only as resolving itself into its moments. [p. 575-576.]
5) In regard to the object in so far as it is an immediacy, a being of indifference,
we saw Observing Reason seeking and finding itself in this indifferent thing—that is, as
equally conscious of its action being external to it, and as the object that is only known
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immediately .. its specific determination is expressed in the infinite judgment that the
being of the I is a thing. And moreover, the I is a being of sensuous immediacy; when
the I is called a soul it is in fact represented as a thing, but as something invisible,
intangible; in fact not as an immediate being, what one means by a thing. That nonspiritual judgment [2] is the concept of its spirituality. Now to see how this inner
sense becomes pronounced. The thing is I, that is, the thing transcended; in itself it is
nothing. It has meaning only in the relation, through the I and its connections with it.
— This moment comes forth for consciousness in pure insight and enlightenment.
Things are simply considered to be useful and are considered only in terms of their
utility. .. The cultivated self-consciousness, which has traversed the world of selfalienated spirit, has through its externalization produced the thing as its own self; it
therefore retains it in itself, and knows that the thing has no independence, that the
thing is essentially only being for an other; or, to provide complete expression to the
relationship, to what here constitutes the nature of the object, the thing exists as beingfor-self; it declares sense-certainty to be absolute truth; however, this being for self is
itself declared a vanishing moment which passes into its opposite, into a being that is at
the mercy of another. — But the knowledge of the thing is still not complete; it must
become known not only in terms of the immediacy of its being and determinateness,
but rather also as essence or inner being, as self. This is present in moral selfconsciousness. It knows its knowing to be what is absolutely essential or that being is
pure will and pure knowledge; it is nothing else except this willing or knowing. Any
other has only unessential being, that is, not being in and for itself, only its empty husk.
In so far as the moral consciousness lets determinate being go forth freely from the self,
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so too it takes its conception of the world back into itself once again. Finally, as
conscience it is no longer this ceaseless alteration of determinate being placed and
displaced in the self; instead, it knows that its determinate being as such is this pure
certainty of its own self; the objective element in which it puts itself for is this nothing
other than pure knowledge of itself by itself. [p. 576-77.]
6) These are the moments of which the reconciliation of spirit with its own
particular consciousness are composed. By themselves they are single and solitary, and
their spiritual unity alone provides the power of this reconciliation. The last of these
moments is this unity itself and binds them all together into itself. Spirit, which in its
determinate being is certain of itself, has for the element of its existence nothing else
but this very knowledge of itself. The declaration that what it does is in accordance
with the conviction of duty, it is the valuing (Money) of its action. — Action is the first
inherent division of the simple unity of the notion and the return from out of this
division. This first movement turns over into the second, in that this element of
recognition posits itself as simple knowledge of duty as against the distinction and
diremption that lie in action as such; in this way it constitutes a stubborn actuality
confronting action. In forgiveness we saw how this hardness surrenders and divests
itself. Actuality, therefore, as immediate determinate being, has no other significance
for self-consciousness than that of being a pure knowing; — likewise, as determinate
being or as relation, what is self-opposed is a knowing partly of this purely individual
self and partly of knowledge as a universal. Herein it is equally posited that the third
moment, the universality or essence, is valued only as knowledge for each of the two
sides that stand in opposition to one another. Finally, they put an end to the empty
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opposition that still remains and are the knowledge of I = I—this individual self that
is immediately a pure knowing or a universal. [p. 577-78.]
[3] How reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness comes about
is stated in two ways: 1) In religious spirit, 2) in the consciousness of itself as such. 1)
Reconciliation in the form of being-in-itself; 2) in the form of being-for-itself. In our
consideration of them they fall apart. The unity of the two sides is not exhibited: 1)
Spirit in itself, absolute content; 2) for itself, contentless form or as the aspect of selfconsciousness; 3) Spirit in and for itself. [p. 578-579.]
7) This unification in religion, as present in the return of picture thinking into
self-consciousness, but not however according to the intrinsic form, since the religious
aspect is the aspect of the in-itself, which the movement of self-consciousness stands
against. The unification belongs to this other aspect, which in contrast is the aspect of
reflection into self; it contains itself and its opposite, not only implicitly but explicitly
or in a developed and differentiated way. The content, as well as the other aspect of
spirit, as other, have been brought forth and is here in its completeness; the unity,
which is still lacking, is the simple unity of the concept. — It is as the particular shape
of consciousness, the beautiful soul, the shape of self-certain spirit, in which the
concept stands forth. Its realization firmly opposed, it is the one-sided shape that
vanishes into thin air but also positively externalizes itself and moves forward. Through
this realization, the determinateness of the concept is raised up against its fulfillment; its
self-consciousness attains the form of universality. The genuine concept is the knowing
of pure knowledge as its being, as essential being that this pure self-consciousness, is
equally a genuine object, for it is self-existent being itself. [p. 579-580.]
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The fulfillment of the concept is partly in the acts performed by Spirit, partly
in religion. .. In the prior shape the form is that of the self itself, in that it contains the
self-certain spirit that acts; the self realizes the life of absolute spirit. This shape is just
that of the simple concept, which relinquishes its eternal essence, it is there or it acts.
The diremption or coming forth out of its inwardness, lies in the purity of the concept,
for this is the absolute abstraction of negativity. Similarly, it has the element of its
being or reality in itself, for this is simple immediacy, which is being and existence as
well as essence; the former the negative, the latter positive thought itself. Hegel keeps
developing the tedious process of the beautiful soul, whose result is the pure
universality of knowledge, which is self-consciousness. — The concept connects the
content to itself; and the concept is the knowledge of the self's act within itself as all
that is essential and all existence, the knowledge of this subject as substance and of
substance as this knowledge of its own act. [p. 580-582.]
8) Spirit knows itself in the shape of spirit, comprehended knowing. Truth not
only is itself identical with certainty, but it also has the shape of certainty of its own
self or its determinate being, that is, in the form of comprehended spirit that knows
itself. Truth is the content, which in religion is still not identical with its certainty. This
equality however is obtained, since the concept has secured the shape of the self. In this
way that which is the very essence has become the element of existence, or has become
the form of objectivity for consciousness—that is, the concept. Spirit, appearing in this
element in consciousness, or produced by consciousness, is science. It is the pure
being-for-self of consciousness; it is I, that is this and no other I and is no less so an
immediately mediated or transcended universal I. It has a content that it differentiates
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from itself; for it is pure negativity or diremption; it is consciousness. This content in
its differentiation is the I itself, for it is the movement of transcending itself or the pure
negativity that the I is. In it the I as differentiated, is reflected into itself; the content is
grasped only when the I in its otherness is at one with itself. [p. 582-583.]
[4]This content, stated more specifically, is nothing other than the movement
just spoken of; for the content is the spirit that traverses its own self and does so for
itself as spirit, by the fact that it possesses the shape of the concept in its objectivity. As
regards the existence of this concept, science does not appear in time or reality until
spirit has attained this consciousness of itself. As spirit that knows what it is, it exists
not before and nowhere at all until after spirit has completed its work of overcoming its
incomplete shape so as to secure for consciousness the shape of its essence—and in this
way to equate its self-consciousness with its consciousness. See the continuation, p.
583 ff. Being that is hidden to itself is apparently only the certainty of itself. The
relationship of time to history. Comprehended spirit the annulling of time.
Experience, Knowledge, transformation of substance into subject, the object of
consciousness into the object of self-consciousness, that is, in as much as the
transcended object or concept. It is only as this reflection of itself into itself that it is
the truth of spirit. In so far as spirit is of necessity this self-differentiation, its intuited
whole appears over against this simple self-consciousness; and since the whole is
differentiated, it is differentiated into its intuited pure concept—into time and the
content of the in-itself. Substance as subject involves the at first inner necessity to
represent in itself what it inherently is as spirit. The completed objective presentation is
equally the reflection of substance or its development into the self. Consequently,
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unless spirit completes itself in itself, has not done so as world spirit, it cannot reach
its completion as self-conscious spirit. Therefore, the content of religion expresses
earlier in time than science what spirit is; but science alone is the true knowledge of
itself. The movement, the form of its knowing as such [p. 583-585.]
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